Newton station’s blackest day
PAUL STEPHEN recalls the Lanarkshire rail crash 25 years ago this month, which prompted British Rail to revise its decision to single many stretches of track, and to introduce new risk assessment techniques
Newton Junction is one of the busiest railway crossroads in Scotland, and a key focal point for train services in the Strathclyde area. It is also the location of a fatal head-on collision between two local stopping services, that occurred 25 years ago this month on a newly singled stretch of track near to the west end of Newton station.
Remarkably, it was the third serious incident in as many years to occur at a single-lead junction, following similar crashes at Bellgrove (east Glasgow) in March 1989 and then at Hyde North station (Greater Manchester) in August 1990. And it was to throw British Rail’s policy of rationalising junctions in this manner firmly under the spotlight.
Four people lost their lives in the Newton rail crash, and a further 22 were injured. The incident prompted BR to carry out a risk assessment of all its single-lead junctions, resulting in the immediate reinstatement of double track at Newton and in several other similar locations.
Handling over 350 train movements a day, Newton marks the point where the West Coast Main Line ( WCML) meets Glasgow’s busy Cathcart Circle and Argyle routes, approximately six and a half miles southeast of the city centre.
On the Cathcart Circle, a half-hourly ScotRail service operates from Glasgow Central along the Kirkhill branch to Newton, where it terminates before reversing to make the return journey.
On the Argyle Line, two services call at Newton each hour running between Glasgow Central and Motherwell, having left the WCML to follow the route via Hamilton.
The two fast lines of the WCML that run adjacent to the station host a daily procession of Pendolinos and Super Voyagers - up to three Virgin Trains services rush past every hour in each direction, connecting Glasgow with Birmingham and London Euston.
For passengers on these non-stop intercity services Newton’s platforms pass by in a flash - partly due to the obvious distraction of being only a few minutes into (or from the end of) their journeys, but also because of the increased line speeds achieved here following the remodelling of the junction in June 1991.
The £ 5 million scheme had been commissioned to improve the transit time through Newton by simplifying the layout and removing redundant sidings, while the singling of junctions had become a widely used method to boost line speeds (owing to the reduced number of points they required). It also offered the added benefit to BR of lower maintenance costs, compared with the doubletrack junctions they replaced.
Although not found to be the cause of the crash, it was made clear in the subsequent Health & Safety Executive (HSE) investigation that the Newton crash of July 21 1991 would not have been possible under the previous double-track layout.
Instead, the investigation concluded that “on the balance of probabilities” the evidence pointed to a starting signal being passed at danger (SPAD) on Newton’s westbound platform, leading to the catastrophic impact with a train approaching from the opposite direction.
The westbound train was the 2155 NewtonGlasgow Central service, formed of a refurbished Class 303 electric multiple unit and driven by a man with 43 years' experience-
Some blame was apportioned to BR after it was criticised for not applying effective risk assessment techniques to its decision to single Newton Junction.
Reginald McEwan.
As it accelerated away from Newton and into the single-track section that would lead to the Kirkhill branch, McEwan’s train was met by the approaching 2055 Balloch-Motherwell service driven by David Scott. His Class 314 had just left the WCML and was coasting into Newton station, where it would pick up the Up Hamilton line.
The impact was estimated at a combined speed of 60mph. Both drivers were killed instantly, as were two passengers as the Class 303 overrode the buffer area of the Class 314 and the trains telescoped into one another. The leading vehicles of both trains were largely destroyed and would need wrenching apart during the recovery operation. Of the 22 injured passengers, four were detained in hospital.
With single-track working a long-established and ordinarily safe feature of railway operations, the subsequent HSE inquiry focused on the condition of the trains, the integrity of the signalling system, the actions of the signaller, and BR’s design of the junction. Increased focus was applied to the latter, after it emerged that a SPAD incident had occurred at the same location barely a month earlier, although thankfully without the same grievous outcome.
Subsequent testing and inspection found the signalling equipment, pointwork and rolling stock to have all been in good working order at the time of the collision. It was impossible to determine the exact state of signalling at the crucial moment, due to the failure of the data logger at Motherwell Signalling Centre to record it, but inspectors discovered two sets of points that McEwan's train for Glasgow
had passed over to be in reverse and run through, indicating that the route had not been set to the Kirkhill branch.
The signaller, Edward Dillon, was fully absolved of any blame after it was calculated that he would have had no more than 17 seconds to react between the time he was able to observe on his panels that McEwan’s train had left Newton and moved past a red signal, to the moment of impact. These 17 seconds would have needed to encompass Dillon’s reaction time, the time required to radio both trains and speak to both drivers, the drivers’ reaction times, and finally the trains’ braking distances. It was agreed that nothing could have been achieved by Dillon to significantly mitigate what was to follow. The inquiry acknowledged that this accident would almost certainly have been prevented if both trains had been equipped with Automatic Train Protection (ATP). BR was already committed to introducing ATP on the network, and was trailing it on the Chiltern Line and Great Western Main Line in 1991, so no recommendation from the HSE was needed in this area. Nevertheless, so blame was apportioned to BR after it was criticized for not applying effective risk assessment techniques to its decision to single Newton Junction. Although the inquiry agreed that the safety of any junction layout would always depend on drivers observing red signals (or ATP acting as a failsafe), the margin of safety was deemed to be much lower when locating a single-lead junction past the ends of station
platforms. Investigators found a perceived risk that a driver waiting for a guard’s clearance to leave a platform might be more likely to forget to check the starting signal.
One of the main recommendations of the accident report was therefore that BR developed, in consultation with the HSE, new risk assessment techniques for proposed schemes involving single-track working.
The report also recommended that double track be reinstated at Newton, although it stopped short of calling for an end to singlelead junctions, by concluding that they had long been safely signalled on the basis of long- established principles.
Before the end of the 1990s there would be three more fatal accidents to occur from SPADs and deemed preventable by ATP - at Watford in August 1996, Southall in September 1997, and most infamously at Ladbroke Grove in October 1999.
Alongside Newton, each served as a graphic reminder of the undeniable need to roll out a mandatory network-wide train protection system, which finally came with the Railway Safety Regulations 1999 that specified the use of TPWS (Train Protection and Warning System).
Network Rail now intends to replace this with more capable in-cab ETCS (European Train Control System), beginning with its installation on Crossrail next year, to make crashes such as Newton firmly a thing of the past.
The impact was estimated at a combined speed of 60mph. Both drivers were killed instantly, as were two passengers as the Class 303 overrode the buffer area of the Class 314 and the trains telescoped into one another.