Leeds Trolleybus: What it offered, and why it went wrong

The Leeds Trolleybus scheme received government approval in July 2012 - a £ 250 million scheme backed with 75% of public money. It was described by its promoters as “similar to those in Athens and Lyon”.

To the north, the route ran via the A660 Otley Road, through Headingley and the university belt with a park and ride at Bodington on Leeds outer ring road, although extending beyond to Holt Park.

The southern route was intended to serve new commercial developments, running to Stourton with a park and ride by the M621 (Leeds’ urban motorway). There were also plans for an eastern route, running via Quarry Hill to St James’s Hospital.

Where possible, there were to be segregated busways and bus-only lanes, with buses given preference at traffic lights and junctions. Proponents of trolleybuses claimed they offered all the environmental benefits of trams, but without the need for entire roads to be dug up for track laying.

“A new system can be installed in a fifth of the time and for a fifth of the expense of a tramway,” its promoters claimed, adding that “virtually all new trolleybuses can be expected to last 30 years”.

The rubber tyres system proposed didn’t need “a massive tram track infrastructure” that “rigidly imposes constraints on other traffic”. Route changes, temporary adjustments and operational flexibility would have been “much easier”.

However, few in Leeds swallowed this sales pitch. In fact, there was uproar - especially in Headingley - about the threat to trees and buildings. The scheme provoked 1,700 written objections, more than enough to convince Planning Inspector Martin Whitehead and Secretary of State for Transport Patrick McLoughlin that the scheme was a dud.

McLoughlin found many reasons for rejecting trolleybus. Among these were:

The scheme would improve public transport in a comparatively small area of Leeds, but could result in worse public transport elsewhere.

There is only slight evidence it would serve the most disadvantaged areas.

Overhead cables, more street clutter, and the loss of green spaces and trees would damage the natural and built environment.

The scheme would not appreciably improve access to employment because of too few stops, the limited places it would serve, and its “comparatively meagre integration” with other public transport. (For instance, it wouldn’t link up with the bus station.)

In sharing “significant segments” of the route with other traffic, the buses could be susceptible to congestion and other delays. It would create longer queues at some junctions.

It could jeopardise the commercial viability of the existing bus service.

Demand for the planned park and rides had been over-estimated.

The promoters had not fully considered more appropriate routes for a rapid transit system.

Impact on air quality, including carbon emissions, would be negative due to the use of grid electricity and the effects on other traffic.

Trolleybuses would share parts of the route with pedestrians, either slowing the vehicles down or endangering people on foot.

The A660 is ill-suited for articulated vehicles.

Estimated journey times are optimistic without any evidence to back these up.

There is a high degree of uncertainty as to whether the scheme would be viable operationally.