Birth of a railway
Former TfL man IAN BROWN CBE offers an exclusive insight into how Crossrail came to be
Former TfL man IAN BROWN CBE gives an exclusive insight into how Crossrail came to be.
To get one of the largest rail projects in Europe funded, planned and delivered required an auspicious alignment of the stars.
The concept of an east-to-west London railway had been around since 1945, although all we had to show for the first 55 years was a large, allegedly 100 metre-wide set of archived files kept in storage at Eastbourne Terrace, in London. Mercifully, nobody was injured when the archive burnt down, but the files were lost.
To get one of the largest rail projects in Europe funded, planned and, so far, successfully delivered required an auspicious alignment of the stars, and that happened around the year 2000. Although London Underground had delivered several Tube lines over the last 50 years, notably the Victoria Line and the Jubilee Line Extension to Stratford, there were few developments in the area of bringing together the Underground and National Rail networks in a strategic way.
I learned three key lessons while working with the Docklands Light Railway (DLR team). I would contend they are still fundamental to the rail industry in terms of delivering rail projects, both new extensions and capacity upgrades.
Lesson 1: DLR was initially managed through legal contracts. This did not work, but what did work was the establishment of a strong client team, with serious engineering and project skills, to oversee contracts. We had to convince certain bodies, particularly the Treasury, that we were capable of delivering projects on time, within budget and with the required outputs.
Lesson 2: Development of the DLR, as
later with Crossrail, had to be for a purpose, and for a customer. In this case, the purpose was the economic regeneration of Docklands with the London Docklands Development Corporation and the Government as stakeholders.
Lesson 3: The Government wanted to privatise the DLR. We came up with our own version of this - the Concession Model. This achieved the benefits of competition to operate the railway, but we undertook the projects (either directly or through concessions), bought the new trains and, critically, oversaw the signalling control system upgrades. We specified the train services and, under direction of the Mayor, set the fares. This was a hugely successful model in terms of delivering a very reliable railway with excellent customer satisfaction. The Concession Model was later applied to the London Overground, again hugely popular, and will be applied to Crossrail.
The Greater London Authority Act 1999 is the Act of Parliament that established the Greater London Authority, the London Assembly and the first Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone.
Two effects of this Act were necessary for the evolution of the Crossrail project. The first was the onus on the Mayor to plan transport development for the next 20 years. The previous annual funding approach had only hindered the development of infrastructure projects. But the long-term approach meant looking at the entire transport network, including main line services.
The strategic choice for Livingstone as newly elected mayor was to determine what sort of London to go for, in terms of population and economic growth. The choice was between a stable economy and no population growth, or a growth of population by over one million people in this new planning timeframe. It was not a difficult decision, but there was one big ramification: the need to provide more rail infrastructure to accommodate a 20% increase in demand over the entire transport network in London, including the alreadycrowded Underground network.
The second effect of the GLA Act was to set up Transport for London, with a rail and road planning capability to deliver an expanding and integrated transport system. TfL, in conjunction with the Mayor, went about this with a combination of road traffic restraint - the Congestion Charge, Underground upgrades, and the provision of a rational and complementary bus service. The big question was how to expand rail capacity overall by 20%
The first London Transport Commissioner, Bob Kiley, was imported by Livingstone from New York’s Mass Transit Authority, initially to fight the Government’s ill-fated ‘Public Private Partnership’. As a concept it had some merit, but it failed because of a lack of understanding about the condition of the antiquated Tube system and what it would cost to bring it up to scratch.
In New York, Kiley had watched the catchment area of Manhattan expanding well beyond the extremities of the New York Subway system. In London, the Tube has done the same. The difference between these two cities is that in the US the national rail operators couldn’t get rid of suburban rail operation quick enough, which led to transit agencies running suburban rail operations. In London, the Government franchises these operations, so rail providers can make profit. Furthermore, the Government was, and still is to some extent, very reluctant to give these rail operations over to a Labour mayor.
The integrated vision was the ‘Electron Diagram’ (see below). This required a new east-to-west railway (Crossrail), a north-tosouth railway ( Thameslink), and an orbital rail network, well beyond the Circle Line, with strategic interchanges, so that many services could avoid Central London. The London Overground established TfL as capable of providing a modern, cost-effective rail service using the DLR Concession Model. It also established that TfL is capable of main line rail projects, as a result of the East London Line project. This was a combination of an Underground conversion, restoration of a former BR alignment (the Broad Street
Line), some new-build and, as later with Crossrail, integration with the main line rail network at both ends, north and south.
The orbital route was a cost-effective way of providing a new line, largely by using existing infrastructure round London. But the missing element was the east-to-west railway. Early ideas on Crossrail stations were modified to accommodate the ‘Electron Diagram’ integrated vision. In the east, Whitechapel was identified as a strategic interchange, now modelled to be one of the busiest Crossrail stations, while Old Oak Common in the west would be the big interchange, with its links to Overground and HS2.
The scene was set to promote Crossrail as an essential component of London’s integrated transport plan. In strategic terms it was essential, but it had to be justified with a strong business case. This meant choosing the optimum route and maximising the benefits. Standard rail business cases ( benefit:cost ratios, or BCRs) ensure that rail investment cases are difficult to justify.
The DfT will only consider a proposal if the benefits are twice the costs in strictly defined transport terms. Crossrail would relieve congestion on the Underground Central Line, which is a good thing. In these terms, however, it detracts from the Central Line, so is technically a ‘bad thing’. But that’s also a bit like saying that reducing road congestion reduces fuel tax revenue to the Treasury.
The breakthrough to surpass the valid business case threshold came from the GLA, not TfL. The proposal was to include Crossrail in the balance sheet for the city, as opposed to treating it as an isolated transport project. The principal business segment for London in terms of the generation of wealth is finance and business services. To be effective, and to develop, these businesses need to be concentrated into areas, namely the City and Canary Wharf.
This concentration and sharing of skills and business methods accelerates growth, and is referred to as the ‘Agglomeration Effect’. A city such as London can only survive if good transport is in place, to bring all those people together every working day, at specific times. The Crossrail project was therefore justified against the background of serving both Liverpool Street and Canary Wharf.
Although the central core between Paddington and Liverpool Street was well defined and partly safeguarded in terms of planning consents, what to do at each end was a matter of fierce debate between TfL and DfT. But it was all the better for this in thrashing out the optimum route solution. I would argue that Thameslink would also have been better, had it been subject to a similar approach.
In the east, there were three principal contenders for the route; the originally envisaged high-density, traditional corridor to Shenfield, a corridor north of the Thames through Barking Reach, and an extension of what was the North London Line under the river to Woolwich and Gravesend (and possibly Ebbsfleet.)
I recall arguing with Livingstone that he could not have all three, and that having two branches was preferable. He eventually went for Shenfield and Gravesend, although following a meeting with then Secretary of State Alistair Darling, this was cut back to Abbey Wood, where the Crossrail alignment joined the North Kent Line. I don’t think Darling had ever been to Abbey Wood when he made that decision.
Barking Reach was to be served by a DLR Crossrail feeder to Custom House. TfL has since replaced this with a cheaper extension of the Gospel Oak to Barking Line to Barking Reach, and it’s not related to Crossrail.
In the west, deciding on the route was much easier. We all agreed on the Great Western Main Line and also Heathrow (for economic reasons, to provide a direct connection to the City and Canary Wharf.) In terms of where a second branch could be built, Richmond was a serious contender due to its important interchange with the Central Line at Turnham Green. It also offered a range of options of connecting with the Chiltern Line and onto the West Coast Main Line, or the Watford DC Line.
There was much political resistance to Crossrail from Richmond, due to a marginal
The model is demonstrating that Britain can do huge rail projects, and leading to increased Government focus on building more infrastructure.
reduction in the number of District Line trains serving it. The favourite remains a connection onto the West Coast Main Line, to allow direct access onto Crossrail straight into Central London, the City and Canary Wharf. Although this got timed out of the first stage of Crossrail, it remains an aspiration. The effect of this in facilitating HS2 construction at Euston Station could be very positive.
There were many other aspirations from main line advocates to extend Crossrail to Stansted, to Colchester and to Basingstoke. In business case terms and, interestingly, the shortest proposal was a Tube service confined to Paddington to Stratford. It was the cheapest option, but it offered the lowest benefits and the worst BCR. The more extensive the Crossrail routes, the higher the income, but not the wider benefits described, and also the higher the cost and operational complexity.
DfT and TfL eventually agreed on Shenfield/Abbey Wood to Heathrow and Maidenhead (and indeed Reading, when the funding of reconstructing Reading station and the electrification beyond Maidenhead had been sorted out).
The Government recognised that Crossrail was key to London’s development and would contribute to the UK economy, and as such treated Crossrail as a Project of National Significance, so treating the funding of the project as, what is described in theatrical terms, ‘a three-way box office split’. Capital funding would come from central government, from London’s government - including business rates, and the fare box, in roughly equal proportions. All this was on the proviso that we convince the Treasury we were capable of delivering the project on time and within budget, and with the specified results.
We did convince the Treasury that we could deliver Crossrail, using the three principles described. The Government stipulated additional measures to ensure they got what they were paying for - an enabling project to sustain the London economy.
The three most significant requirements were:
To set up a separate company - Cross London Rail Links Ltd, to define a detailed route and to obtain the necessary powers. The Crossrail Act would be passed (in 2008) to make provision for the new railway. Operation using the model described was to be through TfL, but embedded in the Crossrail project.
The imposition of ‘intervention points’, whereby if the project exceeded planned costs at a series of defined stages, the Government could reclaim the project and either run it itself or cancel it. This is not a particularly practicable approach, but it has conditioned Crossrail to keep rigidly to the budget, unlike so many other rail projects
The appointment of ‘independent engineers’. This would be a small independent team physically making investigations around the project and providing the sponsors with independent advice about delivery, both physical and financial. This gives the Treasury confidence that the project is running to plan and has proved to be a good investment.
TfL had requirements too, particularly in the area of ‘on network’ costs; for example the Network Rail work. As Network Rail is regulated by the Government (although delivery of these significant works responds to Crossrail) the DfT carries the cost risk here if there are any overruns. Many of these works will be of benefit to multiple users, such as with the electrification to Maidenhead/Reading, the second flyover at Airport Junction, the Acton freight dive-under on the Western section and the refurbishment of the Great Eastern lines from Liverpool Street to Shenfield.
The Crossrail team, led by Keith Berry, was successful in getting the powers. The project has a clear purpose, is well defined and although undergoing the full rigours of the Parliamentary Bill procedure, has consistently enjoyed huge support from its stakeholders. Obtaining powers for such a huge project would be impossible through the Transport and Works Act procedure, although this process is adequate for relatively small schemes, such as DLR extensions. But for Crossrail, a full Act of Parliament was necessary.
The Parliamentary process gave Crossrail Ltd time to set up its delivery phase. The single focus approach has worked. Some may consider the caution and the control methods as rather heavy-handed, but the model is demonstrating that Britain can do huge rail projects, and leading to increased Government focus on building more infrastructure.
The last stage is a tricky one - turning the project into a live railway. TfL has a good model and the management skills to achieve this, having served its apprenticeship with the DLR and London Overground.