WCML upgrade
In the final part of his look at the West Coast Route Modernisation, PHILIP HAIGH recounts how the Strategic Rail Authority rescued the project and examines the railway that Network Rail eventually delivered
How the West Coast Route Modernisation programme went wrong, and how the Strategic Rail Authority rescued the project.
If ‘Black Diamond Day’ in December 1999 had been bad for the West Coast Route Modernisation, October 1 2001 was worse. An outline deal signed by Virgin’s Richard Bowker and Railtrack Chairman John Robinson ditched 140mph running and deferred PUG1’s 125mph railway by 12 months to May 2003.
Within a week ( but not directly connected), Railtrack was in administration after Government withheld vital payments via its agency - the Strategic Rail Authority. Around the same time, the project’s general manager, Tony Fletcher, quit to join consultant WS Atkins.
The October 1 deal is known as the Hartwell Agreement. In it, Railtrack agrees to pay Virgin £ 330 million compensation.
Virgin and Railtrack formally presented Hartwell to government on October 12 2001, but all sides had already talked so government knew of the proposed deal before it applied to the High Court to have Railtrack put into administration.
Hartwell puts forward a range of improvements known as Project Omega. They include allowing Virgin CrossCountry to use London King’s Cross to run Teesside trains via Nottingham and York and Portsmouth-Feltham (for Heathrow)-Nottingham using Class 220 Voyagers. Omega would have extended Virgin’s West Coast and CrossCountry franchises by five years and added a fifth car to 38 Voyagers to make the entire fleet consistent.
In the event, the outline deal was never finalised because Railtrack, now in administration, was not in a position to do so. Hartwell fell by the wayside, but it was clear that something would need to replace the shattered remnants of PUG2. This fell to the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA).
Out on the tracks, Railtrack’s mediumoutput ballast cleaners finally start work, 18 months late after becoming snagged in approvals processes. Railtrack unveils a series of 18 consecutive weekend closures between Milton Keynes and Hemel Hempstead from August 10 2002 and a series of weekend closures between May and September 2003, to allow it to rebuild Bourne End Junction.
Brighter news comes with Virgin’s launch at Euston on April 30 2002 of its Class 390 Pendolino electric multiple units (EMUs), built by Alstom and assembled in Washwood Heath, Birmingham. Class 390s replace the Class 86s and Mk 2 coaches Virgin uses between London, Birmingham and Wolverhampton, and the ‘87’ and Mk 3 combination working Anglo-Scottish trains.
Class 390s consist of nine-coaches, including driving cars with First and Standard Class and a shop from which passengers could buy refreshments and magazines. The trains might no longer be running at 140mph, but they will still tilt and, even at 125mph, cut journey times. Services away from electrified lines - for example, to North Wales - would be Class 390s hauled by Class 57 diesels or Voyager dieselelectric multiple units built by Bombardier.
Pendolino’s launch is followed quickly by Network Rail rescuing Railtrack from administration, and then a deal in which the SRA pays Virgin £106m compensation for Railtrack’s failure to deliver PUG2.
Richard Bowker is now the SRA’s chief executive, and he puts forward a clear plan for solving WCRM’s problems. It will not be easy - there’s a considerable amount to do and it will need careful supervision. However, his SRA is in a position to pull different parts together and plan for the whole railway, rather than just its high-speed operator as Railtack had done.
The SRA also shelves many weekend possessions in favour of longer closures, just as Tony Fletcher had suggested (to operators’ disgust) in late 2000. The SRA reckons the blockades it proposes could save £ 4 billion from WCRM’s bill and cut two years from the schedule.
The first beneficiary would be CreweKidsgrove, which would be electrified to provide a diversionary route in early 2003. Winter 2002-03 would close Crewe-Cheadle
Hulme with Virgin running via Stoke instead. A 17-week blockade in summer 2003 would have renewal gangs replacing trains between Colwich and Cheadle Hulme through Stoke. Euston-Milton Keynes would close for nine days around 2003’s August Bank Holiday.
The sense in electrifying Crewe-Kidsgrove becomes clear when the SRA announces that Crewe-Norton Bridge will close between September 28 2003 and January 4 2004. All lines will be closed at weekends with one northbound line open on weekdays and a southbound line open at peak times. At other times, trains will run via Kidsgrove to rejoin the main West Coast Main Line at Norton Bridge.
Having lambasted Fletcher a couple of years earlier, operators are now in the mood to accept the SRA’s methods, doubtless realising the trouble that WCRM was in. The SRA follows its switch to blockades with a draft strategy to complete the upgrade. Published in October 2002, it would be confirmed the following summer after extensive consultation.
Bowker’s influence extends to specifying franchises, so he can make sure that, for example, when the West Coast Strategy calls for high-performance 100mph EMUs for interurban services that is what the inter-urban operator (today London Midland) delivers.
He can also deliver Manchester-London trains via the Hope Valley and Midland Main Line, to provide an alternative route during all those blockades in 2003 and 2004. Thus HSTs ran under the banner Project Rio, reminding a few of the long-gone Midland Pullman.
Bowker’s draft strategy proposes a 125mph tilt WCML with 4tph London-Birmingham offering 1hr 26min journeys from 2004, London-Stoke-Manchester taking 2hr 11mins from winter 2004, Glasgow in 4hr 33mins from 2006, 80% more long-distance passenger trains and 60%-70% more freight.
Not everything the SRA does meets approval, however. Its idea to demolish Rugby station and its brand new canopies was rejected, for example.
November 7 2002 witnesses the first Pendolino to arrive at London Euston under its own power, with Virgin planning to introduce the type to London-Manchester services from the following January 27. The type’s arrival in London shows that it interfered with signalling, and this delays service introduction. Railtrack (it hadn’t quite disappeared) unveils the West Coast’s first 125mph speed sign for a six-mile stretch of track between Penkridge and Bushbury Junction.
But if Pendolinos are causing problems at Euston, they’re flying elsewhere with 390002 reaching 140mph on test between Rugby and Nuneaton. Richard Bowker doesn’t rule out 140mph running when he unveils his West Coast strategy that June, but notes that it will need ETCS signalling for which there are no real plans. This left Saltley’s control centre
At Stoke, Network Rail appears unimpressed with Railtrack’s work - it proposes a further closure to remodel Railtrack’s layout, which NR has decided is “steam age” and not fit for Stoke’s new role as the main route between Manchester and London.
in limbo - it was built but had no role (it would later become a conventional signalling centre). Bowker’s strategy also puts a £ 9.9bn price tag on the WCRM project.
South Manchester continues to cause problems. Railtrack’s faith in signalling never used before in Britain sums up (on a smaller scale) the problems of the West Coast’s upgrade. It should not have been difficult to remodel track layouts and replace signalling controlled from boxes that dated from 1884.
The SRA proposes a two-stage rebuild for Stockport, with the first in September 2004 and the second the following summer. However, Network Rail axes Ansaldo’s new signalling for Stockport in late 2003, in favour of conventional SSI. This meant it has to remove any Ansaldo point motors already installed, because they can’t be controlled by SSI.
Later, it admits that it will extend the life of Stockport’s five ageing signal boxes, and it spends some of its 2004 summer Stockport blockade removing trackwork installed three years earlier but never commissioned and never used. Trains today still run under the control of those five boxes that should have gone 15 years ago.
The shift towards longer blockades paints a mixed picture. Summer 2003’s closure through Stoke-on-Trent delivered cash savings that were then spent on doing extra work. It prompts Virgin Chief Executive Chris Green to suggest that closures through winter 2004 and spring 2005 could deliver track renewals in Scotland more efficiently. However, Stoke’s closure overran by a week, following failures with on-track plant that was not used to working so intensively over a nine-week closure.
Meanwhile, Bowker is not having everything his own way. Just as Railtrack Chief Executive Gerald Corbett had to battle with Rail Regulator Tom Winsor, so Bowker now has to cope with Winsor’s views. The regulator remains unhappy with West Coast spending, and suggests deferring or cancelling work to save £1bn. Winsor also suggests postponing work at Rugby, Nuneaton and through the Trent Valley to 2009 rather than delivering it in 2007-08, again to save money.
Out on the tracks, NR needs emergency possessions in August 2003 to remove faulty components installed in uncommissioned crossovers at Ledburn Junction, while wiring teams complete work on Crewe-Kidsgrove a week earlier than planned.
NR completes its Crewe-Norton Bridge work on time in January 2004, despite starting a week late, but also warns that Rugby and Trent Valley work may be delayed. And James Martin quits as WCRM director, replaced by Bechtel’s Tom McCarthy.
In early 2004, 30 miles of track is cleared for 125mph running between Hanslope Junction and Rugby, giving Virgin 50 miles on which to stretch the legs of its new trains (it will have 200 miles by mid-summer). Track gangs have installed 472km (293 miles) of rail, 645km of sleepers and 474km of ballast. Teams have installed 774 overhead line runs, erected 418 signalling cabinets and 1,345 signalling units, as well as 640km of fibre optic cables and 119 TASS balises. The latter are vital to control tilt on Virgin’s trains and supervise speeds.
The SRA publishes an update in April 2004 revealing that costs have fallen from £ 9.9bn to £ 7.6bn, chiefly by revising plans for longer delivery following ORR’s earlier work. Savings also came from adjusting scope, which included dropping requirements for 125mph on sections of line where that speed would be impossible for trains to achieve as a result of their stopping patterns. In other areas, the SRA reversed cuts that Railtrack had made, particularly in reinstating plans to install an autotransformer OLE system that would be more efficient and better able to cope with the route’s higher power demands.
The SRA used its April update to remind people what the West Coast Main Line was. For passengers, it was a high-speed passenger link between London, the West Midlands, Manchester, Merseyside, Lancashire, Cumbria, North Wales and Scotland; a key part of the commuter network for London and regional conurbations; and a regional express network linking those conurbations. For freight, the WCML was the route on which over half of Britain’s freight trains ran, heavily used by container and coal trains.
Maintenance featured in the SRA’s update as it considered the best balance between
weekday and weekend work. The modernised West Coast included heavier UIC60 rail that was expected to last longer and need less maintenance. With a four-track railway south of Crewe, maintenance could be done at night to increase weekend travel opportunities. North of Crewe, the railway was twin-track and carried extensive freight on weekday nights. Here, the SRA suggested that longer weekend possessions might be more appropriate.
Her Majesty’s Railway Inspectorate grants Virgin permission to run tilting trains from May 2004. They start on June 14 2004, and Prime Minister Tony Blair formally launches Virgin’s tilting 125mph timetable on September 2004. This marks completion of the first stage of the West Coast Main Line’s modernisation. The new timetable cuts 35 minutes from London-Manchester and 18 minutes from London-Birmingham.
In summer 2004 preliminary work starts at Rugby, where the SRA has decided to keep the station and canopies. Work should be finished in 2008. At Stoke, Network Rail appears unimpressed with Railtrack’s work - it proposes a further closure to remodel Railtrack’s layout, which NR has decided is “steam age” and not fit for Stoke’s new role as the main route between Manchester and London. In remodelling the tracks through Stoke, the SRA decided to close Etruria station because it stood in the way of a faster alignment.
Nuneaton’s new island platforms are brought into use and a track closure started to remove level crossings between Rugby and
With projects generally progressing well, the West Coast Route Modernisation was generating few headlines. That all changed over Christmas 2007 when Rugby’s remodelling overran. This project - now costing £415m - should have taken four days, but took eight. Virgin described NR’s work as shambolic.
Birmingham to allow 125mph running.
Four-tracking the Trent Valley will take considerable work, with earthworks needed to squeeze the extra tracks into the space Network Rail has. NR reckons it will cost £ 300m, as it unveils a plan that will feature work over summer 2005 and 2006 for completion in summer 2007 and use from December 2008’s timetable.
There will also be a series of 37 weekend closures through 2005, to renew track between Preston and Carlisle and Gretna-Carstairs. This generates another £ 300m bill.
Nevertheless, NR is making progress and Virgin is running its new timetable, although it complains that track and signalling is not reliable.
Yet there’s more work to do. The three years from 2005 will include projects to improve line speeds from Crewe to Glasgow and Liverpool, Rugby and Nuneaton remodelling, Crewe-Cheadle Hulme, Trent Valley fourtracking, Euxton, Weaver and Wigan area improvements, Bletchley’s resignalling, and remodelling at Stafford and Milton Keynes.
December 2005 brings another closure for Crewe-Cheadle Hulme, planned to last three months and following a four-month shutdown in early 2004. This time it’s for resignalling which had been planned for 2004 but could not be done because of delays accepting Ansaldo’s kit.
NR sticks by its March 26 2005 reopening date, but later has to admit that it might be May before trains run again. The reason? Problems with Ansaldo’s kit. May turns into June and RAIL 537 publishes a picture of work continuing to rebuild platforms four days after the line should have reopened.
More details emerge of Rugby’s remodelling. It will bring 125mph running in place of 75mph, at a cost of £190m. The project will also deliver a new island platform and refurbish Rugby’s flyovers (there had been talk of demolishing and rebuilding the northern flyover). Milton Keynes generates a £ 200m bill for work that will add a platform and a third northbound line.
Cranes lift a bridge into place over the River Tame as four-tracking work continues, and Easter 2006 brings major work with 19km of track upgraded.
Virgin continues to pursue speed and suggests 135mph trains through the Trent Valley, something NR then confirms it’s examining. Separately the Department for Transport ponders building a bypass line around Stafford and longer Pendolinos. The Department is to take on a more direct role
with NR and the route modernisation as it disbands the SRA from 2006. Bowker had left in 2004.
With projects generally progressing well, the West Coast Route Modernisation was generating few headlines. That all changed over Christmas 2007 when Rugby’s remodelling overran. This project - now costing £415m - should have taken four days, but took eight. Virgin described NR’s work as shambolic. NR had asked for an extra day (December 31) after high winds postponed work, but realised around midday that it would not be enough.
There was a shortage of overhead line staff, not helped by NR running several other projects over the same holiday. Detailed investigations revealed that ten to 15 of 60 specific people had not reported for work.
Regulator ORR fined NR £14m for the overrun and concluded that the company’s 2008 plans were not robust. Its investigation found that NR had enough OLE linesmen at Rugby but not enough supervisors, with the result that only a third of the planned work was done.
NR had the names of staff booked to work, but could not explain why they hadn’t appeared. ORR explained that on December 31 eight agency staff did not appear, and they did not appear on January 1 2008 either. It’s this reliance on agency labour that Tony Fletcher had complained about when he was WCRM general manager several years earlier.
Rugby’s problems generate another planning crisis, with NR asking for much more access and warning of delays if operators don’t agree. It publishes its WCRM Delivery Plan on March 19 2008 and gives operators until March 27 to respond. This is just four working days, which predictably goes down badly. NR wants an extra 1,330 hours and a series of firewall closures to guard against further overruns, and to complete work by December 2008. Virgin counters with 1,285 hours and May 2009 completion.
ORR vetoes a May 2009 completion and NR cuts some of the extra possessions it wanted. But it also defers some of the work - such as Trent Valley bi-directional signalling from September 2008 to August 2009 and ColwichCrewe speed improvements from August 2008 to Easter 2009. NR removes the firewalls it had wanted in June 2008 at Rugby, October at Nuneaton, and December at Milton Keynes. It plans to book 10% more signal testers and OLE staff than it needs.
Sir Richard Branson wades into the argument, telling the Financial Times he doubts NR can deliver an upgraded railway that is reliable and can be maintained. He doubts NR will meet its timetable.
While the arguments about access rumble
on, the DfT decides that it does want longer trains and more trains. It tenders a deal for four new nine-car Pendolinos and extra cars to extend 35 sets from nine to 11-cars. Virgin wins this deal with Alstom supplying the vehicles.
Bank Holiday work through 2008 concentrates on the Trent Valley and its approaches. Lichfield Trent Valley signal box closes during the late Spring Bank Holiday and is quickly demolished because it stands in the path of new track needed for the ‘TV4’ project. Rugby’s new platforms open during August’s Bank Holiday, and the Trent Valley closes for a fortnight from August 23 for track, overhead line and signalling work.
RAIL 609 announces that NR has completed its West Coast upgrade work, but also reveals that it plans to close the route at Christmas for more work. NR has done enough to allow December 14 2008 to herald a new timetable, and Chief Executive Iain Coucher says: “When NR took over this critical project it was a mess. Railtrack left the scheme billions of pounds over budget and undeliverable. Five years down the line, learning the lessons of the new year, NR has rewritten the rulebook on project delivery, successfully hitting over a dozen key milestones in 2008.”
ORR explained that on December 31 eight agency staff did not appear, and they did not appear on January 1 2008 either. It’s this reliance on agency labour that Tony Fletcher had complained about when he was WCRM general manager several years earlier.
However, Virgin defers introducing a series of improvements it had planned from January 26 2009, because it claims the West Coast is not reliable after its £ 8bn upgrade. In the event, Virgin goes ahead on February 16 2009, and the route gets an extra 54 services from Virgin, London Midland and Southern.
From 2008 onwards, RAIL’s coverage of the West Coast’s marathon upgrade mixes with stories paving the way for a new high-speed line north from London. More attention was being paid to the question of how Britain could build more capacity for goods and passengers, and increasingly a new high-speed line was looking like the answer.
The sheer difficulty of upgrading existing lines on the scale the West Coast had needed was convincing more and more observers that new-build should be the future. What became HS2 was promised to provide more capacity by running long trains at high speed between London and Birmingham, freeing space on the WCML itself for more freight, commuter and inter-regional services for towns that Virgin had passed by. Thus, ideas of 135mph running and Stafford’s bypass and remodelling (the SRA had suggested a dive-under to create a gradeseparated southern junction) quietly receded.
It was quite a change from Tony Fletcher’s interview in RAIL 404, when he suggested that new lines were not the answer and cited the problems with building the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (now HS1 and which fully opened in 2007). Building HS1 went well, but it had encountered many problems in getting finance before the Government stepped in.
Government now plans to fund and build HS2 from London to Birmingham with a second stage taking it further north to Manchester and Leeds. An intermediate stage plans to extend the line from Birmingham to Crewe, bypassing Stafford - just as was suggested during the West Coast’s upgrade.
HS2 should deliver the cab-signalling that WCRM failed to do. The technology behind ETCS today is far advanced from that two decades ago, and it’s always been easier to install new technology on a new line rather than trying to retrofit to existing tracks and trains.
The lessons from WCRM remain relevant today. It started without a clear idea of what it was to deliver. It planned to use novel technology that had no track record. The railway always needs new technology if it’s to remain relevant to passengers, but a country’s premier line should not double as a test track.
For all the problems and pain along the way, today’s West Coast Main Line is far better than 1997’s. There are more trains, faster trains and many passengers. If the ends justify the means, then the West Coast Route Modernisation was worth doing.