Will Digital Railway place excessive costs on rail freight?
KEN GRAY examines how the introduction of European Rail Traffic Management System may affect the freight sector’s slim operating margins
DAVID Clough’s article on Direct Rail Services ( RAIL 842) makes it clear how slim the profit margins are in the freight industry. My understanding is that these slim margins extend to the road hauliers as well.
As a result of my time at Network Rail, as a signal engineer dealing with renewals and enhancements, I had been aware of how lean the train operating companies (TOCs) and freight operating companies (FOCs) are compared with Network Rail.
Also, of how an extra few wagons on a freight train can make the difference between profit and loss. It has been disappointing to see freight traffic disappear from the railway each time lorry weights are raised and major highway improvements made. There is a rough correlation between the increase in lorry weights from 28 to 32 to 38 tonnes and the loss of the Speedlink network. Similarly, the latest increase to 44 tonnes appears to coincide with the loss of the less-than-full trainload traffic.
The slim margins in the freight industry has made that sector very nervous about the introduction of European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) and the Digital Railway. The cost of fitting locomotives with ERTMS is considerable, with a figure of at least £200,000 thought likely for retrospectively fitting a locomotive, and around £150,000 for adding it to a new-build locomotive.
While it looks as if the Government is going to pay for fitting the current fleet, replacements will need to be paid for by the FOCs. As DRS has a fleet of 99 locomotives, there is a future additional cost of around £15 million to fit future replacement locomotives with ERTMS, as they are renewed over a 35 to 40-year period.
Given a profit of £1m a year, it can be seen that ERTMS has the potential to consume up to around 40% of DRS’s profit. There will also inevitably be mid-life software and hardware upgrades to be paid for, which could reduce profit margins further.
Other areas of concern for freight operators regarding ERTMS relate to freight train braking and signal section overlaps.
The deployment of ERTMS has resulted in reinvigoration of the ongoing debate about freight train braking. The capacity of railway signalling is (to some extent) a function of braking capability and speed. An optimistic view of train braking is dangerous, as the trains may not stop in time. Equally, a pessimistic view will reduce speed or capacity - or both.
ERTMS has the capability to provide for trains with variable braking characteristics. To do this, trains need to be put into braking categories.
At present, the bulk of freight trains run as class 4 or 6 trains, with maximum speeds of 75mph and 60mph respectively. The existing train classes are very broad, and train braking has all sorts of variables such as wagon type, wagon load state, train length and time since last overhaul.
In general (apart from the former Southern Region), class 4 trains are restricted to the same speeds as class 6 trains at speeds below 60mph. As class 4 trains have better brakes than class 6 trains this already creates an anomaly. However, class 4 trains tend to be longer than class 6 trains, so it takes longer for the brake pressure change to apply the brakes on the back of the train. This factor tends to cancel out their better braking at lower speeds.
As can be seen from this brief summary of some of the freight train braking issues, it is a complex problem. The importance of this issue is that train categories and speeds need to be determined for ERTMS.
Permitted speeds can also have an impact on overlap length, which also affects capacity. Any reduction in speed for freight trains as a result of optimising train categories, speeds and overlaps for a frequent passenger service will cost the freight operators money and so increase costs, and lose them traffic to the road hauliers.
The main line railway is unlikely to achieve the train throughput that London Underground manages on its Automatic Train Operation (ATO) routes, as LO runs a single train type with the signalling optimised for that train type’s acceleration and braking
capabilities. There are even differing acceleration and braking rates for surface and underground sections, to take account of adhesion factors.
Parts of the main line network such as the Thameslink core are already sterilised for freight. I know there are gauging restrictions on the Thameslink core, but what would happen if a freight operator asked for an off-peak path for a Class 73-hauled aggregate train which would fit in the tunnels? There is a risk that in an attempt to squeeze the maximum number of passenger train paths from the Digital Railway, further routes could be sterilised for freight use.
ERTMS does not allow for propelling moves apart from in specific ‘shunt areas’. This means that all those sidings where freight trains are propelled back into them will need shunt areas provided, with conventional signals to control the shunt moves into the sidings. There are at least ten such sites on the Anglia Route alone that are currently in use.
The shunt areas and conventional signalling will add to resignalling costs, and presumably the cost of siding connection agreements paid by freight customers. The shunt areas also need bigger ‘protection’ areas, due to trains not being under the supervision of ERTMS having a higher SPAD (Signal Passed at Danger) risk, plus the locomotives will need to change ERTMS mode. The bigger protection areas and the change of mode will take capacity out of the lines, making finding time in crowded timetables for freight trains to access sidings more difficult.
Supporters of Digital Railway claim that the freight operators will benefit from additional capacity on the network. However, additional capacity is of no benefit to the FOCs if the resulting train paths are too expensive as a result of the Digital Railway resignalling costs and reduced speeds, resulting in a less efficient service. The road hauliers will simply take the business.
There may be some benefits to FOCs from traffic management and Connected Drivers Advice System (CDAS), through improving the flow of traffic at junctions and better train pathing. CDAS can inform train drivers of a suitable speed to drive at, to ensure they arrive at a junction when there is a clear path through the junction for their train.
“The Digital Railway team is looking at the potential savings for freight operators, and hopefully the savings from better pathing and improved junction flows will outweigh the costs of fitting the locomotives.”
“Supporters of Digital Railway claim that the freight operators will benefit from additional capacity on the network. However, additional capacity is of no benefit to the FOCs if the resulting train paths are too expensive as a result of the Digital Railway resignalling costs and reduced speeds, resulting in a less efficient service. The road hauliers will simply take the business.”
Better train pathing has the potential to reduce round trip times for freight flows, resulting in improved rolling stock and crew utilisation. The improved flow at junctions could also reduce brake wear and fuel consumption - a 1,600-tonne intermodal train takes a lot of effort to stop and then a lot of fuel to accelerate again.
A few years ago, while some signalling work was being done at Chippenham Junction (near Newmarket), I looked at the issue of how much fuel could be saved by improving the junction signalling.
The freight operators were not keen to share such commercially sensitive costs, but some information was obtained, and there were enough savings based on fuel saved alone to justify changing the junction signalling. The funding, however, could not come from the signal renewal budget - it had to come from the Network Rail Discretionary Fund (NRDF) enhancement fund.
Also, the full benefits could not be obtained owing to an issue that arose in the detailed design of the signalling. The mechanical locking changes could not be accommodated in the existing locking trays, so would have needed a new locking tray, which would have been too expensive.
One of the reasons that the North London Line resignalling from Stratford to Willesden provided 4-aspect signals was not only to provide capacity for the TfL (Overground) passenger service, but also to enable a suitable differential speed for the freight trains.
Also, the 4-aspect signalling gave freight train drivers an extra aspect on the signals to reduce the need to brake and accelerate with constant changes between green and single yellow aspects.
ERTMS has the capability to improve on 4-aspect signalling in this respect, with the drivers having a forward planning area (see panels) to inform them what speed they can drive at. This should also reduce brake wear and fuel consumption on very busy routes.
The Digital Railway team is looking at the potential savings for freight operators, and hopefully the savings from better pathing and improved junction flows will outweigh the costs of fitting the locomotives.
The idea of national fitment of ERTMS was justified to government around 2008. Unfortunately, the figures used at the time were (to put it mildly) misleading. A saving on resignalling costs of around 30% over conventional lineside signalling was claimed for ERTMS level 2, but such a saving was never going to be achievable.
Compared with conventional signalling, the only equipment that ERTMS level 2 does not require is the lineside signals and their circuits. This represents a small percentage of signalling costs, as the interlocking, train detection, power distribution, cable routes, point circuits and signallers’ control panel or VDU systems are still required. In addition, an enhanced telecoms network, train fitment and a radio block interface with a lot of software are needed for ERTMS.
My understanding is that in Europe the provision of ERTMS rather than conventional signalling is at best cost-neutral, and at worst considerably more expensive. In addition to the above, ERTMS will require mid-life hardware and software upgrades. The signalling industry has already gained experience of what is needed for electronic equipment through the use of Integrated Electronic Control Centres (IECCs), which require regular expensive upgrades. There is no reason to believe ERTMS will be different.
So, why are the above comments about costs provided in 2008 important? The answer is that as with the electrification problems, this is another case of the rail industry seriously misleading government over the costs of a massive project, so why should government ever again trust the rail industry over major investment business cases? Equally, why should freight operators trust what Network Rail informs them about the costs and benefits of the Digital Railway.
Hopefully, the changes in 2016 at the top of the Digital Railway team will ensure that costs are controlled, and misleading claims about the costs and benefits of the Digital Railway will not be propagated in the future.
There are views within the Digital Railway team that the cost of ERTMS should drop massively. However, this is dependent on the signalling suppliers co-operating. Historically, the signalling suppliers have never been very good at reducing costs. Also, NR processes and changes of direction do not help.
The signalling suppliers are never going to provide resignalling savings of around 30%, as this will reduce their turnover by the same amount. What business willingly slashes its turnover by 30%?
A further problem with reducing resignalling costs is that with recent mergers, the number of signalling suppliers capable of delivering an ERTMS system has been reduced. Although there is no evidence of a cartel, the number of suppliers makes an unintentional or deliberate cartel situation much more likely than in the past.
The industry’s record for deploying new systems has not been good. It took 50 years to deploy Automatic Warning System (AWS), once it was decided to implement it. I believe Medway Valley may have been the last passenger route to be equipped with AWS, in 2007, and some freight routes still do not have AWS. Train Protection Warning System (TPWS) was deployed very quickly, but it contributed to signalling cost inflation of around 15%-20% which is still present in the industry.
Freight operators are therefore right to be very cautious about the Digital Railway and ERTMS deployment.