Comment

Did no one say ‘It’s nearly three hours - with no toilets’?

Nigel Harris wants answers on disastrous disruption plans.

“...abandoning that trainload of passengers to soil themselves over the next three hours beggars belief. It is not acceptable.”

We all grumble about the cold of winter, but the recent ‘Beast from the East’ blast of Siberian sub-zero weather was truly Arctic.

It wasn’t just the viciously cold temperatures that bedevilled the railway - worse was that the snow was not wet and clumpy but dry and powdery, the classic ‘wrong kind of snow’ (although that was never actually said!) which drifts easily and deeply. The railway was comprehensively buried all over the country, leading to spectacular snowplough action. Network Rail clearance teams did a great job in a Herculean effort to keep the railway running if at all possible. These teams deserve our thanks for their hard work.

On Southern metals a different kind of problem emerged, leading to an appalling incident at Lewisham where a nine-train standstill led to a trainload of passengers being trapped for three hours within 200 metres of the platforms on a Class 376 metro train with no toilets. Panic, distress and the misery of the ultimate humiliation of passengers forced to soil themselves so close to a station was just ghastly.

This was not the wilderness of Western Scotland’s Rannoch Moor! How can such a terrible thing happen in the heart of the nation’s capital? Let’s deal with the ‘techie’ bit first.

The Southern third rail system is, I believe, unique in the world as a network of interurban routes with long sections in open countryside. Third rail systems are largely limited to city metro systems. It is especially vulnerable to an extreme winter - a ground level 750V DC live rail does not take kindly to snow and ice, which prevent trains taking power.

Thus, on the afternoon of Friday March 2, the exposed third rail network in eastern Kent was inoperable. Then freezing rain hit London in the evening peak: rain freezes instantaneously on the third rail, just as your car windscreen can freeze instantly if you operate the screen wash in winter. This is what triggered the chaotic chain reaction of events on March 2.

The full story and timeline of events - as far as we can ascertain at this stage - is covered in News by Assistant Editor Richard Clinnick, who spent three full days digging into this story. We believe what we have reported is accurate, but we had to piece information together from multiple official and non-railway sources, including passenger statements. Naturally, various investigations are under way and until then, railway sources are being careful with their answers. I understand why, but “it will all come out in the inquiry” is no longer acceptable. Richard is to be commended on his research: see pages 6-7.

A NR Mobile Operations Manager was on site at 1836, the 1556 Charing Cross-Dartford (running 80 minutes late) having stalled leaving Lewisham, on the frozen third rail. He got the power turned off and was de-icing the third rail, with the intention of getting trains moving again fairly promptly. He had virtually completed this task and was almost ready to re-energise the third rail when, at 1845, he noticed passengers self-evacuating from the 1626 Charing Cross-Dartford (54 minutes late at Lewisham), which had been waiting for just over an hour around 200m from the platform end, ready to follow the train he was about to release as a result of the de-icing.

The MOM had no alternative but to order an emergency power isolation over a much bigger area - and it was this isolation that triggered the cascading series of events which stranded nine trains for three hours. On several occasions in that three hours, a power switch-on was imminent - but had to be repeatedly cancelled as passengers self- evacuated successively from five of those nine trains.

It is revealing that when power was finally restored at 2136, it took only 20 minutes to get all nine trains moving again. I am not ‘blaming passengers’, but Richard’s research suggests that had passengers not started climbing out of the second train in the queue, 200m or so from Lewisham, then maybe all nine trains might have been rolling by 1900.

So the first point to make is that Plan A must always be to get trains running again, and this was seemingly within a half hour or so when the self-evacuation of the second train after 67 minutes nudged cock-up into disaster. Where the railway faces the trickiest and most awkward questions is how it handled the situation after the emergency power isolation.

I am not suggesting that railwaymen and women did not do their best to get things moving again ASAP - they did. My concerns focus on procedures, which need urgent review.

Was it right to treat all nine trains as a block, rather than as individual cases maybe requiring bespoke solutions? For example, the second train in the queue - just 200m from the platform at Lewisham - had no toilets. Surely there was a need for a bespoke approach here, given such close proximity to the station and the increasingly urgent needs aboard after even an hour or so? Operational difficulties aside, abandoning that trainload of passengers to soil themselves over the next three hours beggars belief. It is not acceptable.

Should a handful of station staff at all stations receive Personal Track Safety accreditation, so they are able to act as ‘first responders’ in such situations - if only to provide support and reassurance in the first instance?

Have we abandoned locomotive rescue? I understand Class 66s able to tow these trains were at Tonbridge, about half an hour away? This is also relevant in the case of the train stranded at Brockenhurst overnight for 15 hours on March 1. To say poor road access in the New Forest is the explanation doesn’t cut it. That train should have been towed.

There is universal criticism about Southeastern’s poor communicat ion. Reassuring passengers is a first priority. If they believe help is coming they are less likely to bale out, even if a station is just 200m away.

However stressed they are, it is never acceptable for TOC twitter operators to use the ‘F’ word in answer to passenger queries - even spelled ‘F***. SER must deal with this.

Was it enough to have a single NR MOM on duty in such appalling weather?

This incident has been long brewing. Breakdowns are bad enough on a main line train - but at least there is usually food, water and toilets to last at least 2-3 hours. But on a heaving metro train with lots of standing passengers and no toilets, for three hours?! No.

I’m sure all railwaymen and women were doing their best - but I am ashamed that this industry nevertheless allowed paying passengers to be trapped for three hours, soiling themselves. If rail’s procedures allow that, then those procedures need to change.

No, passengers should not self- evacuate. But there could be other circumstances which could result in long delays to non-toilet trains and in such circumstances, bespoke procedures are required.

All TOCs - especially Southeastern - and Network Rail need to take a long, cool, objective look at their emergency procedures and communications.