Thameslink
Three decades since Thameslink services commenced running through central London, PHILIP HAIGH looks back at the landmark project to reconnect rail networks north and south of the capital
A look back at London’s landmark project to reconnect rail networks north and south of the capital, as Thameslink reaches 30.
This month marks the 30th anniversary of Thameslink returning trains to Snow Hill Tunnel in London, linking once more rail networks north and south of the River Thames.
It had been 72 years since passenger trains had regularly traversed this route. In the interim it formed a key freight link across London, until those trains ceased in 1969. Demolition gangs then moved in and lifted the tracks.
Trains continued from north and south. Diesel multiple units smoked and rattled their way from Great Northern stations, along King’s Cross station’s two through platforms and then the City Widened Lines to Farringdon and Moorgate. Class 31s on suburban stock traversed the same route. Southern Region services crossed the Thames on Blackfriars Bridge to Holborn Viaduct station, which was a terminus on what had been a 264-yard branch from the through line under Snow Hill.
You can walk between Farringdon and the site of Holborn Viaduct station in under ten minutes. And for decades this was the best way to transfer between the two, despite several recommendations to restore passenger services. Patrick Abercrombie had called for this in his 1944 report Greater London Plan, which had been commissioned by the government. A further call came from Greater London Council (GLC) in 1974 in its rail study, not long after Snow Hill Tunnel’s tracks disappeared.
In 1976, Moorgate services changed with the closure of those through platforms at King’s Cross. Great Northern passengers now used new Class 313 electric trains to reach Moorgate, via a short link near Finsbury Park that connected BR’s lines with what had been London Transport’s Northern City Line to Moorgate. Direct services to the Midland Main Line ceased in 1979. Rebirth followed after upgrade works, and electric Bedford-Moorgate trains started running in 1983.
Meanwhile, a decade and a deep recession
passed from the GLC’s study before another report called for Snow Hill to return. Career railwayman Chris Austin helped write it as BR’s London regional planning manager. He recalls that BR and government were sceptical.
London and South East Sector Managing Director David Kirby asked what the market was, doubting that many people would want to travel from Bedford to Brighton. But people did want to go from north of the Thames to Gatwick and Croydon, and people south of the river did want to go to King’s Cross and St Pancras for connections further north.
Reopening Snow Hill was projected to cost £1 million, and BR justified the expense not on increased revenue but on saving six 4-EPB electric units. The saving came from combining trains from north and south and avoiding turnaround times at termini, according to Austin.
The result was the British Railways Act 1986, which allowed BR to “make and maintain the following works with all necessary works and conveniences connected”. A further clause explained the work: “A railway (792 metres in length and partly in the existing Snow Hill Tunnel) at Farringdon, being a reinstatement of the former railway between Farringdon and Blackfriars stations, commencing at Farringdon station in the London borough of Islington by a junction with the City Widened Lines at a point four metres north-west of the bridge whereby the City Widened Lines pass under Cowcross Street, and terminating in the city of London by a junction with the railway between Holborn Viaduct and Elephant and Castle stations at a point nine metres north of the bridge carrying that railway over Apothecary Street.”
This allowed BR Network SouthEast (NSE) Director Chris Green to launch Thameslink, which would reopen the Snow Hill line. This link joined the DC electric network prevalent south of the river Thames with the AC network used towards Bedford. It needed a fleet of trains that could work with both, and the result was 60 dual-voltage, four-car, 100mph Class 319 electric multiple units. A second batch of 26 followed in 1990.
When the link opened in May 1988, NSE said it represented an investment of £ 54m including the new trains. The GLC’s study had predicted 20,000 passengers a day on the central section, and the new service achieved this in its first year.
Thameslink joined Bedford and Brighton, and had a branch to Moorgate and a loop to serve Wimbledon. It allowed BR to close Holborn Viaduct station in 1990. At the same time, BR closed the elevated route into the station and diverted Thameslink services into a new tunnel that took them under (rather than over) Ludgate Hill. A new station - eventually named City Thameslink - took Holborn Viaduct’s place, roughly under its site, and paid for directly by property development on the site of the old station.
Permission for these changes came from Parliament, despite complaints from MPs representing northern constituencies. One complained on March 15 1988, in a debate about the British Railways (London) Bill, that it was “a yuppie Bill and yuppie works for London commuters”. This MP represented Darlington, and was complaining that the powers BR sought to reopen York Curve and Hotel Curve at King’s Cross (which had been served by those through platforms BR closed in 1976) would not allow through trains from further north than Peterborough. He was Michael Fallon, more recently a defence secretary and now representing a southern constituency served by Thameslink.
The plan to reopen King’s Cross station’s curves came to nothing. By this time Chris Austin had been working for NSE before becoming BR’s parliamentary affairs manager. He tells “The case was not too strong, as I recall, and the practical problems
But people did want to go from north of the Thames to Gatwick and Croydon, and people south of the river did want to go to King’s Cross and St Pancras for connections further north.
loomed large - particularly in breaking into the concrete track where the spurs would join Thameslink, under King’s Cross station. This would have involved a closure for several months to build this junction. Chris Green rightly saw an intractable problem, and we had a lot of other things on the go at the time, so we parked it there.”
As Thameslink was reopening, BR, London Underground and London Regional Transport were working on a study of the capital’s rail needs, at the behest of Transport Secretary Paul Channon.
With the Department of Transport, they published the Central London Rail Study in January 1989, with Channon writing: “London’s economy has been growing strongly in recent years. This growth is expected to continue. More and more people are seeking to come to work in the tightly packed central area. Parts of inner London, most notably Docklands, are being transformed. In outer London, the general revival in the national economy has contributed to sharp increases in traffic levels. All this is putting severe strains on London’s transport system, which is suffering from heavy congestion at peak times, on both road and rail.”
The study’s report suggested an enhanced Snow Hill scheme called Thameslink Metro, that added a new link north of King’s Cross to feed Great Northern and Midland routes into the central core through Blackfriars to Elephant & Castle, and then through Herne Hill to serve West Croydon and Sutton.
“The Major Upgrade Programme allows for eight trains in the peak hour in each direction between King’s Cross and Blackfriars - a considerable increase on the current service. The Thameslink Metro scheme would develop Thameslink services still further to provide a concentrated, high-frequency service similar to that provided by, for example, the District Line,” said the report.
The major upgrade programme was planning to bring more trains onto certain Network SouthEast lines such as BedfordMoorgate, by investing in more trains and drivers. Across NSE, this programme was estimated at £ 600m for more stock and platform extensions.
“The capacity of Thameslink is at present limited by its signalling system on some sections, and most of the suburban lines have capacity constraints at junctions. To run a more intensive service would require significant expenditure on flyovers, trackwork and signalling, as well as new trains, but still far less than on a brand new line,” explained the report.
The study tested a ten trains per hour (tph) St Albans-Wimbledon and 10tph Enfield Chase-Croydon service, with new stations at Camberwell, Walworth and Southwark. Results showed high level of use, with 18,000 passengers in the peak hour across London.
Elsewhere, it suggested three Crossrail lines: North-South Crossrail would link King’s Cross/Euston with Victoria via Tottenham Court Road, at an outline cost (including rolling stock) of £ 895m; the East-West variant would join Liverpool Street to Paddington/ Marylebone (£ 885m); and the City line would join London Bridge to Essex Road (£ 250m).
North-South Crossrail came with a suggestion of a new link between Euston and the Midland Main Line that would allow Thameslink services to run only to Great Northern stations, with Bedford served by Crossrail.
Thameslink Metro weighed in at £ 330m and gave a Benefit: Cost Ratio of 2.1, the highest of all the schemes suggested (North-South was 0.9 and East-West 1.6). However, the study noted that it was not a new line and would have limited impact on congestion: “It can be considered as a subsidiary option to add to one or other of the two-line packages identified. It would be physically feasible to combine it with both packages, but it would compete to some extent with a North-South Crossrail, reducing the effectiveness of that option.”
British Rail took forward the idea of an enhanced Thameslink network, with a parliamentary bill seeking permission for it. The King’s Cross Railways Bill was presented to Parliament in 1989, and contained proposals for a station for international services through the Channel Tunnel, as well as Thameslink.
BR struggled to get the bill through Parliament, not least because several MPs in constituencies close to King’s Cross suspected BR of playing dirty tricks. It rumbled its way through the House of Commons and House
The inquiry inspector had recommended refusal because he was not happy with Railtrack’s plans for Blackfriars, where he complained that there were no plans for a building above the concourse, creating what he called a “missing tooth”.
of Lords for several years. BR withdrew it on February 14 1994.
Chris Green explains: “Chairman Bob Reid was pushing the Bill through Parliament until the last possible day. But Britain was in recession again, and the Treasury knew that rail privatisation was coming. The DfT was very supportive, but the Treasury effectively killed the Bill by telling Parliament that Thameslink was unfunded (and therefore could not be voted into an Act). When privatisation happened, Railtrack was asked to resurrect the Bill, but it never happened.”
Reading between the lines of Green’s comment, it seems that the Treasury sensed it could get out of paying for Thameslink’s upgrade by delaying it until privatisation took hold, creating Railtrack as the rail network’s owner, and then leaving it to pay.
Railtrack did take the project forward under the banner Thameslink 2000.
Contemporary reports from 1996 suggested a service of 24tph using 12-car trains, with project costs of £ 650m. They added that the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF) had discounted creating a ‘super franchise’ consisting of Thameslink, South Central and West Anglia Great Northern. Thameslink 2000 was expected to be complete by 2002, but this depended heavily on Railtrack securing a Transport and Works Act Order (TWAO) to give it legal authority for the work.
Thameslink 2000’s move towards 12-car trains gave early notice that trains would cease serving Moorgate. This was because Farringdon’s eight-car platforms could only be extended southwards, over the junction to Moorgate which would therefore have to be removed. Farringdon’s lines fall at a gradient of 1-in-27 immediately north of the station, to pass under London Underground tracks, and this was too steep for platforms.
Blackfriars station would need to be altered, with a plan for four platforms stretching over Blackfriars Bridge and a new entrance on the South Bank.
Around London Bridge, outline plans included doubling the single-track reversible Metropolitan Junction-Blackfriars link line, new tracks west of London Bridge to separate Thameslink and Charing Cross trains, and grade separation at Bermondsey and New Cross Gate. London Bridge station would get new platforms and tracks.
On November 21 1997, Railtrack applied for TWAO powers. However, this process was complicated by Thameslink 2000’s continued links with the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (now High Speed 1) that was being planned at the same time.
CTRL’s promoter, London and Continental Railways, was to build Thameslink 2000’s station box at St Pancras (replacing the cramped King’s Cross Thameslink station). But LCR ran into funding problems, and revealed in January 1998 that it couldn’t proceed. The government was forced to step in. Meanwhile, Railtrack reviewed its plans and submitted a supplementary TWAO to allow any public inquiry to take place in 2000.
The inquiry started in June 2000 and ran until the following May before submitting its conclusions to government. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister subsequently
refused permission for Thameslink 2000 to proceed. The inquiry inspector had recommended refusal because he was not happy with Railtrack’s plans for Blackfriars, where he complained that there were no plans for a building above the concourse, creating what he called a “missing tooth”. He said that planning permission and listed building consent should be refused for London Bridge.
Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott called for revised plans from Railtrack in January 2003, and these went to a second public inquiry between September and December 2005. Success followed. and the inspector recommended approval in October 2006.
By this time, Railtrack was no more, replaced by Network Rail after government refused to help with Railtrack’s financial problems. Thus it was NR that received legal authority in December 2006 to build Thameslink 2000. Government delayed funding decisions until the following summer.
Formally the Network Rail (Thameslink 2000) Order 2006, this authority permitted considerable work across southeast England. But it centred on Blackfriars, Borough Market and London Bridge, and came into force on December 16 2006.
Separately, Network Rail received permission to withdraw services between Farringdon and Barbican stations, and close King’s Cross Thameslink station and parts of Blackfriars and London Bridge.
The TWAO allowed NR to widen Blackfriars Bridge and remodel the station to switch the bay and through platforms with each other, leaving the through platforms on the eastern side. The station would be extended across the full width of the bridge.
Around Borough Market, NR would be able to demolish buildings in the conservation area and build a new viaduct to carry new lines between London Bridge and Charing Cross stations. Here, NR would have to work closely with the London Borough of Southwark to ensure that work did no lasting harm to the nature of the market and its surroundings.
At London Bridge (London’s oldest terminus, dating from 1836), Southwark had already granted planning permission for a ‘masterplan’ redevelopment of the station and dismantling of the listed trainshed (that dated from 1867). The masterplan also included changes to bus and taxi arrangements - unconnected with Thameslink, but there was sense in linking the two projects.
Permission also came for what would be Bermondsey dive-under and Tanners Hill fly-down. There was also permission for changes outside of London, mainly to extend platforms at dozens of stations to cope with Thameslink’s planned 12-car trains.
Earlier in 2006, First Capital Connect had taken over train services from Govia’s Thameslink train operating company. Govia had been running Class 319s since privatisation from BR in 1997, and the switch to FCC marked a change of policy from that pursued by OPRAF a decade earlier.
OPRAF’s successor, the Strategic Rail Authority, decided to merge Thameslink with the Great Northern part of West Anglia Great Northern (the West Anglia part went to Greater Anglia). The two parts of FCC worked independently of each other because there was still no rail link between them.
While this was happening, plenty of construction work was taking place around St Pancras as LCR got on with building the second section of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. This included the concrete box that would become Thameslink’s station, and the Canal Tunnels which provided the link to the East Coast Main Line (emerging at a steep gradient to join the ECML between Gas Works and Copenhagen Tunnels, just below CTRL’s new flyover that would carry international and domestic high-speed trains between St Pancras and Stratford).
By summer 2007, Ruth Kelly was Transport Secretary. She approved Thameslink on July 24 2007 with funding of £ 5.5 billion, describing it as a “vital north-south artery into and across London”. It was to bring 12-car, 16tph Brighton-Bedford services by December 2011, and then add Peterborough and Cambridge to give 24tph in the central section by the time it was complete in December 2015. Of the bill, £ 3.55bn was for infrastructure and the rest for new trains and franchise changes.
Her Conservative opponent, Shadow Transport Secretary Theresa Villiers, tartly responded: “We were promised Thameslink 2000 so long ago that the former Deputy Prime Minister was still in charge of transport - never mind Thameslink 2000; at this rate, it will be more aptly named Thameslink 3000.”
A DfT White Paper that accompanied Kelly’s statement explained that the government would be NR’s direct client for the project, which was now losing its obsolete and embarrassing ‘2000’ epithet. DfT would specify the train service pattern and station passenger demand, and NR would design the project accordingly, it said. DfT would procure new trains.
That just left Network Rail to build what was now called the Thameslink Programme.