Communications breakdown

Lack of consultation brings a new low in workforce relationship

Relationship breakdown.

Top-level industry managers appear to have lost the ability to persuade staff to accept changes in working practices that exploit new technology and improve productivity.

It is evident that the long- established collective bargaining process, that includes consultation on organisation and job changes, has been relegated to a low priority. The activity does not remove the management prerogative to implement change, but it does require a cogent justification where implementation alters the way work is organised that may result in fewer staff being needed (as well as other cost reductions).

Staff working in the rail industry are used to adapting to change. A current example is the closure of smaller power and mechanical signal boxes, as activity is transferred to the Regional Operating Centres. This has been done without service disruption - staff have been kept informed well in advance of proposals, and individual circumstances managed by offering early retirement, transfer to new locations, or compensation to leave the industry.

The change in the duties of traincrew, and also the proposed closure of ticket offices, does not seem to have featured that level of consultation. For example, it cannot be right that Procurement Managers responsible for acquiring new trains have been allowed to specify rolling stock that changes traincrew staffing practices without having first consulted with the staff concerned.

Announcements that new trains have been ordered for Driver Only Operation, without those being displaced having their individual circumstances addressed in the way that has occurred for signallers, is certain to promote hostility. The first reaction will be that an individual might lose their job, which will generate a vote to support Trade Union negotiation that authorises strike action if the negotiating outcome is deemed unsuccessful.

This has echoes of early BR High Speed Train design, where the cab was laid out for only a single driver at a time when national agreements specified an additional member of traincrew for such operations.

In the course of time, agreement was reached. But then, as now, there was a disconnect in the process that blandly assumed working methods could be changed without any consultation with the staff concerned.

The same fault lines have been evident in proposals to close ticket offices. It was clear to staff at one train operating company (TOC) that the range of ticket types on offer at staffed stations could not be replicated by ticket vending machines or by mobile devices used by barrier staff. The result is that proposals have been quietly shelved as impractical until there is a simplification of the fares structure, or until ticket purchase apps on smartphones enable the cheapest available fare to be chosen.

In a mature industry such as the railway, with established employment terms, there is going to be resistance to the introduction of agency staff who are not trained to provide the level of customer service that passengers expect. These casual staff can increasingly be found at station gatelines, but they have little knowledge about ticket conditions of use and simply wave people through if the ticket is rejected. It cannot be a surprise that staff confidence in managerial competence is diminished as a result.

Driver Only Operation has always been contentious, and the subtle change to the description of Driver Controlled Operation has acknowledged that there are circumstances where there should be either platform despatch staff or another on-board individual.

Safety regulators maintain there is no need for a second staff member to have a safety- critical role, but there are many other reasons why it is unsatisfactory from a passenger perspective to have highcapacity 12- car trains working lengthy journeys with no on-board staff presence other than the driver.

Most TOC managements have reached the same conclusion, but they want to provide this staffing on an ad hoc basis with the freedom to run trains if no staff other than the driver is available. Suspicion about not having sufficient staff to provide a planned on-board presence is one of the reasons why staff are continuing to support the strikes called by the RMT union.

Working practices for drivers are highly regulated, and described in Group Standards for Safety issued by the RSSB (Rail Safety and Standards Board).

In June this year, RSSB updated its risk assessment covering DCO and published a detailed analysis of the effect of the presence of auxiliary staff such as on-board supervisors.

It examined the impact in the event of an accident that incapacitates the driver, and protecting the line in an emergency, passenger assault, and preventing uncontrolled evacuation. The findings were that the most effective way for safety standards to be maintained was if the individual was equipped with a GSM-R radio, to make the defined Railway Emergency Call which triggers co- ordination to provide any necessary assistance.

RSSB also found that Driver Controlled Operation embodies a lower risk from accidents associated with door operation, provided platform staff can authorise train despatch when judged necessary - for example, when platform curvature prevents door sighting for the complete train.

For a long time, there has been a recognition that on-board customer service should be given more emphasis. The operational activity of guards has been superseded over time by the advent of modern signalling, but there are new needs - in particular as a result of the ‘access for all’ programme whereby many passengers with reduced mobility use wheelchairs and mobility scooters, and thus need assistance. This continues to be an area of uncertainty for passengers, with differing rules applied by the TOCs.

We could do without the inflammatory language from Trade Union officials, but no one can ignore that ballots for strike action are supported by the necessary majority of staff concerned. Now that RSSB has provided operators with clarity about operational risks, there is a need to communicate those findings more widely and dispel some of the safety assertions that no longer apply with modern technology.

“There was a disconnect in the process that blandly assumed working methods could be changed.”