Long-term thinking.

Root and branch rail review must be about a long-term vision

The collapse of train services provided by two of the largest franchises when the May timetable was introduced, coupled with continued disruption due to strike action elsewhere and the financial failure of the Virgin Trains East Coast (VTEC) contract, was a series of events that the Government could not ignore.

In time-honoured fashion the response has been to set up an inquiry essentially to deflect blame directed towards the Department for Transport and to generate a strategy that will counter the widely held public view that nationalisation offers the remedy to provide reliable rail services.

The terms of reference have yet been finalised but the review should be about much more than an operational fix. Recommendations are needed about the future geographic reach of the network and product development that supports a strategy to de- carbonise UK transport operations as a whole by 2040.

A promised root and branch review is likely to be tasked with finding short-term answers to improve the journey experience and in the longer term meet aspirations that improve value for money for both rail users and taxpayers. It is believed this can come from greater track and train integration, more devolved management, and improved industrial relations.

The big reviews in the past led by Dr Beeching (1963) and Sir David Serpell (1983) took place against a background of falling passenger and freight traffic and in both cases offered the opinion that a smaller network was the solution to deliver better services through investment in the activity that remained.

Beeching’s proposals were accepted with little protest but two decades later the publication of the Serpell report was judged to have lifted the curtain on the disaster that must flow from the Government’s policy of starving British Rail of the investment needed for track renewal, new rolling stock and electrification.

The rejection of the various options for a smaller network meant the Government had to plan to invest more to keep the railway fit for purpose, which had not been the case previously apart from the core routes. Infrastructure asset condition was declining to the point where engineering functions were warning that closures would take place because track and signalling could not be considered safe.

In response there was a realisation by successive governments that the level of funding needed was more than could be provided by taxpayers given other priorities such as the health service, social care, education, and defence. Methods had to be found to bring in the private sector to make the necessary investment.

This was to the lead to the 1993 Railways Act that established the concept of a track authority that was to respond to the demand of train operators to run services in the way that airports do in the airline industry. This removed any arbitrary allocation of capacity and required sufficient paths to be made available at regulated prices, if required by a passenger or freight operator.

The framework produced unexpected growth in the demand from operators of both passenger and freight services. At the time the legislation was enacted it was anticipated that the national network would be publicly owned and funded from track access charges but it became clear this would not generate sufficient investment. The subsequent decision to privatise Railtrack failed as it in turn found it could not fund the legacy of decay that had been inherited from British Rail as well as meeting demands for new capacity. The tipping point came with the Hatfield derailment in 2000 which revealed the parlous condition of much of the network.

When the successor infrastructure owner Network Rail was created it was a not for profit organisation but was firmly placed in the private sector so it could raise external funds to carry out the renewal programme that continues to take place and meet the need of growing demand for new infrastructure that is evident throughout the country and particularly in London.

It is one of the elements of the current review to decide how private sector financing of rail infrastructure can be restored following the decision that NR must be regarded as a public sector entity as a result of a new interpretation of accounting standards.

There has been some progress with new initiatives such as East West Rail which is structured as a combined track and train development along with the recent Wales and Borders contract negotiated by the Welsh Government which includes substantial investment by KeolisAmey to electrify the Core Valley Lines.

The inquiry is to be headed by Keith Williams, a previous chief executive of British Airways, but an immediate concern is the amount of time and energy he will be able to offer given the roles currently held as Deputy Chairman of the retailer John Lewis, Chairman of another retailer Halfords, and a director of both the Royal Mail and the insurer Aviva where he is Chairman of the Audit Committee.

Although there will be support from a panel it is hard to see how genuinely new ideas can be generated that can break both the cycle of organisational failure that has come together with the timetable disruption of recent months and the need for a longer-term funding and product development strategy

A lengthy investigation into the causes of the timetable disruption has taken place under the scrutiny of Professor Stephen Glaister, chairman of the Office of Rail and Road, which revealed a lengthy list of incompetencies that might be summarised as attempting to do too much with insufficient resources available.

It is important not to mix the remedies of dealing with what is a tactical failure to provide sufficient timetable planning and operating expertise with navigating a 20-year strategy to find a formula that allows private sector infrastructure funding and the removal of pollutant emissions in the transport industry.

Events can determine longer term decision making, and one such occurrence exists with the need to terminate the VTEC franchise. For the East Coast main line route both the infrastructure provider and the principal train operator is now a Government responsibility. The bold decision would be to create one company providing integrated management of track and train and offer this for sale to a corporate entity with appropriate funding undertakings.

“A lengthy ORR investigation revealed a lengthy list of incompetencies.”