Timetable review
Interim report points to Department for Transport and Network Rail failings for May timetable chaos.
NETWORK Rail’s System Operator function has come under heavy fire in an interim report by Office of Rail and Road Chairman Stephen Glaister into the problems that led to last May’s timetable collapse across Thameslink and Northern services.
Glaister’s 183-page report, published on September 20, claims the System Operator, which produces the national timetable from operator requests, had a view across all the elements needed to successfully implement new timetables including NR’s late delivery of new infrastructure - and could have taken action.
The report says: “Network Rail’s System Operator managed the timetable process and was in the best position to understand and manage the risks, but did not take sufficient action, especially in the critical period in autumn 2017.”
Having blamed the System Operator, the report goes on to admit: “The Inquiry has found that in the current governance system, the body that has the sufficient breadth and authority to oversee the dependent risks between all four of these individual elements is the Department for Transport. However, while DfT is responsible for making big decisions about projects and changes to them, and is accountable for most of the costs, it is the industry that best possesses the information and capability needed to manage these and advise DfT about them. This did not happen at the right points in advance of May 2018.”
It adds that train operators GTR and Northern were not properly prepared for the problems the timetables brought and did not do enough to provide accurate information to passengers. The report criticises the rail industry for not properly managing the risks to new timetables that come from engineering or other projects. Finally, it adds that DfT and ORR itself did not test the assurances the rail companies gave them.
ORR commissioned a second report that examined its own role.
Its author, Her Majesty’s Rail Inspectorate Chief Inspector Ian Prosser found that there was no single failing from ORR but he said that ORR’s performance “could have been more effective and so could be seen as a contributory factor to the events that unfolded on 20 May”.
He added: “In addition, the ORR Board never held a substantive discussion on the new timetable’s potential risk to network performance. Such a discussion could have provided the opportunity to step back and identify the system-wide risks posed by the problems which had been recognised by ORR.”
Prosser’s report acknowledges ORR already knew NR was struggling to produce timely timetables because it began investigating in February 2018 NR’s failure to adhere to ‘informed traveller’ deadlines that make timetables available 12 weeks before travel. There may have been a missed opportunity to have identified the problems unfolding in relation to the May 2018 timetable changes, his report says.
In compiling the main ORR report, Glaister’s team interviewed key players from DfT, NR, train operators and other organisations such as Transport Focus and the chairmen of the independent review board and assurance panel created specifically to help Thameslink deliver its new services.
Thameslink was to have delivered a 20 trains per hour (tph) timetable from May and a 24tph service from December. However, the DfT invited it in 2015 to consider a more gradually phased timetable that would bring 18tph in May, 20tph in December and then 22tph and 24tph from the same months in 2019. Thameslink operator GTR and NR planned for the 20tph May 2018 timetable because that was
GTR’s contractual commitment until formal authorisation came from DfT at the end of October to cut it to 18tph. As the 20tph version had been formed by cutting 4tph from the full timetable, planners thought it would be simple to cut a further 2tph. When this proved difficult (because it left some long gaps between services at some stations), NR and GTR started planning from scratch, but this started too late to comply with industry deadlines and left GTR too little time to develop and implement crew rosters.
Glaister’s report says: “In hindsight, had the final decision by DfT to phase the introduction of services from 18tph been aligned with the schedule for developing the timetable in August 2017, the unpredicted consequences for the Thameslink timetable may have been avoided and the consequential risks of a timetabling failure on the scale experienced would have been greatly reduced.”
In North West England, NR was late electrifying the ManchesterBolton-Preston route that Northern was relying on for its May 2018 timetable. A board, the North of England Programme Board, oversaw this work but, according to Glaister’s report: “It was not specifically remitted to focus on the management of consequential systemic risks to the timetabling process or introduction of services by train operators, although its members including Network Rail’s System Operator (the SO) were aware of these issues. The risks were noted to the Board in October 2017 by the SO, but no sufficient actions were taken by the SO to mitigate these risks.”
NR tried to catch up after a line closure last Christmas but, in failing, it left no realistic options to complete the work in time for May. The programme board rejected a further closure fearing the disruption it would cause.
The failure forced Northern to submit in January revised bids for its May 2018 timetable. In February it asked NR to roll forward its current timetable but NR decided this couldn’t be done because it had made contracted offers to other operators on the basis of the new timetable. The report says: “The Inquiry has found that the SO was the body best placed to address the risks associated with the delivery of [Bolton electrification] upon its timetable process in autumn 2017, but has seen limited evidence that it considered or pro-actively advocated alternative options. This significantly increased the risk that it would not be able to meet the industry schedule for producing a timetable in time for May 2018.”
It adds: “Northern failed to adequately understand or communicate the risks arising from failing to have a sufficient number of trained drivers to operate the 20 May 2018 timetable. As a result, passengers faced severe disruption and were not provided with information that would have allowed them to manage the impact.”
Glaister is now compiling a second report that will examine what changes need to be made to oversee and manage systemic risks from interdependent rail programmes.