Why are SPADs on the increase?

As a retired train driver with over 40 years’ service, I read the articles regarding Signals Passed at

Danger (SPADS) and Ladbroke Grove ( RAIL 889) with great interest.

I am very surprised to learn that SPADs appear to be on the increase, especially since the introduction of Train Protection Warning System (TPWS).

From a driver’s perspective, there are numerous factors that can lead to a SPAD taking place. They can be any of the following:

■ Failure to react to the previous caution signal.

■ Misreading the previous signal.

■ Failure to check the red signal aspect (especially when re-starting a train from a station stop).

■ Anticipating that the signal will clear.

■ Failure to locate the signal (poor sighting).

■ Failure to take into account the effects of railhead contamination (leaf fall).

■ Failure to allow sufficient braking distance (misjudgement).

With thorough route knowledge, a driver must know where signals are located and which of these has a potential risk.

For instance, the signal may be on the right-hand side instead of the conventional left-hand side, it may be poorly sighted, or it may have a history of SPADs.

These anomalies should be brought to the driver’s attention either during the route learning stage or at regular safety briefings thereafter. Any signal that has accrued a SPAD history should be listed in the Weekly Operating Notices, for which drivers must sign.

Regarding the Ladbroke Grove accident, who commissioned the installation of the overhead line equipment without realising that it may compromise signal sighting? It is my opinion that an experienced train driver should always accompany signal-sighting committees.

Apparently, bright sunlight could have been a contributory factor at Ladbroke Grove and could have been rectified by installing larger hoods for the signal aspects (although this may have hindered the sighting from a distance, being on a left-hand curve).

The Driver’s Rule Book states that signals that are imperfectly shown should be treated as a Danger signal and reported to the relevant Signaller, even though this may cause delays. Another problem is the repetitive cancelling of the AWS, where there is no differentiation between yellow or red signals.

Roger Taylor, Bishop’s Stortford