Blue Pullmans...
...at 60. The untold story behind BR’s ‘HST’
Alittle over 60 years ago, on July 4 1960, the Midland Pullman entered public service.
Researching this subject some years ago, it soon became evident that there were significant gaps in the published story of these five iconic Blue Pullman trains. Accessing the records at the National Archives has provided a more comprehensive picture to mark their anniversary.
The British Transport Commission (BTC), of which British Railways was the largest constituent, acquired total control of the Pullman Car Company Ltd (Pullmans) in the UK in June 1954. Despite this, the Commission decided to leave it as a selfcontained, semi-autonomous entity.
Railway managers viewed it with some disdain, while the railway unions regarded it with suspicion, even though Pullmans’ employees were union members. Notwithstanding this widespread antipathy, on January 20 1955 BTC members debated how to get the best out of its acquisition.
The Commission members were drawn mainly from its constituent bodies but with a heavy railway bias, augmented by part-time external representatives who included senior industrialists.
H P Barker was one of the latter, and in October 1954 he submitted a paper to the Commission on ways of developing the Pullman brand. He wrote: “I think there is a need to establish as quickly as possible, and perhaps in advance of the main re-equipment programme, a new type of ‘prestige’ inter-city
service, characterised by the highest passenger comfort and reasonable though not excessive speed.
“1: British Railways need to do something which will catch the imagination of the public and give a visible demonstration of the new potentialities of rail travel.
“2: It may be commercially desirable to show our air competitors that they stand little chance of attracting inter-city passengers from us, at least below 200 miles. The attitude of the public towards internal air travel remains in the formative stage and could be warped away from it, as in France.
“Two instruments have been placed in our hands recently and these are: the possibility of using the Pullman name, which I believe has great sales value; the arrival of the multiple unit diesel train and consequent upon above, the possibility of reversing trains, maintaining a shuttle-like service and thereby achieving an intensive use of the equipment.
“I suggest that the Commission staff and the Regional Managers should examine the possibility of introducing a series of named Pullman trains - eg the ‘Birmingham Belle,’ the ‘Manchester Belle’, the ‘Leeds Belle’ - operating once or twice per day in each direction. The trains would be two-class, probably with a supplementary charge and to modern Pullman standards.
“The train would be reversible and I envisage would be serviced after each round trip - that is to say, if such a train ran on the Midland
The running of additional Pullman Services, however successful in attracting new traffic, was almost certain to have an effect on the patronage of railway restaurant cars.
route to Birmingham, it would depart from the same Euston platform at which it arrived, and perhaps not more than half an hour afterwards. This would mean, I suppose, some new organisation for servicing the train on arrival, but this cannot be a mighty problem - if the airlines can do it, so can we!
“If the Commission seriously intends to develop the Pullman principle, this may be the way to go.”
The senior railway managers in the London Midland Region (LMR) poured cold water on the concept of a multiple unit trainset that would be serviced and reverse in Euston station, and expressed no interest in operating Pullman services.
The other regions were no more enthusiastic, but the Chief of Operating Services on the BTC’s Central Staff was more positive. He saw Pullman trains as a further weapon in the fight against the private car and suggested that the Regions be asked to prepare schemes for the trains, additional to those already running because of their lower seating capacity. London to Manchester was the main route identified.
He was supported by his colleague, the
Chief of Commercial Services, who judged that the running of high-speed trains with special accommodation would have commercial advantages.
At the January 1955 Commission meeting, the members thought that the first objective of any change would be to use these services to develop the railway passenger traffics, which could be carried at a profit.
It appeared that any development policy would have to follow two stages. The first (short-term) stage would consist of testing the possibilities of traffic development by running additional services, particularly over routes not associated with Pullmans. The second (longer-term) stage would largely be governed by the results of the experiment. SwanseaPaddington was chosen, with the South Wales Pullman commencing on June 27 1955.
The running of additional Pullman Services, however successful in attracting new traffic, was almost certain to have an effect on the patronage of railway restaurant cars.
This would affect the interests of the Commissions Hotel and Catering services in two ways. Firstly, it would reduce their gross takings, perhaps necessitating a curtailment of the service they provided. Secondly, it raised difficult staff questions.
Railway restaurant car staff tended to regard the extension of Pullman services with some antagonism. This was particularly marked after nationalisation, when the Pullman Car Company was still in private hands, and it was still likely to be a significant factor - partly because Pullman Car Company rates and conditions of service were rather less favourable to the staff than those of railway restaurant car staff, and partly because there was a fear that the extension of Pullman services would affect some of the most remunerative of railway catering services, leading to loss of earnings by senior staff and to some risk of redundancy.
The Commission next turned its attention to the second stage as envisaged in Barker’s memo, for high-speed diesel multiple units (DMUs) between cities. These would be additional to existing services, expressly designed to meet competition from other forms of transport.
On June 14 1955, a committee entitled the Diesel Multiple-unit Mainline Express Services Committee was set up under the chairmanship of H H Phillips, the Assistant Regional Manager of the Western Region ( WR). Against a remit of running special express DMU services, the committee considered a wide range of aspects of the subject. Members travelled across Europe to study practice on other railways, where the Trans Europ Express concept was well established.
The report in July 1956 provided a detailed consideration of the provision of traction and recommended having a power car at each end of the train. The prime mover proposed
As late as September 1959, arguments persisted over fonts and the positioning of external lettering, and whether the lavatories should be common or with separate male/female provision (which was judged essential in a luxury train).
was a German MAN diesel of 1,000bhp at 1,445rpm. For the LMR sets, the remainder of the power train could comprise GEC electrical equipment, whereas for the WR it would be diesel-hydraulic of either a MAN/ Voith or Maybach/Mekydro manufacture. Both the power trains were already on order for locomotives being built as part of the modernisation plan. Top speed would be 90mph.
These power trains were calculated to result in a total weight of 49 tons for the dieselelectric variant and 28½ tons for the dieselhydraulic, with respective costs of £ 71,000 and £ 61,300 - a clear advantage in favour of the latter type. Perhaps understandably, the committee made a strong recommendation for the diesel-hydraulic variant, not least because some Trans Europ Express sets on the Continent were so powered. Additionally, the saving of 20 tons would assist the WR eightcar sets in attaining better timings, which would not be an issue on the LMR’s six-car formations.
At its July 26 1956 meeting, the Commission accepted the Phillips Committee report and decided that the new trains should be branded as Pullman.
By October, the LMR proposed running trains from Manchester-St Pancras, while the WR planned workings from Bristol and Wolverhampton Low Level-Paddington. Whereas the former would be First Class-only, the latter would be both First and Second class. There would be one spare set for each region, making the requirement 36 vehicles in total.
On November 29, the Commission gave the project its approval at an estimated cost of £1.215 million, with entry to service during 1958. Diesel-electric transmission was chosen, because the BTC regarded the sets as
experimental and timings at an average of at least 60mph on the WR were not now seen as a problem. The WR obtained assurances that diesel-hydraulic transmission would be an option for future orders.
BR’s Central Staff officers, who would have included the chief mechanical and chief electrical engineers, drew up a specification in conjunction with the LMR and WR, as well as Pullmans. When it came to aesthetic design and styling, the BTC’s Design Panel also became involved.
A contract was awarded to Metropolitan Cammell Carriage & Wagon Company Ltd (Met Cam) - not on the basis of a tender process, but because the company had produced well-designed and well-built rolling stock for BR previously.
One aspect of the project that was revised was its title. At its most wordy, it became ‘Diesel Multiple-Unit Main Line de Luxe Express Train’! Eventually the title of ‘Blue Pullman’ was adopted, based on the paint scheme of Nanking Blue with a broad white band at window height.
Vehicle width was an issue because the WR loading gauge was more generous than the LMR’s, but the Commission insisted on a standard width for these five experimental units. The cramped layout at Manchester Central was the main issue.
Two factors weighed in favour of the first sets going to the LMR. Firstly, the two sets only comprised a total of 12 vehicles, against 24 for the WR. Secondly, air competition for Manchester-London patronage had no equivalent on the WR. The sets were to represent the first clear example of BR’s modern face.
The date of entry into service was put back initially to spring 1959 or the start of the summer timetable, because design work progressed very slowly. An indication that the project was in trouble emerges from the BTC minutes of July 1959, because vehicle design had only just been finalised and costs had escalated. Wrangling about interior design and styling continued into 1960, with the following giving a flavour of some of these issues.
The design of the Pullman crest for the sets’ front ends was examined in October 1958 and found wanting. In March 1959, Pullmans was unhappy with the revised all-gold version.
The following month, a colour alternative was produced. On May 26, Pullmans said it universally liked and approved the colour version of the crest but still wanted three minor changes.
It had taken over eight months to produce a piece of artwork and the sets ought to have been in traffic by then. Moreover, the artist engaged to produce end-panel artwork decided to go to India for four months and a replacement had to be found. There were also arguments about table lampshades, mirrors, and even ashtrays.
Met Cam produced a vehicle mock-up, available for viewing during April 1958. While the LMR general manager sent a deputy, his WR opposite number sent no one.
In December, the two general managers complained to the Commission’s secretary general about their exclusion and about the BTC Design Panel taking decisions that went beyond its remit, which the Panel rebutted. Ruffled feathers smoothed, the great and the good inspected the mock-ups on January 26 1959 and were pleased. The ‘Midland Pullman’ was now expected to enter service in October or November.
Another spat broke out when the minutes of the March 1959 meeting of the Design Panel were circulated. Referring to the substantial cost overrun, the BR CM&EE was reported as saying that no blame was attached to the Panel for this. This remark was later struck through in the minutes, after the CM&EE said that he did hold the Panel responsible for much of the increased cost!
The WR also added to the cost and delays over its particular requirements for destination
The ‘Midland Pullman’ began running on July 4, achieving high standards of punctuality and earning much favourable comment from the travelling public. The trains were air-conditioned, a feature that would not be provided in standard coaching stock until 1971. Patrons had a full service at their reclining seat.
blinds. And as late as September 1959, arguments persisted over fonts and the positioning of external lettering, and whether the lavatories should be common or with separate male/female provision (which was judged essential in a luxury train).
Despite all the bickering, the senior officers examined the first complete and painted set on October 15. The overall impact of the livery and streamlined front end was appreciated. The impact was lost somewhat in later years when the ubiquitous full-height yellow front end warning panels were added, while in September 1966 the livery gave way to the new corporate Pullman scheme of Rail Grey with a Rail Blue stripe at window height.
Met Cam released the first set to the LMR on November 14 1959, and the early trial running identified many faults - the most serious were rough riding in the seating located over the motor bogies, and braking system issues. The power cars also included passenger accommodation, unlike on the High Speed Trains.
Unusually in British practice, the leading power car bogie was unpowered. Instead, the rear bogie, together with the leading bogie of the adjoining trailer car, was fitted with traction motors to drive the wheels.
The outlook for the service running early in 1960 was gloomy. The WR received its first set in February 1960 but the final one did not arrive until May 28, held back until the modification programme had been finalised.
Concurrent with the extensive modification programme were negotiations with the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR). By May 1960, a compromise had been reached, whereby BR dining car staff would be effectively seconded to Pullmans but retain their BR terms and conditions and a right of return at any time. This had taken over two years to resolve. But just when the NUR was on side, artisan staff at Manchester Reddish depot, where the sets were based on the
LMR, demanded a large shift premium for no obvious reason for working on the trains.
Inspection of two sets had been planned for November 1959, but eventually took place on June 23 1960 at Marylebone for BTC members, officers and invitees, with favourable newspaper coverage the next day. Marylebone station was over the road from the BTC’s headquarters. On July 1, the press were given a demonstration run to High Wycombe.
The ‘Midland Pullman’ began running on July 4, achieving high standards of punctuality and earning much favourable comment from the travelling public. The trains were air-conditioned, a feature that would not be provided in standard coaching stock until 1971. Patrons had a full service at their reclining seat.
Timings were sharp. The morning Up service took just under 3¼ hours and it was even quicker heading north in the evening. From the sole intermediate call at Cheadle Heath, the 181 miles to St Pancras (including the difficult 43 miles through the Peak
District) required an average of 61.6mph, with 90mph running whenever possible.
The WR introduced its services on September 12 but was less adventurous with the journey times. The West Midlands Pullman left Wolverhampton Low Level at 0700 and reached Paddington at 0935 after calls at Birmingham Snow Hill, Solihull and Leamington Spa. The return train set off from Paddington at 1650.
The Bristol morning departure was at 0745 and ran non-stop via Badminton to make a Paddington arrival also at 0935, returning at 1655. By comparison, the seven-coach Up ‘Bristolian’, hauled by a 2,200hp diesel, was booked for 100 minutes - ten minutes quicker. Both Pullman sets made a return run during the day.
While loadings on WR services were 75% or better, those on the Up ‘Midland Pullman’ were claimed to be only 60%. The late arrival time in London was blamed and so the Manchester departure time was brought forward an hour to 0745, permitting St Pancras to be reached at 1100 from January 2 1961.
With the introduction of a PaddingtonSouth Wales working on September 8 1961, the WR had arranged Pullman workings so that all three sets had daily diagrams.
Not so on the LMR, where there was only one daily diagram, giving an uneconomic 50% utilisation. Even deploying the one set in use on the existing mid-day fill-in turn beyond Leicester to Nottingham proved problematic, due to trade union objection in principle to Pullman services.
Despite this, the revised service commenced on January 2 1961, departing just 20 minutes after the set’s booked arrival from Manchester and thus proving one of Barker’s precepts.
Tackling low utilisation on the LMR rumbled on into 1963. A meeting on
November 6 1962 noted that both sets were undergoing overhauls and modifications at Derby and that only one complete set would be available until April the following year. A spare rake of five Pullman vehicles was held in reserve at Derby Etches Park and a set of First Class coaches at Manchester - chronic overprovision of 22 cars for one six-car trainset, albeit a prestigious one.
The November 1962 meeting proposed the use of the second set for a St PancrasManchester Central-Liverpool Central working, heading north at 0745 and returning at 1625, to start with the Winter 1963 timetable. It was to be maintained at Liverpool Allerton depot.
In June 1963, the LMR CM&EE advised the region’s general manager that all upgrades on both sets would be completed the following month (much later than planned), and that he wanted authority to recruit relevant staff at Allerton to deal with the new service when it started later that year.
But by December, a more modest proposal involved the second set working from Manchester at 1830 and returning the following morning from St Pancras at 0745. Eventually, the idea of finding work for the second set was dropped.
The upgrade to the sets related in particular to many complaints of rough riding, especially in the seats over the motor bogies.
By October 1960, the BTC’s Member for Engineering convened a meeting of both Central Staff and regional engineers. Clearly, the measures taken during commissioning of the sets, which had been a significant cause of delay in entry into service, had proved inadequate. The Swiss design of bogie had performed satisfactorily on the continent, and now fresh attempts were put in hand to resolve the matter during 1961, involving Derby and Swindon Works, Met Cam and the Swiss designers.
To assess the situation personally, the LMR’s general manager took the region’s assistant general manager, the head of public relations and the CM&EE on the Down service, returning on the next day’s Up train.
They sat in the seats with the worst reported bad riding. Summarising the situation, the worst riding in both directions was on the southern part of the Midland Main Line and unremarkable elsewhere. The general manager walked through the Down train and spoke randomly to passengers, who were
Demonstrating how far-sighted was the design, it was not until the advent of the Mk 2d coach in 1971 that air-conditioning became standard, together with a public address system - 11 years after Blue Pullman.
generally satisfied with the ride quality.
Completion of West Coast electrification and the introduction of new electrically hauled Pullman stock between Euston and Manchester in 1966 had a double impact on the WR. Concentration of London-West Midlands traffic on the electrified route meant the West Midlands Pullman was axed on March 3 1967. The two LMR sets were transferred to the WR, which had to find work for them on top of the redundant Birmingham train.
In 1965, the WR had produced a report which looked at service substitution by Pullman stock and additional services on existing and new routes.
With maintenance accounting for a third of costs, the practice of providing a riding technician on every service was questioned. This provision had been done to minimise the risk of an on-line failure and was likely to have contributed to a higher standard of reliability than exhibited by Class 21s with a similar power train.
Blue Pullman viability in the future would be hit by the loss of the West Midlands operation, because the 1964 loadings had been higher than on the other routes (157,000 journeys against 134,000 for Bristol and 104,000 for
South Wales). With annual running costs per set given as £95,000, the problem was identifying how five sets could be deployed profitably, because substituting a set for a conventional service would require additional annual revenue of approximately £ 35,000.
The conclusion was that only the existing two sets diagrammed from Bristol and South Wales to Paddington would be profitable. Deploying two of the other three sets on extra services over the same routes or substituting them on the ‘Golden Hind’ from the West of England to London was said to have doubtful prospects of being profitable. Patronage on the ‘Golden Hind’ would also require a greater proportion of Second Class seating.
Whether the British Railways Board was aware of this review is not known, but in
April 1966 it was critical of overall utilisation and asked the regional general managers to improve matters.
Proving the conclusions of the 1965 report, regarding the difficulty in finding profitable use for five sets, during 1969 the WR’s general manager petitioned for withdrawal of all the stock because this would improve the financial performance of his region.
The problem was that they represented in the public’s eyes the most advanced example of customer service on BR. With no train of similar quality available in substitution, withdrawal was refused.
By August 1972, the BR chief executive wrote to advise the chairman that the sets needed refurbishing and the cost could not be justified. Withdrawal came in 1973.
By the mid-1960s, LMR internal memos had spoken warmly of successful financial performance, with average loadings on the ‘Midland Pullman’ of 72% southbound and 80% northbound. This took no account of the capital charges of construction and the use of only one set each day.
When the sets were authorised in 1956, the cost was estimated at £1.215m. But in March 1961 the final bill was a few pounds short of £ 2m, and this means the trains could never be profitable overall. Whether the WR rakes ran at a true profit prior to losing the West Midlands service and inheriting the LMR’s stock is not known, but thereafter it too suffered losses.
Did the Blue Pullmans leave a legacy? Described by the BTC at the time of being ordered as experimental, the concept was not replicated. The LMR did, however, get 29 new air-conditioned hauled Pullman carriages for new services along the electrified West Coast Main Line to Liverpool Lime Street, as well as Manchester Piccadilly, powered by any Class 86 locomotive (keeping the outlay much lower and offering the fastest end-to-end timings over these routes).
Demonstrating how far-sighted was the design, it was not until the advent of the Mk 2d coach in 1971 that air-conditioning became standard, together with a public address system - 11 years after Blue Pullman.
There is good reason to argue that the
Blue Pullman experiment was the father of the High Speed Train concept. Reports and memos during 1969 refer to the former as an example of what might be built as an interim train until the Advanced Passenger Trains came on stream. Nevertheless, and despite being a decade ahead of British practice, the sets were a financial white elephant.