The serial: Largie Castle, A Rifled Nest Day 71

The Japanese soldier possessed a spirit of selfsacrifice and displayed huge endurance with an unbreakable morale

On his return Angus found life in Singapore tense; with its troops now in Indo-China, its warships in coastal ports, and its air force near Saigon, Japan was closer than ever to Malaya, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies. In London, General Sir John Dill informed Lieutenant General Arthur Percival that he was unable to spare more personnel, ammunition or war materials as he needed to build up Britain’s defences. He believed that Germany, which had invaded Russia in June 1941, would soon overrun the Soviets.

In spite of the latter’s success in holding out against its enemy, Dill was unwilling to risk compromising the defence of the UK. As far as military resources were concerned, the War Office decided to prioritise Britain and the Middle East and sent no further troops or equipment to the Far East.

In August 1941, Lieutenant General Percival insisted that he receive at least five divisions and an armoured brigade for Malaya. Three months later, in November, additions arrived but Percival still only had four divisions and they were under strength. Small force However, during late August and in September, the 27th Australian and 28th Indian Brigades arrived in Singapore. From the latter part of August 1941, Churchill urged the Admiralty to send a small force of ships to Singapore. But the Royal Navy was hard pressed to spare more than two capital or leading ships after supplying the needs of the Home Fleet, Gibraltar, and the Mediterranean Fleet.

By the end of October 1941, the Prince of Wales, a modern battleship, joined the old battle cruiser, Repulse, and headed towards the Far East.

At the time when Angus was enjoying his leave (August 1941), Churchill and Roosevelt held their Atlantic Conference in which it was agreed that the United States, the UK, and the Dutch would issue a warning to Japan regarding further aggressive actions.

On September 6 1941, the Japanese also held a conference at which they decided to go to war while there was a chance of victory, otherwise they’d be strangled by the US trade embargo. Japan’s objective was to seize the raw materials of South East Asia, particularly oil from the Dutch East Indies.

However, during the closing months of 1941, Japan tried to reach an agreement with the US to end the trade embargo, but the latter refused to lift it until the eastern power promised to retreat from the Asian mainland. These were harsh terms, and on October 14 1941 the Japanese Army Minister announced that the withdrawal of troops was unacceptable, as their position in Manchuria, Korea, and China would be endangered.

The Japanese cabinet resigned, as it was reluctant to embark on another war; three days later, General Tojo was appointed Japan’s Prime Minister. His cabinet resolved to pursue negotiations with America until November 30. This date was strategic as Japan knew that if it were to make a successful attack, it would have to be made at the approach of the winter monsoons. Tojo believed that war was necessary to preserve the Japanese empire, although he was aware that an invasion of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies was a gamble. Bellicose This bellicose prime minister envisaged Hitler and Mussolini taking care of Britain and the Soviets, while his country might do a deal with the isolated US. However, Admiral Yamamoto, the Commander-inChief of Japan’s combined fleet, was more ambitious.

He saw it as a plus point that the US Pacific fleet’s base had recently moved to Hawaii. If Japan could deliver a decisive blow and knock out the American fleet, it would help them to forge a Pacific empire. If successful, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s 11 battleships and 10 aircraft carriers would be more than a match for Allied naval forces.

Japan’s southern army headquarters were already established at Saigon. This army was divided into four smaller armies. The XXV Army would seize Malaya and the XVI, the Dutch East Indies. Their plan was to carry out an invasion with speed and approach with stealth, surprise, and infiltration.

The Japanese soldier, who possessed a spirit of self-sacrifice, displayed huge endurance and with an unbreakable morale, he regarded surrender dishonourable, even treasonous. He also understood that indiscipline would earn him severe punishment.

Lieutenant General Tomoyaki Yamashita took over XXV army command in November, but his chief of planning operations, Lieutenant Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, had been studying tropical jungle fighting for months: sea landings, transport, equipment supply and training took place on Hainan Island.

During 1941 Tsuji sent Japanese officers disguised as commercial travellers to Malaya to gather intelligence. Having established a good espionage network on the peninsula, he also arranged that Japanese residents should help with intelligence.

While this was happening, the allied powers were watching. American code breakers intercepted Japanese signals on November 24. The US Chief of Naval Operations signalled Pearl Harbour that Japanese attack was a possibility. On November 29 the War Office in London passed a message to Singapore that Japanese negotiations had broken down and an offensive was likely. Sigh of relief On December 1 volunteer forces mobilised and there was a sigh of relief when, on the following day, the Prince of Wales and Repulse arrived in Singapore. On the third, the Admiralty informed Singapore that the Japanese Embassy in London had destroyed their cipher machine. At dawn on December 4, the first Japanese transports bound for Thailand and northeast Malaya left Hainan Island. Another transport left the next day, planning to join up with the previous one on the morning of December 7.

To prevent detection, they relied on bad weather or the breaking monsoon. Nevertheless, RAF reconnaissance sorties attempted to fly into the South China Sea but bad weather stopped them on December 4. The next day, the British Chief of Imperial General Staff advised Brooke-Popham he could launch Operation Matador if the Japanese sailed to the Kra Isthmus in Southern Thailand.

This operation was a plan to mobilise allied forces across the border into Thailand to intercept the Japanese before they were able to invade Malaya. The next day, No 1 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force took off from Kota Bahru at midday and sighted three transports and a cruiser approaching the Gulf of Siam, about 185 miles from Kota Bahru on the northeast coast of Malaya. More tomorrow