The serial: Largie Castle, A Rifled Nest Day 83

As for Paris, 10 miles south of the river, he only learned at 8.30am that tanks had broken through the Trolak sector but by that time they had almost reached Slim Road bridge. By 8.30am, the Argylls B and C companies and HQ reassembled near Trolak but within half an hour, more Japanese tanks and infantry arrived, so the Highland regiment established a perimeter 200 yards south of Trolak.

By this time, Stewart was in touch only with the Argylls D Company positioned on the estate road. After ordering them to delay the Japanese advance, the enemy surrounded D Company and most officers and men were killed or captured. Later in the morning, Lieutenant Colonel Robertson, now commanding officer of the Argylls, ordered his men to push through the jungle towards Slim River. Few men from B and C Companies ever rejoined their battalion. Dozens lost their way, died of disease, were captured after being betrayed by Tamils or killed. Robertson was eventually ambushed and killed. The surviving Argylls and men from the other battalions retreated towards Kampong Slim, while the tank column and Japanese infantry bludgeoned their way towards Slim River Station, then followed the road that looped eastward towards Slim River Bridge. Rampage As the Argylls fought on, Brigadier Selby made his way to 12th Indian Infantry Brigade’s HQ, its isolated position hard to reach. Trolak would have been better but this was where Paris had established his HQ before moving to Tanjong Malim, and Stewart was reluctant to make another move as his staff were tired. The tanks moved steadily forward at walking pace, mowing down the unprepared 5/14 Punjabs then the 2/1 Gurkhas, until the 155th Field Regiment halted them at 9.30am, two miles south of Slim River Bridge.

While the tanks rampaged slowly south, Stewart re-established his HQ close to Selby’s on a hill near Kampong Slim but at midday tanks shot at them. Sometime after noon, 25 bedraggled Argylls, separated from their battalion, scrambled through the jungle and reached Brigade HQ where they found Stewart, Angus, and Lieutenant Ian Gordon (an Argyll on the brigade staff). Later, Donald Napier arrived with a dozen men. The Japanese were still very active close by but, with his customary sangfroid, Stewart told the men “to pay no attention to these people. They are firing any old where”. Together, Stewart, Selby and Lieutenant Colonel Harrison decided that the remnants of the two brigades should hold out until nightfall, by which time they could withdraw across Slim River and retreat down the railway line to Tanjong Malim.

Before they made their retreat, the two brigadiers held a perimeter around their HQs and collected stragglers. All transport north of the river was destroyed. In the evening, swathes of tired and hungry troops crossed the Slim River, trudged down the railway line and arrived at Tanjong Malim at midnight where transport was waiting to drive them south. Others staggered in to Tanjong Malim during the early hours of the next morning.

The Argylls’ survivors of Slim River numbered fewer than 100 (four officers and 90 other ranks) from the original 576. They were mainly from Donald Napier’s A Company and the transport section. It had taken the Japanese six hours with a Company of 30 tanks, an infantry battalion, motor transport and engineers (with the rest of the tank battalion and remaining two infantry battalions in reserve) to cover nine miles and wreak mayhem among 11th Division’s two northernmost brigades. Disaster With the withdrawal of the remaining troops from these brigades came the loss of the Division’s transport, guns and the equipment of two field batteries and two troops of anti-tank guns. The Japanese also captured a month’s supplies for two brigades, 50 light armoured cars including Bren gun carriers, many vehicles of great value to the transport-starved Japanese, 16 25-pounders and seven anti-tank guns. Additionally, valuable sappers, gunners and medical personnel were captured.

Slim River was a major disaster. 12th Indian Infantry Brigade was annihilated – on January 8, the Hyderabads could only account for three officers and 110 men; with Deakin, their commanding officer, captured, the 5/2 Punjabs were left with one officer and 60 men. Two-thirds of 28th Indian Infantry Brigade was destroyed, their 2/1 Gurkhas decimated.

Of 12th Indian Infantry Brigade’s personnel who were lost in the jungle, 14 officers and 409 men escaped the Japanese and returned to British lines: 800 were killed, 1,200 captured and 2,000 went missing, many of whom were captured. Of the 576 Argylls, 40 died in the jungle, 75 were killed, 30 reached Sumatra, 300 were captured and 94 returned to British lines weeks later. The number of Japanese casualties was a fraction of the losses suffered by the British and Indians. The battle of Slim River lost central Malaya to the Japanese and threatened the British chances of holding northern Johore long enough for reinforcements to arrive.

Above all, 11th Division ceased to be effective. There were many reasons for the disaster. It is obvious that Japanese tanks caused much of the problem. Neither Paris nor Stewart were present at the battles of Asun or Jitra farther north, where tanks were used by the enemy. These officers underrated them and their potential in thickly-wooded terrain. Tanks were not involved along the rugged Grik road where 12th Indian Infantry Brigade earned its reputation. After the end of the war, Stewart wrote that he had never taken part in an exercise of coordinated anti-tank defence. The use of tanks on a road at night was a surprise but it was not the first time that the Japanese had employed this measure.

Other factors contributed to the defeat. Communications broke down so that the rear brigade defending the Slim River area was unaware that the Japanese had engaged with the forward battalion of 12th Indian Infantry Brigade. Brigade HQ was positioned well off the main road so they lost touch with the situation. There was also a failure to make full use of anti-tank weapons – 11th Division possessed an anti-tank regiment and 1,400 anti-tank mines yet 12th Indian Infantry Brigade only possessed one troop of anti-tank guns, 24 anti-tank mines and a few concrete obstacles.

The brigade had a field regiment and, although it could not be used to support the forward infantry companies because of the wooded country, there was no attempt to use it in an anti-tank role. Added to all of this, the brigade relied too much on demolitions as a delaying factor, yet in some cases bridges were not successfully blown up.

“Few men from B and C companies ever rejoined their battalion. Dozens lost their way, died of disease were captured after being betrayed or were killed