Don’t assume all of Europe is united against Britain
‘For the central and eastern states the prospect of losing the EU’s most committed Nato state is a sobering prospect’
What does the EU referendum result mean for the UK’s negotiating position when Brexit talks start in Brussels? Interpreting the will of the public will fall to the next prime minister. He or she will need to balance the UK electorate’s expectations against the exit deal that the EU might be prepared to agree to.
The EU’s official line, upheld by all 27 members and the Commission, is that there will be no informal or formal negotiations until the Article 50 exit clause is triggered by the UK.
It’s early days and much is uncertain but, behind this show of unity, different opinions are emerging. Ireland is understandably a special case. Its close economic and political links to the UK mean it has the most to lose from a botched negotiation and it has urged calm on all sides.
Then there are three broad groups. The first, the toughest nut to crack, comprises the European Commission, European Parliament and the Eurozone-south led by France. They are pushing for a speedy British exit.
Federalist-minded members and centralising institutions view the crisis triggered by Brexit as a means to spark the next push forward in “the project”.
From a French point of view, putting as much distance as possible between the UK and the EU would cement its place as second in the European pecking order to Germany.
At the other end of the spectrum are the Central and Eastern states where geopolitical considerations are likely to be paramount and the prospect of losing the EU’s most committed Nato state is a sobering experience. These countries often shared Britain’s scepticism about the EU’s accretion of power and have already put pressure on Mr Juncker to resign.
Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who is the main power broker within the Polish government, has even called for “efforts aimed at making Britain return, including a second referendum”.
The UK’s prominent role in Europe’s defence and its close relationship with the US might, if deployed intelligently by the UK, transcend the seemingly intractable impasse with these states in the last round of negotiations over the free movement of people.
The third group is Germany, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavians, which sit somewhere in the middle. German chancellor Angela Merkel and Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte have stressed that the priority is to get the talks right. These countries share Britain’s liberal trading instincts, are the most deeply economically linked with the UK, and are wary of Brexit being used as a pretext for greater centralisation, which could further fuel domestic Eurosceptic sentiment.
As net contributors to the EU budget, they would also have to pick up the lion’s share of the tab in Britain’s absence. On the other hand, they are also keen to avoid Brexit becoming an attractive precedent.
These differences should not be overdone and there are limits to any “divide and conquer” strategy on the UK’s part. All EU members – as well as MEPs – will have to ratify a UK deal and all have so far been united in saying that the UK cannot cherry pick the best of the EU from the outside.
The UK Government must remember it is not dealing with a homogenous free trade bloc but a political entity with its own internal dynamics. It must use these to pitch its negotiating offer appropriately.
Open Europe is a pan-European think tank