The EU’s answer to Brexit? Yet more Europe
As the European project turns 60, there’s no sign of a change in attitude from the Brussels Eurocrats
In 1975, when the EEC was still avant-garde, we voted to stay in by two-to-one. By last year, any lingering veneer of modernity had peeled away, exposing a rusted and rickety Brussels structure. We concluded, albeit narrowly, that there were better long-term opportunities beyond the oceans, and we reversed our decision.
That wasn’t the only factor, of course. Several arguments came together, some economic, some democratic. Still, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that, had the EU not spent the previous seven years lurching from crisis to crisis, the referendum would have ended differently.
Hard, at any rate, for British observers. In Brussels, almost no one accepts that the EU has a problem. The problem, for Eurocrats, was Britain and its arrogant refusal to share sovereignty. Brexit, as they see it, has conveniently removed that problem, allowing the rest of the EU to forge on. People often respond to unexpected events by doubling down. When something shocks us, we take it as proof of whatever we were saying before. Those who spent the past 60 years turning everything into an argument for “more Europe” have done the same with Brexit. The French, German and Italian leaders agreed this month to push ahead with deeper integration, especially in the military and fiscal fields. But is closer union really the answer? The EU turns 60 on Saturday – a useful moment, perhaps, for inward reflection.
The EU’s two chief initiatives in the past 20 years have been the merging of national currencies into the euro and the collapsing of national borders into Schengen. Neither has delivered the promised benefits.
Both the euro and Schengen have been exposed as fair-weather schemes, shredded by the first squall. Just as the debt crisis revealed the weaknesses of the monetary union, so the migration crisis made a mockery of Schengen.
More to the point, both revealed the extent to which European integration comes at a democratic price. Overseeing the economy and securing the national territory are elemental government functions. Yet, both on monetary policy and on immigration, European voters found themselves powerless, because the key decisions were taken in Brussels.
This might not have mattered if they had all come together as Europeans. Then, a pan-continental democracy might have been made to work. But, despite 60 years of political assimilation, there is no sign of people thinking and voting as a single demos. Indeed, on the one empirical measure available – turnout at elections to the European Parliament – we have seen an unbroken decline since 1979.
That’s not to say that the EU has been a disaster. It has successes as well as failures to its name. The trouble is that, in its pursuit of political amalgamation, it has over-reached.
The dismantling of trade barriers, for example, was a tremendous achievement. But as the focus shifted from mutual product recognition to over-regulation, the EU found itself slipping behind. Every continent on the planet has outgrown Europe this century – even Antarctica, if we count the increase in cruise traffic as economic activity. Meanwhile, the wealthiest countries in Europe are those that chose a free trade area (Efta) over a customs union, namely Switzerland and Norway.
Making travel easier was, likewise, a great accomplishment. Again, though, the EU over-reached, insisting on equal benefits claims and the right to overturn deportation orders. Free movement of labour turned into EU citizenship, with a series of enforceable rights. People sensed, correctly, that they were no longer in charge of their own borders.
What of peace, the EU’s original justification? We can argue that one endlessly. In my view, the EU was not a cause, but a symptom of a European peace based on the defeat of fascism, the spread of democracy and, in part, the American security guarantee.
Which brings us to the fundamental problem – and the reason that Britain is leaving. The EU is incapable of reform. It demonstrated its incapacity beyond doubt during David Cameron’s attempted renegotiation. Until then, British opinion polls were finely balanced when people were offered a binary choice. Throw in a middle option, though – a looser form of membership – and it consistently attracted 70 per cent support.
Had Mr Cameron been able to come back with such a deal, had he been able to recover just one or two powers, and thereby set a precedent, he’d almost certainly have won.
Britons concluded that the looser deal they had always wanted – a common market, not a common government – was not on offer to members. So they decided to seek it from the outside.
The UK now has the chance to become what Churchill envisaged in 1946: a friend and sponsor to a united Europe rather than a member. We have an interest in the stability and prosperity of our allies: prosperous neighbours make good customers.
We have been an unhappy and fractious tenant. Let’s now resolve to be a loyal and generous neighbour.