Translating angry words into action against Syria is likely to be harder than the president believes
Donald Trump’s angry denunciations of Bashar al-Assad’s recent gas attack have led to suggestions that, despite only recently insisting the US would not get involved in renewed Middle East entanglements, the US President is actively considering military strikes in Syria.
On the White House lawn on Wednesday, Mr Trump said that Assad had crossed “many” red lines; yesterday reports emerged that he had told several members of Congress in phone calls that he is considering retaliatory strikes on Assad regime assets in Syria. But if he does choose to engage the military might at his disposal, what options are on the table?
The most dramatic plan would be to undertake broad and intense military strikes from sea and air to coerce Assad into negotiating an end to the war in his country. But this runs the very real risk of inflicting casualties among Russian forces on the ground and drawing the Cold War superpowers into direct confrontation. Such all-out strikes would have serious regional ramifications too, possibly drawing reprisals from Iran, through its proxy Hizbollah, which could even take the form of terrorist attacks on the US mainland.
More limited, but still ambitious, would be strikes aimed at taking out what remains of Assad’s chemical weapons arsenal. This would have the obvious advantage of a more limited objective, and one also more likely to garner international support: enforcing the international prohibition against chemical weapons. The problem is that the likelihood of eliminating all stockpiles and production facilities is not high, and may simply encourage Assad to lash out in yet more lethal fashion with those illegal munitions that survive the US bombardment.
Both of these goals will be difficult to achieve and risk confrontation with Russia.
What does the US law say about such strikes? Ideally, presidents have preferred to ensure that they have domestic support from Congress before resorting to the use of military force. George Bush and George W Bush secured support for their wars in Iraq, but Bill Clinton launched strikes in Libya and Kosovo without congressional approval. President Obama joined a multilateral military intervention in Libya that had the backing of the United Nations Security Council, a second possible strategy for securing support for intervention, but not one that guarantees that foreign interventions will be popular at home.
Given the uncertainty surrounding military strikes, though, it would be wise to consider non-military options very seriously first.
Mr Trump may choose to turn, once again, to the Kremlin for help in pressuring Assad to get rid of chemical weapons. So far, though, Russia has refused even to attribute responsibility for the recent attacks to the Assad regime. And whether Mr Trump has any leverage over Russia is far from clear. He will also be intensely aware that the personal costs he may suffer for inaction in Syria could be considerable.
Absent the strong support of Congress, the public, and international allies, it is a very risky calculation for a president who cares a great deal about his domestic popularity. How he responds may tell us a great deal about the next four years.