How Churchill made aviation history

SIR – Today marks a centenary that has been generally overlooked by historians of politics, aviation and Churchilliana.

On August 8 1917, Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, told the War Cabinet that a major offensive was about to begin on the Western Front.

Winston Churchill, who had recently joined Lloyd George’s government as minister of munitions, drove straight to Hendon airfield and was flown by a Royal Flying Corps pilot to General Headquarters in Amiens to carry out a fact-finding tour.

My research suggests that this was the first time any member of a government, from any country, had travelled by aircraft on affairs of state.

Given that statesmen today are so dependent on aircraft, it is perhaps an anniversary worthy of record. Patrick Hickman-robertson

Eastbury, Berkshire

SIR – Paul Ham (Comment, July 31) confuses political and military questions. In suggesting that “the First World War was not worth it”, he ignores the question that few members of the “peace” party will answer – namely, were we willing to live with the consequences: continental Europe ruled from Berlin?

Nevertheless, he is right to attack the revisionist military historians who defend General Haig’s performance. Passchendaele illustrates the tension: on one hand, reforming generals supporting the new “bite and hold” tactic to counter the defender’s advantage in the era of the machine gun and barbed wire; on the other, Haig’s cavalryman’s dream of the great breakthrough, through which he could pour his horsemen to end the war.

The “bite and hold” tactic envisaged the attacker massing overwhelming artillery on a narrow front, seizing a portion of the enemy front line after massive bombardment, then consolidating in the enemy’s trenches.

The counterattack then provided an opportunity to massacre the enemy with overwhelming artillery fire.

On the Somme, General Rawlinson’s plan for this was overruled by Haig; but, at Messines, General Plumer adopted the tactic, inflicting much heavier casualties than our losses. In the second phase at Passchendaele, Plumer used it again, making three significant advances, each at least as costly for the Germans as for us.

Then Haig appointed General Gough for the final phase, turning it into another bloody fiasco. They again tried for a decisive breakthrough, which could only have been achieved – against the defender’s massive advantage in trench warfare – if the German army had been almost finished.

The real charge to be laid against Lloyd George was his failure to confront Haig, with his media lobby and royal backing, and replace him with a reformist general. Sir Julian Brazier

Canterbury, Kent