Why I banned the ‘special relationship’
We should be tough and pragmatic, not romantic, in our dealings with our most important ally
That sound you hear is panicked fluttering in the Westminster dovecotes, provoked by one Jeremy Shapiro, a former mid‑ranking diplomat in the US State Department. A few days ago, he told an audience at the Cheltenham Literature Festival that, under Barack Obama, America had regarded the notion of a special relationship with the UK as “a joke”. He added that the Americans went so far as to tease the Brits with public references to the Falkland Islands as the “Malvinas”, the name used by Argentina to pursue its claim of sovereignty.
To the British ear, steeped in the mythology of the so‑called special relationship, Mr Shapiro’s comments not only sounded gratuitously offensive, but came as a rude shock. After all, are we not counting on our special relationship with the US, which President Trump has so fulsomely praised, to open the gates to a rapidly negotiated free‑trade agreement after we leave the European Union?
Mr Shapiro’s bedside manner clearly leaves something to be desired, but he did us a favour by telling us some home truths about our delusional addiction to the idea of a special relationship with the US.
I believe strongly that America is our closest and most important ally. How could it be otherwise with such a vast concentration of British interests invested in the relationship: economic, military, intelligence, cultural and so on? But I do not believe in the “special relationship”. The phrase had freshness and relevance when Winston Churchill first coined it just after the Second World War, when our alliance had helped to defeat the Nazis and construct a new world order.
But that was then and this is now. On this side of the Atlantic, the idea of a special relationship has evolved into an idealised vision of UK‑US relations, which generates unrealistic expectations and encourages prime ministers to behave like poodles. It was a phrase that I banned in the British embassy in Washington 20 years ago.
Just before Jack Straw paid his first visit to the US as foreign secretary, I was invited by the secretary of state, Colin Powell, to come to the State Department and discuss the agenda for their talks. Powell showed me the text of his short speech of welcome. Somebody had scrawled in black ink across the top of the page: “Don’t forget the special relationship!” I pointed this out. Powell replied with a laugh: “We know you Brits will go ape‑s‑‑‑ if I don’t mention the special relationship.”
It was humiliating to be seen to be so needy, like a banana republic. It makes me curl up inside to recall Gordon Brown’s look of relief when President Obama spoke the dreaded phrase on his visit to Britain in 2009. Worse, it was often used against us in negotiations. In a particularly tough exchange over transatlantic air services, I remember being accused of not caring about the special relationship, which would be damaged if Britain did not agree to the US position.
I have never known a negotiation with the US where “America First” has not been the driving motive on the US side. It is no recent Trumpian invention. When it comes to negotiating a free‑trade agreement with the US, the UK should forget any idea that the so‑called special relationship will blunt the single‑ mindedness of the American team to get the better of us.
In my experience, most American trade negotiators have been trained as lawyers and are skilled in the arts of take‑no‑prisoner litigation. The stark truth is that the transmission belt between warm and fuzzy words of encouragement from the White House and the cut and thrust of the negotiating table can be gossamer thin – the more so when they have been uttered by a president as mercurial and capricious as Trump.
There is no room for sentimentality in any negotiation. Mr Shapiro has usefully, if cruelly, reminded us of the hollowness of our illusions. In truth, the US has only one special relationship. That is with Israel, because of its influence over the US Congress. So, when the UK‑US trade talks open, the only thing special I hope to see will be the toughness of our pragmatism.