CHOICE OF OBJECTIVE

From the loose writing and speaking on the subject a somewhat vague notion has obtained that there were two rival “plans of campaign” for defeating the Central League, the first being to subdue the enemy through his weakest allies by defeating successively Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria, so as finally to isolate Germany for a combined offensive; the second, to strike directly at the German forces in France with the main forces of the alliance, which, incidentally, covered London and Paris. Some such division of opinion still exists, nor is it correct to say that either school was completely right or wrong. Obviously neither Germany nor her allies could be neglected, and if Germany had to be held in check, such an important fraction of our strength would be required for the purpose that it might as well be used offensively. The really important deduction which can be made from the controversy and from the events of the war is that both plans were tried with insufficient resources, and both have failed so far. If our policy was to defeat the German armies in France, the sideshows ought not to have been permitted to interfere with the necessary measures and distribution of resources, as they have done. If, on the other hand, we resolved to beat down the weaker members of the enemy league in succession, our army should have refrained from a too-ambitious programme in France until this policy had been given a fair trial. Neither policy has been wholeheartedly applied, with the not unnatural result that we have fallen between two stools, and triumphed through neither scheme.