Can Trump do a deal with Kim without selling out a key regional ally?

The outlines of a Trump Doctrine are beginning to emerge. It is mercurial, flexible, and tactically volatile, but there is method to the madness. The question is: can Trump give Kim Jong-un what he needs to make the deal?

He is certainly full of surprises. We have gone from the US president threatening war on Twitter to accepting South Korean president Moon Jae-in’s Peace Olympics initiative within a few short months. Trump’s swift acceptance of a summit may even have taken the North Korean leader by surprise, causing him to run to Beijing for counsel and support. Whatever the merits of Trump’s style, he is pragmatic and bare-bones, with little sentiment or principle. On the details, however, there is cause for deep caution.

What does North Korea want? Everyone agrees it is looking for three things, more or less in this order: regime survival, unification with the South, and the removal of US forces from the region. So, take the first condition: does this mean we guarantee the security (and prosperity) of one of the world’s greatest human rights infringers? Sure, it’s better than a nuclear war, but it would be a bitter pill to swallow.

Two, can we give them unification? Maybe, but recent years have seen South Korea’s younger generation view the idea unfavourably. Nuclear blackmail does not inspire fraternity.

Third, the removal of US forces from the Korean peninsula completely ignores the geostrategic logic behind US power in North-east Asia. Yes, one could argue for leaving “Asia to the Asians”, but let’s not forget that South Korea is a fellow liberal democracy. There are serious moral imperatives for Western democracies – including the US and UK – to stand by it until the threat is really over.

Going forward, then, one senses the central drawback to Trump’s impetuous style. It’s excellent at opening doors, but less effective at knowing which to walk through. Flexibility is well and good, but without principles, pragmatism is all ends and no means. Thus, the president will have to apply some principle to the final answer, whether it leads to conflagration or to support for a human rights nightmare. Let us hope that he does not throw one of the West’s key allies in the region under the bus for a symbolic diplomatic “win”.