If Trump wants a legacy, he mustn’t walk away from Iran
The president wants to win kudos in his talks with Kim Jong-un, but he must first prove the US keeps its word
It can be difficult to admit it, but amid all the bluster, vanity, contradictory statements, scandals and administrative chaos of the Trump administration, the president does quite often have a point. Sometimes he even deserves a bit of credit for going about things in his own idiosyncratic way.
This is certainly true on North Korea’s nuclear missile programmes, where his approach of threatening war, making the issue a top priority in relations with China and then being prepared to take great diplomatic risks through offering a summit with Kim Jong-un has produced at least the potential for some kind of agreement.
Of course, the forthcoming talks could still be seriously mishandled by Trump. Accustomed to snap decisions, he could make errors when faced with the wily North Korean leader. He might allow a wedge to be driven between the US and South Korea, or the talks to fail but with Pyongyang receiving the credit for being ready to make concessions. He will have to get used to the idea that Kim is almost certainly not going to give up the nuclear warheads he has amassed, but that it could still be worthwhile to strike a bargain. There could be a freeze on North Korean nuclear and missile developments with verifiable limits, deliberate reductions in military exercises and tensions, security guarantees from the US and its allies, and a discernible economic opening up by the North with some assistance from outside.
Such a deal would be a long way from perfect, because Kim Jong-un would still have nukes. His gross human rights abuses would continue; it would be difficult to police; it could collapse in the future; and the improved commercial links might help the regime survive rather than eventually bring it down. But it would be better and more stable than the current situation of a cornered dictator and rampant nuclear proliferation.
It would be described as Phase One or interim. Most of the world would greet it with relief, and Trump would no doubt think that, if he can preside over a growing economy, control immigration into the US more tightly and survive the Mueller probe looming over him, a deal on Korea would give him a strong platform for re-election.
Why, then, is Trump so opposed to the deal with Iran, signed in 2015? It has certain similarities to a possible agreement with North Korea. Those of us involved in parts of the negotiations often thought we were more likely to end up in armed conflict with Iran than to reach a deal with them. Eventually we were able to sign up to Iran dismantling many of its nuclear facilities and activities in return for relief from sanctions on its oil exports.
There are three reasons why Trump is so hostile to this, and is considering effectively pulling America out of the deal by the end of this week. One is that he didn’t do it himself. This was an Obama flagship achievement, denounced by the Republicans in Congress as weak, and Trump has a campaign commitment to ditch it as “the worst deal ever”.
Secondly, he is highly influenced by pressure from Israel and its strong supporters in the US. The Israelis do not want anyone giving financial relief to Iran or relaxing in any way about it. And third, he – and they – do indeed have a point. While the Iranians appear to be implementing to the letter the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action they solemnly signed, they have if anything stepped up their development of ballistic missile technology since then, and have intensified their bid for power across much of the Middle East. Wherever you look across an arc from Lebanon through Syria, Iraq and over to Yemen, Iran’s money or militias are there – and for the West and its allies they are trouble.
Furthermore, the agreement with Iran expires in 2025 and in theory she could return to her nuclear ambitions having gained strength in every other way in the meantime.
Sitting in the White House with fingers poised on his Twitter feed, it must be so tempting for Trump finally to denounce all this and declare he is fulfilling another promise and ripping it all up. If he does so, he will be making a very great error. Boris Johnson is correct to be in Washington now, warning of the consequences.
Abandonment of the Iran deal by Trump would leave the Iranian leadership as the all-round winners of the events of recent years. Much of world opinion would sympathise with their complaints. The Western alliance would be more divided than on any issue since the invasion of Iraq. It would be impossible to reassemble the international sanctions that brought about the earlier negotiations and so there would be no new or improved deal. And Iran would be free, if it chose, to pursue a renewed nuclear programme, having already received the cash owed to it when sanctions were relaxed.
The best answer to the Iranians’ regional troublemaking is not to go back on the one agreement made with them. It is to maintain strong counterweights to their influence. That always includes being fully supportive of the security of Israel, but now also the prospect of a reformed Saudi Arabia under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The US should be planning to maintain its military presence in Syria, not withdraw it as Trump has wanted. The Gulf States, deeply divided among themselves, should be encouraged to settle their differences rather than have them exacerbated by the president’s own comments. America and the West can have a credible and coordinated strategy for containing Iran without risking a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
It is entirely possible that Trump will further postpone or fudge the decision scheduled for the next few days. If he is wavering, he should picture himself sitting across from Kim in the near future. Kim intends to rule for far longer than any American president. He is less interested in whether Trump keeps his word than in whether the United States does so.
Ending the Iran deal would mean that what the US signs up to in one year it can abrogate three years later. It would broadcast the message that Washington does not honour its word. And that in turn would not bode well for an agreement with North Korea or the stability of the Middle East – and thereby for the peace of the world.