Divorced, but still living in the annexe

For those who supported it, Brexit was supposed to be a moment of national liberation. On the eve of the June 2016 referendum, we said in an editorial that “a world of opportunity is waiting for a fully independent Britain. This country is a leading economic power, its language is global, its laws are trusted and its reputation for fair dealing is second to none.” A majority of voters agreed.

Indeed, at 17.4m it was the biggest vote in British electoral history. But while decisive, the result was also divisive because 16m voters wanted to stay in the EU. In the two years since, the latter have made the running while the Brexiteers have consistently been on the defensive, seeking to justify their position against a barrage of Remain hostility, big-business scepticism and EU obduracy.

Rather than accept the democratic decision of the voters, the losing side has spent every waking hour trying to undermine Brexit rather than help make it a success, advising EU negotiators that together they can engineer a political crisis to stop Brexit in its tracks. They are getting close to achieving their aim.

The Cabinet’s agreed negotiating position, finally achieved, has satisfied neither the Brexiteers nor the Remainers. The former consider it a capitulation that will keep the UK shackled to the EU and limit the global opportunities that Brexit was intended to release; the latter say we may as well stay in and at least have a say in matters affecting us. But we cannot stay in because the country voted to leave. Moreover, so did the Commons – triggering Article 50 by a majority of nearly 400 in the full knowledge that in doing so the process leading to Britain’s exit had begun. Not to leave would be a democratic enormity that no parliament could contemplate without another referendum, to which neither of the two main parties is committed.

Two main questions, therefore, arise from the Chequers summit. First, does the Brexit that is now proposed, assuming the EU agrees, meet the aspirations that we set out in the editorial quoted above? It is now clear that the answer is no.

The second question is whether this is the best that can be achieved from the position we are now in. Theresa May convinced the Cabinet, including such diehard Brexiteers as Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, that this was now the optimal position, one that allowed the referendum vote to be delivered while being acceptable to the EU.

History will be the judge of why we have come to find ourselves cast as abject supplicants for exercising our democratic right as a nation to leave a set of political institutions that have developed in a way never envisaged the last time there was a vote on EU membership in 1975. The political crisis that ensued when David Cameron resigned; a lack of direction since; a failure to rally the country behind the Brexit decision – all played a part. Above all, the loss of the Government’s parliamentary majority severely limited Mrs May’s options and gave renewed hope to those who wish to undo Brexit.

When the Prime Minister said “Brexit means Brexit” it was deliberately ambiguous. What it means now is that we will be leaving the EU next March, as promised, but we will remain wedded to all the aspects of our current relationship until the end of 2020 and to much of it even after that date. It is like a divorce where we continue to live in an annexe to the marital home, contribute to the household funds and agree to the rules, but are never consulted about anything. The Brexiteers, like Jacob Rees-mogg on the page opposite, are furious. But they have to show a workable plan that overcomes the obstacles the Cabinet has faced.

It is possible, even likely, that the final agreement will be voted down in the House of Commons by a combination of Labour and the Tory Eurosceptics, as happened to the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. But if the Brexiteers calculate that we would then crash out without a deal, Parliament will almost certainly stop that from happening, too.

A general election could then ensue, at which Brexit may be reversed. In their dudgeon, therefore, the Brexiteers need to consider whether Mrs May’s approach will at least deliver Brexit, albeit a pale imitation of what was once possible.

‘History will be the judge of how we became cast as abject supplicants for using our democratic right’