Why May won’t get the flexibility she wants from key figure of Macron

There is little secret about Theresa May’s pitch to Emmanuel Macron when she interrupted his holiday for an off-site Brexit meeting in the presidential hideaway of Fort Brégançon.

The UK has to make a substantial Brexit offer and now it is time for Europe to reciprocate – or risk a catastrophic no-deal that would poison the well of EU-UK relations for a generation. Mrs May believes the only way to avoid this is to shift the talks from the “technical” track run by the European Commission (whose pure raison d’être is the defence of the EU rules) to a “political” track, where the EU “chiefs” make real-world decisions. Mr Macron is key to that.

So, freed from the flummeries that accompany an official visit, it is hoped that some straight talking between two leaders will bear fruit – but that cuts both ways. Mrs May will argue she has made a giant leap by offering to bind the UK into much of the EU’S regulatory orbit by accepting a “common rule book” and maintaining a “level-playing field” on state aid.

It was a leap, she will have no doubt reminded Mr Macron, that cost her both her Foreign and Brexit secretaries and leaves her administration teetering on the brink. And if Europe pushes her over, her government is likely to be followed by something far less palatable to the EU.

Whether it’s a takeover by Eurosceptics who would like to see the EU unravel altogether, or a hard-left government led by Jeremy Corbyn (who wants to be set free from the EU’S state aid rules), Mr Macron should be very careful what he wishes for.

But what about French thinking? To put it mildly, officials in Paris are pretty unsentimental about Brexit. They think London should accept the decision to leave – and then leave – without trying to cling simultaneously to all the benefits of membership. The issue of trust – or lack thereof – makes it doubly difficult to grant for latitude. Mrs May’s Chequers “offer” to remain bound to Europe on goods, but free to diverge on services, will be extremely difficult for Mr Macron to sell at home.

Viewed from Paris, the UK White Paper is not a sensible halfway house, but a backdoor into Europe’s single market for goods that might soon be attractive to others – like populist Italy, for example, which has a goodsorientated economy, but is

‘It is hoped that some straight talking between two leaders will bear fruit – but that cuts both ways’

increasingly fed up with Europe. And what about independence-minded forces in Catalonia or Corsica? Or even, if Europe splits further ideologically, Hungary or Poland? The EU cannot be in the business of building off-ramps.

There are countries with special deals, but France sees the UK as a country that is too large, and has too much negotiating “heft” to risk setting up complex arrangements that might soon be extremely difficult to police.

The “common rule book” pledge looks solid, but in practice France (and Germany) fear that, step by step, the British will get to have their cake and eat it. “Non,” say the French. Leaving must come with demonstrable consequences. If past form is any guide, Mr Macron will therefore suggest to Mrs May that she focuses on concluding a narrow “divorce deal” – including the dreaded Irish backstop – and accept the EU offer of a zerotariff Free Trade Agreement.

Mrs May will protest that this is politically impossible and, anyway, divides the UK by requiring a customs border in the Irish Sea. Mr Macron will say he understands her problems, but Europe cannot solve them by creating new problems for itself.

Downing Street wants flexibility from Mr Macron, but it should not bet on that. Indeed, Mrs May is likely to come away from her meeting understanding that Mr Macron’s calculation on the costs of a no-deal are calibrated differently to her own.