We cannot let Putin redraw the map of eastern Europe
Moscow’s strategy of cyber destabilisation is meant to ensure small states do not join Western democracies
Last week’s co-ordinated revelations by British, Dutch and American intelligence agencies about the activities of Russian agents – conducting cyber attacks on countries, companies and international organisations – were a setback and an embarrassment for Moscow. The extent of such activities and the duplicity of the endless denials were illuminated. The eyes of other governments and the wider public will have been opened to what is really going on. Yet of equal, or even greater, concern is the nature and scale of Russia’s interventions in a growing number of southern and eastern European countries. While the West is distracted and divided, President Vladimir Putin is busily undermining its future stability in plain sight.
Events in Ukraine since 2014 remain the starkest example of this. Russia has annexed part of its territory – Crimea – and then pursued a long campaign of attrition and destabilisation to prevent Ukraine functioning as a normal country. Years of tragedy and death have ensued, including the shooting down of a Malaysian airliner, fiercely denied by Moscow but shown beyond doubt to have been caused by a Russian missile.
It is in smaller states, however, that the strategy has become utterly clear: to prevent countries choosing of their own free will to become democratic nations within the Western alliance. In 2016, an attempted coup in Montenegro – a last-ditch attempt to prevent this tiny country joining Nato – was foiled, with Russian nationals among those indicted for the plot.
More recently and overtly, Russia has used its expertise in influencing electoral events abroad to depress the turnout of voters in the country still labouring with the official name of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Last week, a referendum on the new name of “Northern Macedonia”, agreed with Greece and opening the way to its application for membership of the EU and Nato, failed to reach the required participation threshold. Reports abound of phoney social media accounts, cash payments to troublemakers and “fake news” to discourage voting and stir up tensions.
It is a fair assumption that similar techniques will have been used to influence two national elections in recent days. In Latvia, a pro-russian party received sufficient votes in the general election to mean it may have to be included in the government, bringing its influence inside the West’s institutions. And in Bosniaherzegovina, the election of Moscow’s ally Milorad Dodik to the shared presidency will make it much harder for a country of enormous significance to peace in the Balkans to overcome its deep internal divisions or progress towards joining Nato. To join all these dots, we need to connect them to the talks between two other Balkan nations, Serbia and Kosovo, about the idea of “correcting” their border. While precise proposals are awaited, this would, in principle, involve moving some municipalities with mainly Serb populations into Serbia, and possibly some with Albanian majorities into Kosovo.
To many, such an issue must seem utterly obscure and unimportant. Many Western governments are not interested. In Brussels and Washington, officials say they could agree to it provided it does not have implications elsewhere. But that is precisely the problem – it will have many such implications. Russia enthusiastically supports the border change. The UK is sceptical. Only Germany has so far been emphatically and publicly against it. As the German foreign minister has said, “It can tear open too many old wounds”.
Back in 2010, as foreign secretary, I made many visits to the Balkans saying to all concerned “the map is finished”, and telling all countries not even to think about changing it again. It would be best if the West as a whole would now join Berlin in reaffirming that message. For once one border can be “corrected” there will be a new justification for changing many more.
For some Bosnian Serbs, the notion that borders in the region can be changed is an incentive to try to complete the dismembering of the country along ethnic lines, bloodily attempted in the 1990s. For Russia, most significantly, there is a long list of borders to “correct”. Perhaps Abkhazia and South Ossetia, seized from Georgia 10 years ago, could be formally absorbed into Russia? What about stirring up the intensifying row between Hungary and Ukraine by suggesting that ethnic Hungarians might need to “correct” their border too? And how about the Baltic states with a large number of ethnic Russians – possibly they could be presented with “corrections”.
Russia has no qualms about easing open this Pandora’s box, for the likely result is embittered relations between countries that might otherwise move on to a more stable and prosperous future within a broadly Western framework. It matters enough in Moscow for resources and a coordinated strategy to be devoted to it.
Preoccupied as we are with the politics of Brexit, Brits will wonder why this matters to us. There are three reasons. First, because if we are not firm about issues like this, we are saying to millions of people in fragile countries not far away that they are stuck permanently in a no man’s land of political and economic stagnation, their leaders rewarded for fuelling ancient divisions rather than finding new grounds for working together.
Second, Russia’s systematic approach of weakening Western Europe with these policies – along with support for disruptive nationalist parties – is reaching into Nato itself, the bedrock of our security for nearly 70 years. Finally, weakness in the face of such activities will lead to a greater showdown in the future, on a border or in a country we cannot yet predict.
Theresa May and Jeremy Hunt have been commendably clear-sighted in their speeches about Russia. British agencies have led the way in exposing murderous and unacceptable actions. Britain has remained highly active in trying to promote the future stability of the Balkans and assuring the security of our Baltic allies. But now it is important to add to that a clear understanding of what is taking place, a united effort to deal with it, and a categorical insistence that the bloodstained map of eastern Europe is finished.