REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS
Turning from this high and sovereign duty to lesser matters, the present proposals deal gently with the national authority of each State. It may even be said that the only absolute diminution of sovereignty to be imposed upon any free State is that of the right to make unauthorised war. Herein the shrewdness of the project is to be seen. It has been drafted with a fuller knowledge of human nature than is always apparent in these great international agreements. For beyond these imperative cases the sanctions to be imposed by the League of Nations are not absolute, and it may be assumed that the influence brought to bear upon the individual nation will be indirect, and in most cases will take the form of an indication of future trouble should the nation in question elect to run the risk of disregarding the opinion of the League.
In this class the most important article is perhaps that dealing with the reduction of armaments. The clauses dealing with this thorny question need close attention. It will be seen that the extent of the reduction of individual State armaments will be dictated by the needs (1) of the State, and (2) of the League of Nations. The Executive Council will present to the State a scheme for effecting such a reduction, and “These limits shall not be exceeded.” It is, however, to be observed that no provision is made for the case of a State proving recalcitrant. This is not the disadvantage that at first sight it appears to be. To refuse to take the advice of the League of Nations in this matter will draw upon the unwilling State an amount of direct and unsympathetic attention that will, at all events, make it impossible for that State to prepare armaments on a scale large enough for it to have any hope of putting up even a brief opposition to the military strength of the League.
Article 14 suggests the formation of a Permanent Court of International Justice. At present this Supreme Court will exist as the only Court of Arbitration to which members of the League of Nations will submit causes of dispute, if no other Court is agreed upon by the parties. It is obvious that the Court will also have another and an even more important duty to perform as soon as the League of Nations settles down to work. It, and it alone, can be the qualified interpreter of the constitution and the decisions of the League. Its functions will therefore be similar to those which the Supreme Court of the United States possesses in deciding the interpretation of any disputed point in the American Constitution.