This flawed deal was not the unilateral exit mechanism that we asked for
‘The deal would have required us to keep good faith with the EU over the backstop, but, having sat on the Brexit Committee for years, I have learnt that this is itself a leap of faith’
So that was that. Following weeks of negotiations after Parliament rejected the Prime Minister’s draft Withdrawal Agreement back in January, the Government brought its deal back to the House – only to lose once again. It’s fairly obvious why. In the hours following the release of the revised agreement, it was pored over by numerous legal experts, including the ERG’S legal team (the “star chamber”), the Attorney General, the DUP’S experts and others, including Lord Anderson. A clear picture emerged.
The new deal only limited the risks posed by the backstop, and did not remove them entirely.
We would have had the right to seek an “arbitration” in the event that we wanted to leave the backstop and the EU was stopping us. This was problematic. It was not the unilateral exit mechanism that we asked for. We should never have to ask permission to act as a sovereign country.
I could not support this deal, even after the Prime Minister’s tweaks.
When MPS voted for the Brady Amendment, which specifically outlined that Parliament wanted the backstop replaced, I do not think they had what the PM came back with from Strasbourg in mind.
The deal would have required us to keep good faith with the EU over the backstop, but, having sat on the Brexit Committee for years, I have learnt that this is itself a leap of faith. The risk that we would have been forced into maintaining the backstop, even when we wanted to leave it, was too great. In the Conservative manifesto, we made it clear that we would not remain in an EU customs union. This deal would have meant that we could have.
In short, the changes the Prime Minister secured made a bad deal slightly less bad – but the deal remained deeply flawed. But my fellow Brexiteers and I had other reservations with the PM’S initial offering which were, effectively, sidelined by developments on the backstop.
There was no change to the fact that the deal would still leave us subject to decisions from the European Court of Justice – decisions that would directly impact on our laws and subsequently, our sovereignty. The deal still required us to pay the European Union £39billion just for the right to leave.
This appears to have been ignored in the renegotiations, despite the vocal concerns of myself and numerous colleagues. These funds could be better spent in the UK, and yet we were being asked to hand them over in order to “build and improve on the single customs territory”.
Ultimately, it was clear to me that the deal would have served as the blueprint for our future relationship with the EU. From day one, Britain has conceded far more to the EU than it has to us. It is time the EU showed some willingness to compromise, just as we have done. Otherwise, I am afraid that not just this deal but any other deal will be doomed to failure.