Compromise in search of lowest common denominator is not the way

The departure of Theresa May is a sad moment and I am sorry that it came to this. However, it didn’t really start this week. It began right back when, despite her assurances to the contrary, she chose to call a general election in 2017.

Unprepared for such a decision, the Conservative Party mounted probably the worst campaign in history. Having lost her majority, with her reputation

in tatters, and with her strongly Eurosceptic chief of staff having left her, she made a pledge to her party, that having got them into this mess she would get them out of it.

From that moment on, the direction of the Government on Brexit shifted quite substantially. First was the appointment of Gavin Barwell – a very strong supporter of Remain – as her new Chief of Staff. The influence of the Civil Service increased dramatically, with Olly Robbins reporting directly to her, cutting out David Davis. Somewhere along the road they convinced her that there was only one way to keep the border open in Northern Ireland and thus the dreadful “backstop” was invented, the issue destined to torpedo her deal and finally her premiership.

Mrs May’s position shifted, from her previous declaration that “no deal is better than a bad deal” and “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” into a messy string of weak compromises, the very same compromises she so ironically praised in her resignation speech yesterday morning. This culminated in the disastrous “deal” in December 2017, which to all intents and purposes remains the core of the Withdrawal Act we were about to have put in front of us.

Her deal was in effect a lesson in how not to carry out a negotiation, and certainly a lesson in how not to compromise. When I heard about it, I went to see her and told her that it wouldn’t go through. Not just because of the backstop but also because in pledging to pay the EU £39billion we handed over our most powerful negotiating lever without agreeing a free trade deal. We had accepted the EU’S sequencing of the negotiations, which left us locked into them. I said that she should tell the EU that it was unacceptable and that the UK should leave the table and prepare to leave

Her deal was ... a lesson in how not to carry out a negotiation, and certainly in how not to compromise

without a Withdrawal Agreement. To my surprise she answered that she could only walk away once and that would be kept for the trade negotiations. I was surprised by that answer, but now that I look back on what then followed I realise the deal hadn’t been forced on her: it was what our negotiators had sought, including the backstop. She didn’t want to veto it because it was our deal. We had sought, and been granted, the lowest common denominator Brexit.

As we go forward, the lesson must be clear. No, compromise in search of the lowest common denominator is not the way forward. It becomes a dirty word, especially when the group you constantly ask to compromise are your core supporters, as we will be brutally reminded on Sunday evening.

Conservatives have to deliver our departure from the EU at the latest by Oct 31 2019. To do this we cannot continue with this lowest common denominator policy. As Article 50 implies, ultimately we must leave, deal or no deal. The only chance of a proper outcome relies on us believing that and the EU realising that we mean it. Only then can we reinvigorate the Conservative message of benign capitalism delivering opportunity for all. However, we will only earn the right to be listened to if we deliver on the referendum.

Iain Duncan Smith MP is the former leader of the Conservative Party