Putin’s power play could see him rule to 84
Russian leader’s theatrical appearance in parliament paves the way for him to stay on as president
THE Russian parliament yesterday moved closer to making Vladimir Putin president for life after a bombshell statement, meaning he could potentially stay in power until the age of 84.
Speculation has been rife about what the Russian leader of 20 years will do when his fourth and final term in office expires in 2024.
Mr Putin in January launched a discussion of constitutional amendments that would overhaul Russia’s system of power, potentially giving him options for staying in charge in another role.
But yesterday, Valentina Tereshkova – the first woman in space – took the floor at the State Duma to suggest Mr Putin should stay in place as president.
The 83-year-old former cosmonaut said voters were “anxious and worried” and wanted Mr Putin to stay in power or at least “be around in case something goes wrong”.
Less than two hours later, Mr Putin made a surprise appearance. He told politicians it made no sense to change the wording in the constitution that bars anyone from seeking more than two consecutive terms in office. But he said he supported the idea of resetting the count of his own terms as long as the constitutional court approved.
The announcement appeared to be part of Mr Putin’s plan to stay in power.
“I’ve always found it hard to see him go away as long as he’s physically fit,”
Alexei Venediktov, the editor-in-chief at Ekho Moskvy radio, said. “Everyone was expecting a fifth (presidential) term, a legal way for Putin to carry on.”
The amendments Mr Putin floated in January were aimed at expanding the powers of parliament, a new State Council body and that of the president.
Yesterday’s announcement showed he “was playing his own game and kept his plans close to his chest away from his administration”, according to Tatyana Stanovaya, a non-resident scholar at Moscow’s Carnegie Centre and head of the R Politik political analyst firm.
The amendment, which received preliminary approval by 380 votes to 43 yesterday, at the very least gives Mr Putin an option of running again, but it remains to be seen how he is going to use it in 2024, Ms Stanovaya said.
The amendment is likely to breeze through all the stages of the approval process including a vote at the upper chamber and the Constitutional Court.
If it passes, it creates the possibility that Mr Putin could surpass Joseph Stalin’s 29-year leadership. The surprise proposal, however, shocked many in the opposition. “What is happening today is technically a coup d’état,” said Leonid Volkov, one of the closest allies of opposition leader Alexei Navalny.
Mr Navalny, who was barred from running for president in 2018 due to a conviction the European Court of Human Rights ruled unlawful, wrote: “The current constitution guarantees my right to run for president and absolutely bars Putin from doing so. In reality, I still can’t run… while Putin who has been in power for 20 years will run for his ‘first’ term no matter what.”
The Saudi royal family’s decision to pick a fight with Moscow over oil production quotas is not just a squabble about which country exerts most influence over the world’s declining oil market. It is a reflection of Riyadh’s deep unease about the growth of Russian influence in the Middle East, together with the fact that Moscow is actively supporting long-standing enemies of the Saudis, such as Iran and the Assad regime in Damascus.
Tensions between Russia and the Saudis have grown in recent weeks due to Moscow’s support for the Syrian government as it mounts its final push to recapture Idlib province, the last remaining rebel stronghold in the north-west of the country.
From the outset of the Syrian conflict the Saudis have backed groups committed to overthrowing President Bashar al-assad, including some of the jihadi organisations operating in Idlib. But any hope of removing the Assad regime has disappeared as a result of the support Damascus has received from Russia and Iran.
The Russian contribution has been particularly effective during the assault on the rebel strongholds, with Russian warplanes conducting daily sorties until the implementation of the ceasefire agreed earlier this week between Moscow and Turkey.
Nor have the Saudis been impressed with Moscow’s tacit support for Iran, which Riyadh sees as its main rival for influence in the region.
Apart from giving the Iranians diplomatic cover at the United Nations in their stand-off with Washington on the nuclear issue, the Russians have promised to help defend Iran from military action by the Trump administration, as well as condemning the recent American operation to assassinate Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s terrorist mastermind.
The deepening friction between Moscow and the Saudis certainly marks a significant change of tone from last autumn, when Russian President Vladimir Putin was greeted with a red carpet roll-out and a 21-gun salute during a rare visit to Riyadh.
Back in October, there were genuine concerns in some Western capitals that the Russians were about to replace them in the Saudis’ affections, especially after the Saudis agreed a number of trade, security and defence deals worth a combined £1.6 billion.
In retrospect, the summit amounted to little more than a Saudi attempt to persuade the Russians that their interests would be better served by throwing in their lot with Riyadh, rather than persisting with their support for the basket-case regimes running Damascus and Tehran.
It was no doubt the same mindset that persuaded the Saudis that they could form an alliance with Moscow to protect their respective stakes in the global energy market, even though Russia’s refusal to join the Opec oil cartel indicated that its main objective was to protect its own interests, as recent events have dramatically shown.
The Saudis’ decision to launch a global oil price war, taken in response to Moscow’s refusal to cooperate further with Riyadh on influencing oil prices, means that the Saudis have finally given up on the notion that they can do business with the Kremlin.
The much-vaunted arms deals signed between the two countries last October will come to nothing, not least because the Russian equipment is completely incompatible with the American and British military hardware that forms the backbone of the Saudi military.
Moreover, the Saudis have now set themselves on a course where their primary objective in the oil war is to inflict significant damage on the Russian economy, which relies on oil prices remaining at the $50 a barrel mark to maintain the profitability of its energy sector.
By contrast the Saudis, whose extraction costs are around $6-7 a barrel, can live with a far lower price, which explains why they believe they now have a significant advantage over their Russian rivals.
The collapse of global oil prices, coming in the midst of the coronavirus crisis, is not a blow the Russians can easily withstand. Their economy already faces severe pressures as a consequence of the Trump administration’s sanctions regime, and is set to suffer further damage after troubles over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline that was supposed to enable Russia to supply Europe’s energy needs for decades to come.
Another key Saudi calculation in deciding to initiate its oil price war is that, if it succeeds in causing the Russians genuine economic hardship, then this will limit the Kremlin’s ability to finance Mr Putin’s military interventions in places like Syria.
Mr Putin might regard his military involvement in the Syrian conflict as a strategic success, but it has come at a heavy cost to the Russian taxpayer. With Moscow now likely to face increased economic pressure, Mr Putin will have to limit his enthusiasm for further acts of adventurism.
The Saudis have made a massive gamble by taking on the Russians. But if they pull it off, it could severely curtail Russia’s military adventures in the Middle East.