FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS.
From LIEUT.-COLONEL REPINGTON.
WASHINGTON, Wednesday.
In spite of the goodwill prevalent here, and much evidence of good intentions on all sides, there is a certain vague feeling of awed suspense as the day approaches for the opening of this historic meeting. There is so much that is unknown to us. We do not know precisely the character and direction which will be given to the labours of the Conference by the American delegation, and upon the nature of their initiative much depends. We do not know whether the instructions of the Japanese delegates may be altered by reason of some change of Government or personalities in Japan, and the expectation of the majority of the Japanese delegation that Mr. Hara’s instructions will stand must be confirmed by Tokio before we can safely share them. The Chinese delegation represents a Government that has failed to make good, while the Anglo japanese Treaty is viewed askance by the American and Chinese Governments, and even the signatories of that instrument are not sure whether, however useful in the past, it aids or impedes their future liberty of action.
Even more grave is the conviction that this Conference must have most momentous consequences, whatever its decisions may be, and the apprehension that a single serious mistake may be irreparable. The destinies of almost half the world are at stake, yet, except the delegates of China and Japan, there are few with first-hand knowledge of Far Eastern questions, while others, however distinguished, have not the accumulated experience behind them arising from national and personal handling of the great affaire of the world. Nothing here is simple, and everything relating to the Far East is extraordinarily complicated. There is scarcely a word in the agenda which may not provoke long and serious discussion.
Countries like France and Italy may, indeed, tack on to the armament discussion the questions of guarantee and reparations, upon which M. Briand is certain to be eloquent. If America stands firm in her refusal to ratify the Anglo American guarantee France may have better fortune on the other count, and at some future conference there may begin the long-needed negotiations of experts to stabilise the exchange and restore sound currencies to beggared Europe. But, generally, this is not a conference on European affairs, and the Asiatic problems are so complicated and dangerous that the delegations are liable to become quite absorbed in them. Armaments must wait on political and economic decisions as to Eastern Asia, and even if the latter are amicably secured, the benefit can scarcely extend to unfortunate Europe until another conference shall have called together all the armed States of the old Continent.
The length of the Conference, it is anticipated, may be anything from three to six months. The American Government is undoubtedly anxious to give the greatest possible publicity to the proceedings, and statements to the contrary are not justified. But it must surely be recognised by the public that when such grave affairs are under discussion and so many discordant interests involved publicity must be tempered by discretion and resort be had to many private meetings where opinions can more freely be expressed. The preliminary discussions and definitions of the terms of the agenda are likely to occupy a considerable time, and the public must not look for any startling rapidity in the discovery of formulae satisfactory to Mr. Harding’s many well-wishers. President Harding’s first address is looked forward to with the deepest interest, and it is believed that the Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes, will be unanimously elected to preside over the meetings of the Conference.