The West has no real strategy… could we keep weakened Russia out of China’s orbit?
Grand strategy is the stuff of great power. It is the generation, organisation and application of immense means in pursuit of high strategic aims. There was a time when the conduct of grand strategy was such a second nature for Britain’s elite that it did not even have a name. As Britain’s relative means have retreated, so has a culture of grand strategy at the heart of government. Worse, the relationship between strategy and tactics has become hopelessly broken, undermining the all-important mechanism for application through ends, ways and means. Post-brexit Britain is trying to rekindle such a culture through the mantra of “Global Britain”. From my own command experience, re-establishing grand strategy as a “doctrine” of power at the heart of government will be hard.
Catchy slogans are a useful indicator of intent but devising and then coherently executing the strategy to achieve it is quite a different issue.
I saw first hand how short-term goals were prioritised at the expense of long-term strategy: unfortunately, the problems I confronted throughout my career are now clearly visible again in our approach to the conflict in Ukraine.
In 2003, during the second Gulf War, as assistant chief of the general staff and an occasional member of the chiefs-of-staff committee, I observed Western political leaders at fairly close quarters. Both George W Bush, the US president, and Tony Blair, then prime minister, had a relatively clear strategy for Iraq, but their tactics were hopelessly flawed. There were also marked limits to Britain’s influence.
For example, I visited Ambassador Paul Bremer, US head of the coalition provisional authority in Baghdad. My instructions from London were to try to reverse US decisions over the status of the Ba’ath party and the dismantling of the Iraqi army and police. The failure back in 2003 properly to understand sensible ends – and the best ways and means to seek them – led to a very long and tragically drawn-out process. It was the slowest possible route to what some argue now looks like a strategically successful outcome.
As commander of the International Security Assistance Force, like my US successors, I was forced to question Nato and UK strategy and tactics in Afghanistan, but with little effect. Despite accepting the logic of my arguments, politicians in Washington, London and elsewhere never took ownership of the campaign with the profound consequence that ends, ways and means were never in sync. Last summer, the campaign reached its strategic denouement and a chaotic withdrawal. Even then, political leaders focused on a tactical withdrawal ignoring the hard truth – complete strategic failure.
The withdrawal was only possible with the co-operation of an enemy who had killed and maimed thousands of Allied soldiers and civilians.
In 2011, as Chief of the UK Defence Staff, I disagreed with David Cameron, then prime minister, on the Libya strategy. It is on the record that I was opposed to regime change because of the long-term strategic consequences for a country that was inherently unstable. Both Mr Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy, the French president, helped by a strategically detached US president, Barack Obama, confused politics, strategy and tactics. They were overly focused on the short term and the tactical, and their respective political needs to be seen as the heroic victors of a war.
Good strategy is about hard choices. As Chief of Defence Staff, my outstanding team devised a coherent Syria strategy, which independent experts agreed had a good chance of leading to a successful outcome. Once again, political leaders were not prepared to align ends, ways and means, with Washington saying “the General’s plan is more than the market can bear”. What “market”? Consequently, my advice was to let Bashar al-assad, the Syrian president, win quickly and to stop encouraging and supplying opposition groups with insufficient support. The price in deaths, ruined lives and destroyed cities would be too huge and a massive strategic setback for the West. Russia was already sensing an opportunity and so it proved.
A similar lack of a coherent strategy is now apparent in Ukraine. There is, at best, what might be termed incremental strategy with again no early and decisive synchronisation of ends, ways and means. It is a “let’s see how it goes” strategy – in other words not really strategy at all. There is little idea in London, Washington or elsewhere how we want the war to pan out, or what sort of Russia we are seeking to shape, especially on the vital long-term issue of relations with China. Is there an opportunity, using carrots and sticks, to persuade a weakened Russia to align with the West rather than having it pushed into China’s orbit? No one is thinking grand strategically because no one is brave enough to think beyond the political convention of the moment.
London should be capable of grand strategic thinking and acting. Britain remains one of the world’s leading economies and military powers even if it is a regional strategic power. Strategy is about choices and the more choices made to balance ends, ways and means when pursuing the national interest the more informed they must be.
That means big, clear thinking and a better understanding of how plausibly to achieve our goals. This is a failing across government. It needs sorting out urgently if the UK is to successfully navigate its way through the perilous challenges ahead. On appointment, all ministers should attend an intensive tailored course on strategy, as must senior officials. And the organisation that should serve as the Government’s strategic conscience and executive branch – a more dominant National Security Council – must themselves be properly trained and qualified in the requisite skills. Importantly, as well as becoming strategy experts, they must have the moral courage to robustly speak truth unto power.
‘There is little idea in London, Washington or elsewhere how we want the war to pan out or what sort of Russia we are seeking to shape’