How the MOD failed to stop the rot in the Navy

Sir – The rot in the Royal Navy (Letters, January 8) began with the so-called peace dividend 1988-91. The ill thoughtthrough introduction of the Warfare Branch in 1993 coincided with a major round of redundancies. Forecasts at the time warned of “black holes” (severe shortages of qualified personnel) in the immediate term at leading rate level and longer term at senior rate level.

These fell on deaf ears in the Ministry of Defence and Navy Board, and acute shortages followed. Short-termist thinking led to the decommissioning of perfectly good warships so that newer ones could be manned. Outsourcing recruitment to Capita proved a disaster.

Politicians claiming that “lessons will be learnt” inevitably means they won’t, and the Treasury in particular will force through measures that the country will surely regret. With 90 per cent of the world’s trade going by sea – and unrest spreading to hinder safe passages – this is not the time to ignore our vital maritime interests.

Cdr John RM Prime RN (retd)

Havant, Hampshire

Sir – In August I spent a day at sea in the Type 23 frigate, HMS Iron Duke. It is 30 years old and has recently undergone a £103 million refit. She is a fine ship, with a happy and highly motivated ship’s company – a sign of good leadership at all levels.

It would be a travesty were she, like others of her type, to be sacrificed because of personnel shortages (report, January 5) – which can only be attributed to incompetence.

There’s no better illustration of poor long-term strategic thinking by the MOD than the 1981 Defence White Paper, which set out plans to cut the Royal Navy by 19,500 personnel (of which I was one) and decommission some County, Leander and Rothesayclass ships. Within a year we were at war with Argentina, which, despite clear signs, seemed to come as a surprise to the MOD.

Until long-term strategic thinking is the norm, our Armed Forces will continue to lurch from crisis to crisis.

Dr Alf Crossman

Rudgwick, West Sussex