AN EMPTY FORMALITY.

FROM OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT.

Great Britain has recognised Soviet Russia de jure. But this gesture, which was inevitable in the case of a Labour-socialist Government, will remain an empty one unless Soviet Russia, in her turn, recognises Great Britain, i.e., the rights both of the British Government and of British nationals. Indeed, although the recognition of Moscow as such is unconditional, it will remain a mere formality, which will bring to the Bolshevik Government no financial and economic advantage, and singularly little political advantage, unless that Government is able and willing to recreate outside confidence by the adoption, in its relations with foreign Powers and citizens, of the standard of international comity and commercial morality, in the absence of which no real and beneficial intercourse between nations is possible.

It must be admitted that the whole tone and tenour of the Note handed by Mr. Hodgson to the Soviet Government are such as might have been expected in the case of recognition being accorded the present rulers of Russia by a British Government of a non-socialist complexion. For the Note, in its caution and astuteness, clearly bears the impress of the professional diplomatist. Recognition, in these conditions, represents no more than the initial step in a series of what will probably prove to be protracted, difficult, and laborious negotiations.

It is of interest to review the paragraphs of the Note one by one. The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is to be recognised as the de jure successor of the old Russian Empire in regard to those territories which acknowledge Moscow’s authority. The qualification is important, for it excludes not only Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland, but by implication Roumanian Bessarabia as well, and the Caucasian Republics, whose Soviets are widely held to have been amalgamated with the Moscow Soviet against their own inclination, although possibly Armenia would prefer Russian to Turkish rule. Mr. Macdonald, as is well known, has always taken an especial interest in the Caucasian Republics, and, in particular, in the Georgian Socialist Republic.

Insistence on the recognition by Soviet Russia of the Anglo-russian Treaties and Conventions in existence before the Russian revolution should greatly facilitate the restoration to British subjects of whatever rights and privileges they enjoyed in Russia under the old régime. There must be a host of such diplomatic, Consular, trade, and maritime agreements. This British stipulation would seem to dispose of the contention, widely put forward in Labour-socialist circles, that the new Russia would be treated by Great Britain as an entirely separate entity from Tsarist Russia.

It will be observed that the recognition of State as well as of private debts is here postulated by Great Britain. Indeed, any premature and wholesale cancellation of State debts in the case of Russia might seriously have prejudiced our claims in the case of other debtor States. Which is not to say that Great Britain would not eventually be entitled to treat the various debts contracted by foreign Powers according to the merits of each individual case.

The demand for the cessation of anti-british propaganda is no less warranted. Its cessation, it may be recalled, had at least once, if not twice before been promised Great Britain. But Moscow did not keep its promise.

There is a singular opportuneness in the British request that Moscow should appoint real plenipotentiaries to negotiate with this country a preliminary settlement. Previous negotiations were unduly protracted, because even such powerful emissaries as M. Krassin had to refer to Moscow for the approval of every step taken by them. Finally, it should be noted that, for the time being, there is no question of appointing Ambassadors, but only Chargés d’affaires. Presumably the exchange of Ambassadors will only follow upon the satisfactory conclusion of the proposed treaty.

There is, however, a nuance between Mr. Macdonald’s action in formally recognising Russia as a preliminary to such a treaty and that of Signor Mussolini in making of its conclusion a prior condition of formal recognition.