Dangers lie ahead in the shifting relationship of Russia and Nato

A column for outside contributors. Contact: agenda@theherald.co.uk

RUSSIANS talk of an “August curse”. Attempted coups, invasion, financial collapse, wildfires and floods have all taken place during this late summer month. For many Russians, tragedy and intrigue keep to a calendar. They don’t of course. However, events over the past few weeks have done little to dispel the myth.

President Vladimir Putin carried out a ruthless shake-up of his inner circle, resulting in a significant reorganising and personalisation of the regime. The furore surrounding the US Democratic National Committee email leaks rumbles on. The Olympics doping controversy resulted in many Russian athletes staying at home. Moscow even decried the World Anti-Doping Agency as forming part of a Western conspiracy. Despite dropping off the Western media radar somewhat, events in Crimea – the Ukrainian territory annexed by Russia in 2014 – continued to simmer throughout August. Moscow accused Kiev of attempting to sabotage Crimea’s infrastructure and of killing two Russian servicemen. We have seen a build-up of Russian troops, artillery and tanks both within Crimea and along Russia’s western border. This has been accompanied by Russian military drills in the Black Sea.

These events rounded off a tense summer. In July, Nato confirmed the deployment of small battalions to the Baltic states and Poland, to act as buffers against any potential Russian military advancement. As Russia continues with its $700 billion military modernisation programme, there are fears that its Ukraine incursion may be replicated at other points along Nato’s eastern flank. This concern seems to have revitalised the alliance’s core function – territorial defence – but this new stand-off with Moscow has not eradicated questions over Nato’s identity and purpose.

Nato spent much of the 1990s attempting to redefine itself. With direct territorial threats viewed as a relic of the Cold War, the alliance adopted the language of peacekeeping and crisis management. It also became more explicitly value-driven, promoting democratisation among existing members and demanding it of new ones. As Nato membership has continued to grow, the organisation’s territory has expanded towards the Russian border.

Earlier this year, an agreement was signed which will culminate in Montenegro becoming Nato’s 29th member. However, whilst it had to implement various democraticallylinked domestic reforms before being accepted into the Nato family – thus highlighting the “democratic expansionism” which underpins Nato’s agenda – the Balkan state has an active military of just around 2,000 personnel. Montenegro will add nothing to Nato’s military strength. This cannot fail to raise questions over the motivations of an alliance defined principally by collective defence. Should Nato accept members that cannot make a telling military or strategic contribution?

Other questions loom large. Ukraine and Georgia continue to push for entry into Nato but it’s hard to see any strategic rationale for their addition. Indeed, given how dedicated Moscow is to keeping those states out of Western institutions, their accession to Nato may be dangerously provocative. Allowing Russia to think it has a say in Nato’s expansion programme may be a mistake; but so is an expansion policy which seems to lack clear priorities and principles.

So what of Moscow’s future actions and outlook? Testing the credibility of Nato will continue to be a priority. However, for all the bluster, Russia has no desire to take territory in the Baltic as it did in Crimea. Instead, most of Moscow’s attention will be directed toward the smaller (non-Nato) neighbours and the frozen conflicts in its near abroad. This is not to diminish the threat that Russia will continue to pose. Military force has an unpredictable nature and it remains Moscow’s preferred tool to use, both in wielding influence abroad and in maintaining legitimacy at home. While Russia’s finance ministry recently proposed cuts to the defence budget, the reality is that military development will continue to be privileged in Moscow, even at the expense of much-needed domestic programmes.

The Western understanding of Russia appears to be limited, at times caricature-like. The 2014 Crimea annexation was described as a wake-up call for Nato. However, so was the 2008 Georgian war. Important questions hang over Nato’s identity, how far it’s willing to protect its values, and how well it truly knows its eastern neighbour. As for Mr Putin, his risky pragmatism and desire to project authority is not blunder-proof. His talk of war is crude and unhelpful. On both sides there is a danger of miscalculation. The consequences, however unintended, may be very serious indeed. Lindsay Mackenzie is a transatlantic security analyst with a particular focus on Nato-Russian affairs. He is currently working with the Scottish Global Forum.