Catalonia referendum is fraught with problems for all concerned
IT IS TEMPTING to think of Catalonia and Scotland as being in a similar position. Both have pro-independence governments, which enjoy parliamentary majorities owing to the support of smaller secessionist parties.
Around 45 per cent of Catalans and Scots support independence. And both nations see demands to hold independence referendums – in Catalonia they have been running strong since 2012 and there is wide support (80 per cent) for a referendum, assuming the Spanish government agrees to it.
Despite these similarities, the differences are also significant.
Scots voted in an independence referendum supported by the British Government, while Catalans may vote in a referendum opposed by Madrid.
The position of the Spanish government and most Spanish parties has always been that such a referendum is unconstitutional. The strategy of the Spanish government has been to challenge a plebiscite via the Constitutional Court.
After several requests to hold a negotiated referendum, there has been six consecutive years of mass pro-independence demonstrations on Catalonia’s national day – most recently this weekend. Now the Catalan government has decided to organise an independence referendum unilaterally.
It has already held a symbolic vote on independence in 2014, and a subsequent election that returned a pro-independence majority.
The new referendum has been called for October 1, amid deep political tension between the governments and, within Catalonia, between pro-independence and unionist parties.
The referendum law has already been suspended by the Constitutional Court, and Spain’s attorney general has ordered security forces to prevent any preparations for the vote. However, the Catalan government has announced that it will go ahead and that the vote will be binding.
The situation reflects a debate between legal and democratic legitimacy. In contrast with British unionism, the appeal to unionism in Spain has become a predominantly legal argument.
There are also competing visions of sovereignty and nationhood. The view of a single Spanish sovereignty enshrined in the constitution is supported by all unionist parties except Podemos.
Amid increasing political tension, both
the outcome and consequences of the referendum are uncertain. Two key issues will be turnout and the Spanish Government’s response. Perhaps paradoxically, independence supporters need unionists to get out and vote and take part in the debate.
A turnout of 50 per cent or higher would be a success for the Catalan government, giving the referendum legitimacy and putting the Spanish Government in a difficult position. A turnout similar to the 2014 symbolic vote (36 per cent) would be a defeat for the Catalan Government, probably putting an end to the independence project for some time.
In terms of results, and again paradoxically for the independence movement, a narrow Yes victory would be preferable to a large victory. It would make the vote more legitimate as it would better reflect actual public opinion. The most recent poll suggests that 41 per cent of
Catalans support independence while 49 per cent oppose it.
The Spanish government’s goal is to prevent the referendum – and, if that is not possible or convenient, to encourage as low a turnout as possible. Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has two main options. First, is to seek to prevent the vote using ordinary methods.
This means treating the referendum as a case of civil disobedience and deploying security forces to prevent any preparation for the vote
This would make it difficult for the referendum to be held and could have a negative impact on turnout. Alternatively, Mr Rajoy could seek to prevent the vote using exceptional methods – for example suspending Catalonia’s political autonomy.
This is a double-edged sword, while it could prevent the referendum, it would also be seen by many Catalans as a disproportionate reaction that would
further discredit Spain’s institutions and strengthen the independence cause.
The focus on the constitution is unhelpful because this is a political dispute, not a legal one: it is the very concept of a single Spanish nation which is being contested.
Yet holding an independence referendum opposed by the full weight of the state and which could potentially be hostage to a boycott by most Catalan unionists is not without problems.
Even if turnout is significant and independence wins comfortably, it is unclear how such a mandate could be implemented unilaterally. If the referendum is a success, the Spanish government will face a serious crisis. Yet that currently looks very unlikely.
It reflects a debate between legal and democratic legitimacy