The Netanyahu Doctrinne starts to reshape the Gulf
A POPULAR analogy used by Israeli military intelligence compares Middle East diplomacy to a double decker bus. We, the public, only see the top floor, while underneath there is an array of covert connections (and only occasionally do those downstairs come upstairs and reveal themselves).
This is what happened last week when Israel and the UAE declared they will sign an agreement to normalise relations. The announcement surprised us all, even senior Israeli cabinet ministers. But with the benefit of hindsight there were several markers leading to the breakthrough. They included the UAE’s ambassador attending the unveiling of the Trump plan back in January and his subsequent op-ed published in a leading Israeli newspaper, where he effectively formulated the agreement: forego annexation and we’ll normalise relations. The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office took note.
Prime Minister Netanyahu was quick to declare the agreement “the greatest advancement toward peace between Israel and the Arab world in the last 26 years.” He does indeed deserve credit. Conventional wisdom had it that only with substantial progress in Israeli–Palestinian talks would other Arab states acquiesce in normalisation. The Netanyahu Doctrine has diversified Israel’s international relationships (whilst maintaining US supremacy) across the planet, from Japan, China and India through to countries in Africa and South America.
In expanding this doctrine to the Arab world, Mr Netanyahu has successfully removed the Palestinian veto over advancing bilateral ties.
The convergence of strategic interests shared by Israel and pragmatic Sunni states starts with shared concerns over Iran — their nuclear ambition, missile development and aggressive regional posturing. Ironically, in recent years, just when Mr Netanyahu was vexing the Europeans (and the Obama administration) by harshly criticising the JCPOA nuclear agreement, he was gaining more admirers in the region for articulating their concerns.
Clearly Israel has plenty to share when it comes to intelligence gathering, cyber-security and military hardware. Normalisation could also include commercial ties, medical cooperation and eventually even tourism. However, Mr Netanyahu’s proudly declared framing of “peace for peace” may be missing the price that Israel will pay.
The stated price of the deal — giving up on annexation (the application of sovereignty to parts of the West Bank) appears a very good deal as few in Israel ever thought it would be implemented. Mr Netanyahu has upset some of his right wing base and large parts of the settler leadership but this is a cost he can absorb as he remains, for now, the only viable candidate for prime minister on the right.
The second cost is unclear but there are reports Mr Netanyahu gave his consent for the US to sell F-35 fighter planes to the UAE, which would appear to threaten Israel’s much guarded qualitative military edge. While he has dismissed these claims as “fake news”, the details — and the truth — remain obscure. It could be that both sides are right. In other words, there is no formal agreement within the deal but instead unstated understandings on the matter.
President Trump also deserves some credit as it is unlikely that the deal would have happened without his insistence. The timing, with the optics of a peace treaty being signed at the White House weeks before the US election, is not entirely coincidental.