Flow charts and lists make for a very businesslike war against Hamas
“I USED to be a romantic when it came to warfare,” said an Israeli general this week. “As a company and brigade commander, I wanted to be at the head of my men on the battlefield. That’s how I felt until my early thirties. But by the time I was 35, I began to see things differently. Perhaps because I had children. And the romance moved aside. Now I prefer to do things the other way round.”
The general — like his colleagues in the IDF — is just slightly bewildered at the public response, both in Israel and abroad, to the week-and-a-half of warfare between Israel and Gaza. From abroad, most of the response has been horror and condemnation of the civilian casualties, the families buried under their homes in Israel’s bombings and the dozens of children killed. To which the general responds that “any other army operating in a dense urban environment would have killed many more civilians. And don’t kid us, we’ve studied how NATO armies operated in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.” They see the total figure of deaths put out by the Health Ministry in Gaza, 220 by Wednesday night, and shrug. It could have been much higher.
From the Israeli public, the response has been of course very different. Most Israelis are rather underwhelmed by the IDF’s Operation Guardian of the Walls so far. Why haven’t any truly senior Hamas figures been killed yet, they want to know? Why is the assessed number of Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters killed so far, about 150, so paltry? And how come the deadly rockets are still flying towards Israel in such large numbers?
Putting aside the stark difference between western and Israeli sensitivities and sensibilities, neither public fully grasps the way the IDF is waging this campaign.
The generals in charge of Southern Command and the Operations Directorate reckoned a few years back that the next major confrontation in Gaza would probably happen with little warning, as a result of a miscalculation on either side, and escalate rapidly and then be over after a few days. So rather than set themselves unrealistic goals, such as taking out the top leaders, who would be in a bunker under some untouchable civilian building, or taking out each of the thousands of rocket launchers, they settled on an objective of “degrading Hamas capabilities,” prepared detailed lists of targets according to military priority, and in batches they could deal with in one day-and-night. And since last Monday evening, when Hamas launched its first salvo of rockets towards Jerusalem, they’ve been making their way down the list.
Top of the list were the rocket-pits where the less manoeuvrable multilaunchers were stationed. But only if they were not under civilian homes. Hamas’ tunnel networks and weapons-manufacturing sites were next. Then came their research departments (some masquerading as tech companies) and intelligence offices (in the Gaza City multi-stories and the homes of Hamas commanders which double as operation centres).
It’s a business-like way of making war, with flow-charts, standard procedures and in-house legal experts authorising the targets and attack protocols well in advance. The generals seem very satisfied with it. They certainly prefer it to a messy ground offensive with thousands of casualties.
Satisfying the Israeli public and dealing with western opinion are another matter.
WHO GOT IT WRONG?
So who miscalculated and why? The Israeli assessment is that the decision was taken by Hamas’ political leader in Gaza, on the spur of the moment, literally on the day. According to this theory, Yahya Sinwar thought he had a unique opportunity to capitalise on the clashes between Israeli police and Palestinian demonstrators at Al Aqsa mosque, and on the anger among Palestinians with President Mahmoud Abbas for indefinitely postponing the parliamentary elections two weeks earlier. Sinwar, goes the Israeli thinking, didn’t reckon with such a devastating Israeli response. That’s the miscalculation that he made.
But the Israelis still think that he’s in charge in Gaza, and that his overarching strategy remains to pursue a long-term truce with Israel and try to get it and Egypt to agree to a gradual reopening of Gaza to the world.
This is a slightly self-serving assessment, as it tallies with the prevailing Israeli view before the fighting began (which I wrote about here last week), that Hamas was “deterred” and Sinwar was focusing on diplomacy. At least one veteran Hamaswatcher on the Palestinian side
It’s a businesslike way of making war, with flowcharts’
agrees with Israeli intelligence that Hamas’ aim was to capitalise on both the Al Aqsa clashes and the election cancellation — with one key difference. He believes that Sinwar wasn’t the one who miscalculated. Instead, he was out-voted by Mohammed Deif, commander of Hamas’ military wing, and the “outside” leaders, Ismail Haniyeh and Salah al-Arouri, who are behind the decision to launch the rockets.
The fact that Hamas has been appealing for a ceasefire since last week is proof that they realised soon enough they had overreached.
Sinwar’s policy, once he emerges from his bunker after the ceasefire, whether he tries to go back quickly to diplomacy or constructs a new identity as the Palestinians’ warlord, will indicate whose mistake it was.
ONE POLITICAL WINNER
● Benjamin Netanyahu is also frustrated with the generals. They gave him a streamline battle plan but no tangible “victory picture” to end this confrontation. Just numbers of targets destroyed. As this is being written on Wednesday night, there are no clear details of a ceasefire, at least not one that Israel has publicly agreed to, though the expectations are that there will be a ceasefire by the weekend.
At least he has gained politically. Naftali Bennett has given up on the government he almost formed with Yair Lapid.
Officially, the reason was that he thought on Thursday night that to quell the rioting between Arabs and Jews in Israel’s “mixed” towns, the army would need to be sent in and there was no way the Arab parties, which would have to support the new government in some way, would agree to that.
The real reason is that from the moment the rioting began, his colleagues in Yamina, led by his righthand woman Ayelet Shaked, told him there was no way they were going to be part of a government supported by Arab parties.
The rioting has died down, and the ceasefire is around the corner. But Lapid will have barely a week-anda-half left of his mandate to form a government and with Bennett gone, it’s looking almost impossible.
Not that Netanyahu has a better chance, but he’s still prime minister for the time being.
So yes, unless something drastic happens over the next month — Gideon Sa’ar mending fences with his nemesis Netanyahu, or the ultraOrthodox parties abandoning their old ally — Israel is on the way to a fifth election in the early autumn.
And after 10 days or so of rockets and riots, being in an election campaign again will feel just like getting back to normal.
Even reassuring.
Israel is on the way to a fifth election in early autumn’