TABLE3:TAUNTON TO PADDINGTON
PowercarsNos.43053 Paddingtonon Dawllsho, 43098/43xxx 2+8/274/290/430 OS.OPSenzanc-ePaddington February14,2019
Heaton
J0 4½ 6½ 000 422 622 930 1525 1832 2045 23 05 2430 2717 3033 3207 33 59 35 57 802xxx 802019+ 802020 9/430/455 10/501/525 OS.OPSenzance-Paddington 04.58Penzance-Paddington -/-2019 December19,2019
J Heaton J Heaton 1L-/96
88
99
97
100
86
95
86/97
70tsr68 24½ 99 27[1] 96 31 89 32½ 106
109/88 0 4½ 6½ 18½ 36½ (½) 42½ 000 434 7 21
1615 1919 21 32 2347 25 OS 2804 3112 3243 ½E-/90 S0tsr48 0 4½ 6½
102/88
89/96
94
86 73/70tsr24½ 100/102 27[1] 99 32 90/- 33½ 18½ 000 409 609 922 15 23 1825 2039 22 54 2419 2716 3031 32 04 3400 35 59 4023 4140 4342 4700 4954 53 24 SS37 5855 ½L-/95 86/99 98/94 97/96 103
87/96
95
86/95 70tsr 69 90/102 98
86
102 108/87 101 106/110 93/99 84/70 89/91/72 74 90/103 101
Penzance progressively improved from the
05.07 ofl982 to 05.21 by 1990 and 1991 when the fastest origin to destination schedule of279min was advertised. The 180min time from Plymouth eventually became just 175min in 1997, but the Penzance to Paddington at that stage was 280min.
Table 2 shows a run from that 1990 peak of timetabling ambitions. Was it realistic?
On September 27, driver BillHartis of Exeter left Taunton just a few seconds late. His schedule showed 2min recovery time for the 106.73 miles to Reading and his weekly notices warned that temporary speed restrictions (tsrs) were in force - 40mph, 60mph and 20mph that could easilycost 5min. That would mean punctuality hinged on finding a path through Reading when running about 3min late and then claiming the 5min chunk of recovery time just before the terminus. The driver was determined to get time in hand for the temporary speed restrictions and ran at speeds of up to 13mph over the maximum permissible speeds, unthinkable in modern circumstances.
The run is shown in RM)s September
2004 Practice & Performance, but only as far as Reading, repeated here with the high-speed extension to Paddington added. Despite two signal checks costing 3min, the flight up to Paddington was eye-wateringly fast, the 5min recovery time enabling a 6min early arrival - this on the fastest of the 'Golden Hind' schedules after delays had absorbed all the timetabling allowances. The net time was a shade more than 87min, although this means little in a situation where the running would have been easier in more favourable circumstances.
Imbalance
I had left railway employment by this time so I was no longer responsible for Exeter drivers.
It was a huge pleasure to have managed Bill Harris. He was a man of relativelymature years whom I knew to be keen, motivated, skilfuland sharp of mind. I did not know he was quite this fast though. Some would criticise these excessive speeds and others the early arrival, but the imbalance in the schedule meant the only way to achieve punctuality was to pass Reading on time and pocket the excessiverecovery allowance to Paddington as its dissipation made no sense in the morning business arrivalpeak.
Some six months later I again found myself in the hands of driver Harris on the 'Hind'.
Delay had been predicted from installing axle-counters on the Dawlish sea wall section so the Berks and Rants (B&H) had been deliberately cleared of temporary restrictions.
Bill Harris left Taunton llmin late and ran much as the log published here, but with the benefit of a clear run. He passed Reading in 66min 57sec (also shown in RM Sept 2004) to reach Paddington in 88min 09sec, lmin early.
On one 'Golden Hind' trip, perhaps five years ago and when it was in a poor seam of form, the brakes came on yet again.
businessman sitting across the aisle from me put his phone to one side and remarked, "When I first moved to Taunton, 30 years ago, this train was never late." Not entirely true, but the absolute priority accorded to it was based not only on operational criteria, but also in the knowledge this train was used by opinion formers and would represent their view of rail travel.
The schedule employed some gamesmanship from time to time. During the HST years of the
A
'Golden Hind' its load was increased from a 2+7 formation to 2+8, requiring marginally longer sectional running times. The authorities of the time felt that this required the now sub-standard 2+7 running times to be continued, whereas a simple rebalancing of normally excessiverecovery time would have sufficed.
There were also some occasions in Privatisation where the working time arrival at Paddington was a minute or two later than the advertised 10.00. The dividing line between gamesmanship and cheating is both narrow and ill-defined.
Other factors influencing the running time came from the period when the train was decelerated to 110mph, costing 75sec, to avoid the provision of two drivers. Restrictive practice or safety requirement? I guess that depends on whether you think the second driver provides another set of eyes or a potential distraction.
It was back in 2005 when the 'Golden Hind' suffered a major change in its fortunes; a change that it did not need hindsight to detect.
For 41 years the 'Golden Hind' had run non-stop through the Up main through road on the flat junction at Reading. For much of that time the train had priority over other trains so it was relatively easy to ensure a gap in Down trains, but the situation became complicated when the franchisee decided a traffic stop was necessary.
Traditionalists bemoan the extra stop, but there was a gap in Reading trains from 'Taunton and west thereof' that needed filling as the Thames Valleyinformation technology industry grew, as well as demand for access to Oxford and the airports. On the other hand, increased main line frequencies meant the availabilityof a clear run across the flat junction to a vacant platform was compromised.
Furthermore, the timing of the new stop was the first main line train that off-peak ticket holders could use, resulting in station overtime and overcrowding. With the greater frequency ofB&H London trains nowadays, perhaps removal of the stop could be considered?
In the first year of the Reading stop, the timings were 292/185min, with the 07.00 Plymouth departure altered by the customer
"Thedriver was determined to get time in hand for the temporary speed restrictions and ran at speeds of up to 13mph over the maximum permissible speeds, unthinkable in modern circumstances."
focused privatised operator to 06.55 but the 10.00 arrival safeguarded.
This was the top of a slippery slope.
Three years later the timings were 298/188min with a 10.03 arrival. Now the bimode IETs, usually 2xClass 802s running on electric power from a changeover on the move at Newbury, are indulged with a 301/187min schedule.
Table 3 shows an HST run from Taunton to Paddington, including the Reading stop, compared to with an two IETs in the electrification period, the latter being on the current schedule with its 04.58 start. Not even 05.00!
Sacrificed
These examples have been chosen on the relatively random basis of being the latest of each category I have timed, with the intention of reflecting typical performance. Note the propensity of the Paddington approaches so often to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory when it comes to punctuality.
At Reading, both trains used the remodelled route below the Bristol line to reach a vacant platform. In theory this costs an extra ½min, but should save the regular heavy delays over the flat junction.
Unfortunately, the full benefit has been sacrificed as the 'Golden Hind' now suffers the ultimate indignity for any Class 1 train - scheduled signal stop for lmin (in addition to 2min pathing from Southcote Jct to the Reading stop). How the mighty are fallen.
There was even a suspicion the 'Golden Hind' had lost its title in December 2019 as it ceased to be announced on board or on the stations I use - it was even omitted from Great Western Railwaypocket timetables.
aHowever, the last vestige of its identity clings to survival as a footnote in the electronic Network Rail public timetable. Dwell times at Reading are now much longer than they once were, but at least the electric starts save a full minute on HST timings, reaching 125mph by Twyford as opposed to Maidenhead. One of the Table 3 logs attained speeds reminiscent of another more cavalierage.
The Down train has been booked at between 17.30 and 18.04 from Paddington. Because it is easier for passengers to plan outward journeys rather than return trips, the Down 'Golden Hind' has not shared the same profile as the Up run.
The train was never scheduled to reach Plymouth in three hours and improved on the 5hr barrier to Penzance for just fiveyears from 1988 with fastest timings ofl85/29lmin, all during nationalised ownership. The current schedule timed for an IET is 194min to Plymouth and 307min Paddington to Penzance.
The 'Hind' remains one of the few trains where a full silver service dinner can be taken on a British train, but observation suggests the clientele is drawn from wealthy Cornish property owners rather than business people returning from London meetings.
For simplicity this article has concentrated on Up trains, but two Down journeys stand out in the memory. One featured a 66min 56sec Reading to Taunton run and another when Exeter driver Andy Braund lost no time on the gross schedule between Reading and Exeter, despite having one power car out of action.
Those stories will have to wait for another day.
Thanks are due to Neil Bowmar-Scothern for the loan to the RPS of material recordedbythe
Rer Haines.
■
.... , ~>-., . ,
and economic factors affecting the UK in the early-1980s. press and media pack, seemingly pervaded with a 'music hall joke' style of reporting for railways,did not help matters either.
In 1976, what was the world's fastest dieselpowered passenger rail serviceswere launched on BR's Western Region with the introduction of the lnterCity 125 HSTs.
The '125s' had effectively'let the genie out of the bottle' in terms of demonstrating to passengers in a tangible and consistent form how good Inter-City rail travel could be if the railwayinvested in both route infrastructure and, crucially,in new and modern trains. By 1982 the '125s' had replaced the once-mighty 'Deities' entirely on the East Coast Main Line.
Investment
Following evaluation of the success of both 110mph Inter-City serviceson the electrified West Coast Main Line and the 125mph performance of the IC125's, BR was able to demonstrate that electrifyingthe London King's Cross to Edinburgh route would meet the then 7%rate of return needed for the capital investment required by the Department for Transport. significant part of the justification for the scheme was based on up to a 60% reduction in maintenance costs.
In July 1984, Margaret Thatcher's government permitted British Rail to spend £306million electrifyingthe ECML between Hitchin, Edinburgh and Leeds. There were three main elements to the project, with infrastructure costing £170m, rolling stock £7 4m and motive power £62m. dedicated project team was formed, with the BR Board giving it independence and accountability for the multi-million-pound scheme.
In 1980, BR had decided the time was opportune to consider the development of a 125mph electric passenger locomotive. However, because of internal resource limitations, BR
AAAapproached the UK traction industry with the proposition it would provide a performance specification against which the industry would tender for design and construction.
The locomotive was primarily destined for use on the ECML, where the mainly straight route geometry reduced the advantages of APT running, utilising 9 degrees of cant deficiency over the standard 4.25 degrees. However, the specificationwas deliberately drafted to ensure the locomotive could handle the traffic being hauled over the northern section of the WCML by Class 87 locomotives.
Initially, to contain costs, the design of the locomotive specified was a Bo-Bo. However, serious adhesion problems over Shap and Beattock had been experienced by Class 86 and 87's. Consequently, BR's director of operations persuaded the Traction and Rolling Stock Committee that the specification of the new locomotive should be a Co-Co design.
This led to a prototype 125mph Co-Co electric locomotive being ordered from Brush in May 1982: the Class 89. The locomotive went on to form part of BR's business case to gain approval for the electrification of the ECML which was granted in July 1984. However, what had started as a mixed traffic electric locomotive, with the ability to offer high-speed haulage on the ECML and heavy haulage over the undulating northern sections of the WCML, became confused and was overtaken by other developments within BR. This was compounded with the development and construction by Brush being more than a year late David Rollin was appointed as project director for IC225. In February 1985, the then director of InterCity Cyril Bleasdaleleft a hand written note on a dusty table for Mr Rollin: "The project director's life is a lonely one. You have the difficult and important task of writing the conversion case from the Class '89' to the Class '91' for the ECML in three weeks. Good luck." -