>> Guscott: Lions move reminded me of Bath
“Having a first and second playmaker is key to a team employing the screen-pass successfully”
THE Sean O’Brien try against New Zealand in the first Test was the best of the series – and one of the best in any Lions series. It was a spectacular counter-attack which was crucial in the context of the 2017 tour because it showed that the Lions were capable of doing exactly what New Zealand are renowned for.
The way that Liam Williams fielded Aaron Cruden’s kick, and then wrongfooted the closest All Black chaser – Kieran Read – before setting off on a brilliant counter-attacking run which saw him link with Jonathan Davies and Elliot Daly, before Davies and O’Brien rounded it off sent New Zealand a clear warning. Simply, that they could not afford to underestimate the Lions attack.
It was not just the first vindication of Warren Gatland’s back three selection of Williams, Daly and Anthony Watson, but also confirmation of the attacking intent that we have seen Northern Hemisphere sides develop since their failure to secure a single semi-final place at the 2015 World Cup.
In a broad sense the attacking pattern that the 2017 Lions employed was similar to the diamond shape that was in vogue a couple of years ago. It also shared strong similarities with the two wave attacking line that we had in my day. Off phase ball we always tried to have a front line attack of 10 – 12 – 13, and a second line behind them of any back row and blindside wing.
At that time it was not so much a pass behind the back of an attacking player to the second wave as it is today, as a pass in front of the receiver – simply because a player in front of the ball was invariably seen as obstruction.
At Bath we had a move called ‘worldclass’, which Stuart Barnes had picked up and introduced. It was used mainly from a scrum and involved the ball being moved to him at fly-half, and then passed to me in the inside-centre position, having moved there from my usual post at outside-centre.
The aim was Barnsey would zip a flat lateral pass which I would run alongside and off of. What I loved was that I could drift and take the ball late, and as I did so the blindside wing was tracking my run arching in behind. This meant that if there was a gap I could take it and have a support runner on my shoulder for a pop pass to beat the last defender. The blindside wing would either run through to score, or pass to the touchline to put the openside wing over.
However, the real beauty of the move is that if you froze it when the fly-half got the ball he had numerous options. This is because with the 10 fixing his opposite number, the 13 fixing their 12, the 15 fixing their 13, and the insidecentre creating uncertainty with the lateral run, one or more of the defenders would mess up or be caught in two minds because of confusion about where to go to cover all the bases.
In those circumstances if all the attackers are tuned-in they will pass to exploit the defensive mistake. It could be an early pop-pass from the 10 to the blindside wing coming off an arcing run to slice through the middle. Or it could be to use the inside-centre as a decoy before putting the 15 or 13 through a gap.
That ‘world class’ set-piece has been moved in the modern game into phase play, and trying to keep that diamond shape. This means that you have a player who can take the short ball, or another who can come from deep, or a receiver out wide, to keep the defence guessing.
We had a great example of this with Conor Murray’s momentum-swinging try at the end of the second Test in Wellington. In earlier games, including the first Test, the Lions had used a screen pass behind the back of, say, Ben Te’o, so that instead of him taking the ball it went to a second receiver behind him.
For the Murray try, Jamie George took the Te’o line, and because the defence had drifted onto the second receiver anticipating a pass to him, when George came onto Johnny Sexton’s pass on a closer line he shot straight through the gap. The All Black defence never recovered, and Murray’s clever break from George’s quick recycle rounded it off.
When the Lions had Sexton at first receiver and Owen Farrell at second receiver the diamond shape generally worked well, whereas with Te’o it worked less well. That may be because he is still learning Union timings, but because it is similar to the shape of a Rugby League attack he should be able to do it in his sleep.
Having a first and second playmaker is key to a team employing the screenpass successfully, but it is also about everyone realising the potential of it when you are in phase play. The more players you have who are comfortable ball-in-hand, the more likely it is to work effectively.
The other side of the equation is that you are unlikely to play this way if you have a crash-ball carrier at insidecentre, because if he cannot distribute it does not work. That’s why teams who want to play like this sometimes take so long to get their attacking shape in order that they miss simple overlaps.
For instance, how many times did we see the Lions make a break, but then fail to walk the ball over the line? Likewise, England sometimes try too hard to get the right players in the right places, rather than playing what is in front of them.
Wales have tried to use the diamond formation, but Jamie Roberts is not really used to it – although they might have more luck with Scott Williams because of the way the Scarlets attack. At Bath with Brian Ashton, and for the Lions with Ian McGeechan, we always had those smoke-and-mirror options that the diamond shape gives you.
New Zealand have depended on making their counter-attack as good as attack from great first-phase ball for a long time now. They are so clinical when they attack from deep off turn-overs or poor opposition kicks because they have practised it so much.
What the All Blacks also target is ruthlessly exploiting a back-pedalling defence off quick ball, using precision pass and draw tactics until they get an overlap. However, what they have not been confronted with very often is a team like the Lions, which – because it was as fit as New Zealand – managed to realign its defence so quickly.
The Lions kept reloading their defence so quickly that at times the All Blacks were confused, and this was added to because of the effectiveness of Jonathan Davies as a rush defender. It may explain why, when the Barrett brothers combined to give Julian Savea a scoring pass early in the Third Test, he dropped it.
I doubt it will take New Zealand long to see whether the screen-pass/diamond shape system employed by the Lions works for them. At the moment they do not employ it to the same extent as the Lions and England, but given the skillset of their players it is something that you would expect them to master very quickly if they want to.
One of the great things about this Lions tour is that it has helped to restore the balance in the game by putting a strong emphasis on attack, and revisiting strategies that create uncertainty in defences.