‘ Exaggerated’ personal injury claims cannot be dismissed

Scotland has no defence of ‘ fundamental dishonesty’, says Andrew Constable

In the case of Grant Grubb v John Finlay, Mr Grubb had been sitting in his stationary car in a petrol station in Dundee when Mr Finlay reversed his car into the front of Mr Grubb’s car at 4mph. Mr Grubb sued and claimed £ 500,000 for injury to his cervical spine.

He claimed the injury prevented him from working as a chef and he required assistance around the house. Although Mr Finlay accepted he was at fault for the accident he denied that Mr Grubb had been seriously injured. Mr Finlay advanced the argument that Mr Grubb was being fundamentally dishonest in the presentation of his claim and therefore the case should be dismissed.

He relied on a number of examples of Mr Grubb’s dishonesty, including that Mr Grubb had pretended to be his father in communication with insurers so that a cheque for the damaged car would be sent to him; he told doctors that he was unable to drive due to his injuries, but it was discovered that he had actually been convicted of driving without insurance on three occasions after the accident and he also told medical experts that he had been unable to return to work and his employment was terminated, when in fact he had been dismissed for gross misconduct.

In an effort to try and address apparent public concern over rising insurance premiums fuelled by spurious personal injury claims the government passed the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. The Minister of Justice at the time, Lord Faulks, said there was “an epidemic of people claiming in circumstances that most right thinking people would find deeply unattractive”. Crucially, however, the Act does not apply in Scotland. The Act provides English and Welsh defenders with the defence of “fundamental dishonesty”.

Even if the court finds a person is entitled to damages as the result of an