May takes a (short) break from Brexit with a European getaway
● Think-tank says register would avoid Windrush-style errors ● Brexit is good time to alter immigration and border policies
Prime Minister Theresa May and her husband, Philip, visit Desenzano del Garda on Lake Garda, Italy, during their summer holiday. Meanwhile, think-tank Policy Exchange has called for sweeping reforms to the UK’S immigration system to rebuild public confidence in the wake of the Brexit vote.
British citizens should be able to sign up to a national identity system being rolled out for European Union residents after Brexit to avoid losing their rights if another Windrush-type scandal happened, a think-tank has said.
The report from Policy Exchange calls for sweeping reforms to the immigration system to rebuild public confidence in the wake of the Brexit vote, including the controversial idea of a national identity registry and an amnesty for illegal immigrants.
It comes as the UK government prepares to reveal its plans for the future of immigration policy after Brexit by the end of the year, with growing calls for Scotland to get more powers over how migration is managed.
EU citizens already in the UK will have to pay £65 and join a registration scheme if they wish to stay in Britain after the end of the transition period on 31 December, 2020 under changes announced by Home Secretary Sajid Javid.
Around 3.6 million Europeans living in the UK are expected to begin the process of requesting “settled status” in the coming months.
Those securing settled status will have their details held by the government so they can prove their right to employment and public services.
In the report, David Goodhart, Policy Exchange’s head of demography, immigration and integration, suggested the scheme should be widened to Britons, initially on a voluntary basis.
He said: “We strongly recommend reopening the debate about ID management to reassure people that we know who is in the country, for how long, and what their entitlements are. A proper national ID system would have prevented the harassment of the Windrush victims.”
The Policy Exchange paper argues that Brexit is the perfect time to find new ways of controlling national borders and managing migration.
It also suggested an amnesty for illegal immigrants who have been in the UK for ten years or more, and reforms to allow applications for asylum from outside the UK, as well as private sponsorship of asylum seekers and refugees.
Citizenship application fees should be reduced from £1,500 per person and almost £5,000 for a family with two children to a level “more closely aligned to public policy, not just revenue needs”, the report said.
However, Policy Exchange also called for a tougher immigration removals process, deporting those refused the right to stay before they can judicially review their cases, and said more cash should be set aside to pay illegal immigrants to leave the UK.
The report calls for a joint scheme involving the Department for International Development to help those deported from the UK to set up businesses in their countries of origin.
There should be a single “command” responsible for securing the UK’S sea borders, and more investment in border staff, patrol boats, and detection systems for lorries at Calais and Dover. Rail operators should also have to provide the same information as airlines, the report argued.
The idea of a national ID system for British citizens remains controversial. A £5 billion national identity card scheme was introduced by the last Labour government in 2006, but a bill to scrap it was the first legislation introduced by Theresa May when she became home secretary in 2010.
Mr Goodhart added: “While a general amnesty for the estimated 500,000 illegal residents here would send the wrong signal, some form of regularisation should also be considered for those who have been here for more than ten years, who are now parts of their communities with ties to the UK and often become the focus of grassroots campaigns.”
A Home Office spokesman said: “We are pursuing an ambitious programme of reform at the border as well as investing in new capability to improve passenger experience. Border Force invested £63.5 million in new technology and capability in 2017-18 and £90.4m in the two previous years combined.
“Decisions on the future immigration system will be based on evidence.
“This is why we have asked the independent Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) to advise on the economic and social impacts of the UK’S exit from the EU and also on how the UK’S immigration system should be aligned with a modern industrial strategy.”
“We recommend reopening the debate about ID management to reassure people that wek now who is in the country and what their entitlements are.”
DAVID GOODHART
Since 2004, thousands of EU nationals have travelled to Scotland each year, mainly taking on lower-skilled jobs, despite often having high levels of education. Many have stayed on, raising families and contributing to their local communities.
In contrast to Uk-wide targets for lowering migration, political leaders, local authorities and civil society organisations in Scotland agree that the country needs to continue to attract and retain migrants if it hopes to meet a range of social, economic and population goals for the future.
Our recent report found that policymakers must consider the combination of goals they wish a new immigration policy to achieve. Crucially, they must also take account of the varied needs and choices of migrant workers and the attractiveness of the UK as a destination.
As Brexit negotiations grind on, it seems highly likely that an end to free movement will be part of whatever deal is reached – or no deal, even. This raises concerns about how Scotland and other parts of the UK will recruit sufficient labour, particularly for lower-skilled and low-paid jobs in areas such as social care, agriculture, food processing, construction and hospitality.
Until now, a significant proportion of these jobs have been filled by workers from the EU. Even before Britain has left the EU there have been difficulties. Nurses and care workers from Europe have left the UK in higher numbers since 2016. In agriculture, difficulties recruiting workers to the soft fruits sector have resulted in considerable losses as produce rots unpicked in the fields.
Current proposals for managing immigration for these kinds of jobs after Brexit are short-term schemes with restrictions that require migrants to leave the UK at the end of their stay. This is in marked contrast to the open-ended flexibility provided by free movement which has included rights to change employer, access to benefits, rights to family reunion, and relatively straightforward opportunities to settle.
Our report reviews a range of options available to policymakers when designing programmes to manage migration for lower-skilled jobs. Drawing on case studies from other industrialised countries such as Canada, Germany, Spain and Sweden, it shows that a variety of possibilities, incorporating different “bundles” of rights and restrictions, exist. Future immigration policy will have an impact not only on the types of migrants who are willing to come to, or settle in, Scotland but, perhaps more worryingly, on the country’s ability to attract migrant workers at all.
The report shows how the flexibility of free movement has shaped decisions made by EU migrant workers and their families over recent years. Younger, unattached migrants and those coming for a short term to earn better wages are unlikely be put off by restrictions on length of stay, access to welfare or family rights.
However, a desire to settle long term often emerges over time, and an overly restrictive system, especially if perceived to be unfair or complicated, may encourage overstaying of visas and other undocumented forms of migration and irregular migrant employment.
If longer-term stays are desired as a policy goal – as is the case in Scotland – then social and family rights are crucial. Families with young children and those seeking to settle are those most likely to be deterred by a more restrictive system. In many rural areas of Scotland, where migrants are overwhelmingly employed in lower-waged jobs, it is precisely the combination of social and economic rights allowed by free movement that has encouraged and facilitated their longer-term settlement.
Whatever programme is adopted after Brexit, the UK as a whole and Scotland will have to compete with other countries for migrant workers. For EU citizens, other countries within the EU where free movement still exists will become more attractive. And if entry requirements to the UK become as complex as those in other English-speaking countries such as the US, Canada or Australia, which offer warmer climates and stronger economies, these may also emerge as competition, especially for younger migrants with good English.
If EU citizens become less willing to take up jobs in the UK, this might be offset by recruiting immigrants from further afield. But employers, local communities and service providers would have to make (perhaps costly) adjustments to accommodate such a shift. Looking to the future, policymakers, employers and local authorities will need to balance a range of labour market, social and population goals in developing new immigration policies.
Crucially, they must also consider how different programmes are likely to affect migrant decisions on mobility and settlement. A shift to a more restrictive system is likely to have substantial negative long-term effects on the supply of EU citizens into lower-skilled jobs.
This will likely have wider knockon effects for particular industries and for local communities. A recent study exploring the potential impact on the agricultural sector in Scotland found that nearly two-thirds of farmers would have to switch to other agricultural activities or diversify into non-agricultural activities. Meanwhile, falling recruitment to the social care sector could worsen an already looming crisis in social care as Scotland’s population ages and more and more people need care.