Chilcot and the ICC

Sir John Chilcot’s inquiry into the invasion and conduct of the Iraq War has taken a painfully long time: about as long, in fact, as the entire six-year period (until the withdrawal of British troops in 2009) that it is examining. For the families of the 179 service personnel who died in the conflict, and the many more who were wounded, the wait has been agonising. But this Wednesday, when Sir John finally delivers his report, they will at last get some answers.

The nation, too, is entitled to know: were our Armed Forces knowingly dispatched to the desert battlefield under false pretences? Was the intelligence that proved crucial in accelerating the build-up to war wilfully distorted? And most important, who was to blame for the evident failures, both in the lead-up to the invasion and in planning for its aftermath, too?

These are the crucial, strategic points. Yet, astonishingly, at the International Criminal Court (ICC), it is still individual soldiers who find themselves in prosecutors’ crosshairs. The ICC has confirmed that it will examine the Chilcot findings in order to bolster its case against service personnel accused of abusing Iraqi civilians. What the ICC will not do, however, is use the report’s findings to judge whether, potentially, to begin proceedings against those who unleashed the dogs of war in the first place, notably Tony Blair.

To any right mind, it seems insultingly obvious that this is the wrong way around. Naturally, troops should behave, and be punished if they do not. But if there are war crimes charges to be answered, we must look above all to the motivation and deliberations of those who initiated the battle, not those who risked all to fight it.