German self-interest leaves reputation in the dirt
Chancellor is sending out mixed messages on how far country will go to help Ukraine repel Russians
‘There have been suggestions that the US and UK want to keep the war going in the hope it will bring down the Putin regime’
The cartoon said it all. A bedraggled German eagle lay in a pile of manure, while the Ukrainian president sat high above it on a horse. “Thanks Mr Zelensky,” said the eagle. “Do you need any more fodder for your high horse?”
Mitteldeutsche Zeitung, a German newspaper, does not usually attract much attention beyond its home city of Halle, but this drawing went around the world on social media.
It summed up a week that has been Olaf Scholz’s toughest since he became chancellor last year, and has left Germany’s reputation damaged.
Six weeks ago, at the start of the Russian invasion, Mr Scholz seemed to have transformed Germany. He tore up Angela Merkel’s policies, ditching the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, pledging €100 billion to rearm Germany, and overturning a ban on supplying arms to Ukraine. But that was a distant memory by the end of a week as Germany was being accused of acting selfishly by blocking an embargo on Russian oil and gas and sitting on its hands over heavy weapons deliveries.
It all came to a head when Ukraine declined to entertain Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German president, and told him brusquely he was not welcome in Kyiv.
Mr Zelensky may have been getting on his high horse as far as Mitteldeutsche Zeitung was concerned, but there was no mistaking the damage to Germany’s reputation – and even Mr Scholz’s allies began to turn on him.
“The problem is in the chancellery,” said Anton Hofreiter, a prominent backbencher in Mr Scholz’s coalition partner party, the Greens. “I have the impression that Mr Scholz is not aware of the serious damage he is doing to Germany’s reputation in central Europe, in eastern Europe, basically in the whole of Europe. He must finally show some leadership.”
At the start of the week, Ukraine was optimistic it would secure heavy weaponry from Germany. It had ordered 100 decommissioned Marder infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), at its own expense, from the German supplier Rheinmetall. But Rheinmetall said the decommissioned vehicles for Ukraine needed repairs and could take months to deliver. It proposed a solution: Germany could hand over functional Marders from its own military stocks immediately, and replace them with the decommissioned vehicles once they were repaired.
But there was a shock rejection from the German defence ministry. “I have to honestly say that we have reached a limit when it comes to deliveries from Bundeswehr stocks,” said Christine Lambrecht, the German defence minister. “The troops must be able to guarantee the defence of the country and the alliance.” Privately, Ms Lambrecht was said to be unhappy with the decision but under “strict orders from the chancellor”.
To get around this, the German government late on Friday announced that it would provide more than a billion euros in military aid to Ukraine, allowing Kyiv to use the funds to buy weapons directly from arms firms.
There are similar problems when it comes to an embargo against Russian oil and gas. Mr Scholz is not prepared to go that far. Germany has reduced its dependence on Russian gas to about 40 per cent, from 55 per cent last year. But cutting it gas off completely could cost Germany €220billion (£181billion) in economic output, analysts said.
It is not simply a question of finding alternative energy sources. The German chemical industry relies on Russian gas as a basic material in the production of everything from car parts to medicines. Without it chemical production could rapidly grind to a halt, and that would damage the German and European economies.
It is a price Mr Scholz does not appear prepared to pay. But his critics say his position remains maddeningly opaque. “I’m ready to bite the bullet, but it’s more like biting cotton wool, because you really don’t know exactly what the chancellor wants. That makes it much more difficult,” said Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, a prominent backbencher from his second coalition partner, the centre-Right Free Democrats (FDP).
On the question of Russian oil and gas, Mr Scholz can at least claim German public support: a recent survey found 57 per cent reject an embargo. But he has no such backing over supplying heavy arms to Ukraine: 55 per cent of Germans support the move, as do some in his government.
Some in Berlin believe Mr Scholz is trying to placate the powerful hard-Left faction of his Social Democrat party (SPD), which remains opposed. But more and more people in the party have begun to speak out in support.
Ukraine’s snub to the German president this week may have been an attempt to play on those divisions. Mr Steinmeier wanted to travel to Kyiv with Poland’s president, Andrzej Duda, and the leaders of the Baltic states but at the last moment he was told Mr Zelensky would not meet him and he was not welcome.
Ukrainian nian anger at Mr Steinmeier is genuine. As Angela Merkel’s foreign minister, he was the architect of Germany’s y’s Russia policy. He was a leading proponent roponent of Nord Stream and had a close se relationship with Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister. Kyiv blames him im for a policy that has left Germany y dependent on Russia.
But the snub nub may also have been a message e to Mr Scholz: it is time to choose e whether to continue on Mr Steinmeier’s einmeier’s path, or to deliver on n his own pledge of a “turning point” in the wake of the Russian an invasion.
Before the rebuff to Mr Steinmeier, er, Mr Scholz was under growing domestic pressure to follow in the footsteps of Boris Johnson and Ursula von der Leyen and travel to Ukraine.
But he clearly didn’t want to go, and the rejection of Mr Steinmeier has given him the perfect excuse.
To go now, when German politicians are fulminating against the “unacceptable affront to our head of state”, would be seen as inappropriate.
Mr Scholz contented himself this week with describing Kyiv’s move as “confusing” and “irritating”, and said he has “no plans” to travel to Ukraine.
This has left his allies and critics alike wondering what is going on in Mr Scholz’s mind.
On a gas embargo, there is at least a motive to protect the German economy. His reluctance to arm Ukraine is harder to exp explain. But there are murmurs in Berlin t that Mr Scholz may not be entirely hap happy with the direction of US and Brit British strategy.
In the immediate afte aftermath of the Russian invasion, the theW West was united in trying to stop the war war. But since Ukraine’s success, there have been suggestions the US and UK want to keep it going i in the hope it will bring down do the Putin regime.
Mr Scholz, Scho some commentators comment say, is committed committ to the
goal of swiftly ending the war and minimising minim casualties – and protecting p German businesses.