The shrinking of Japan

The populations of many developed nations are ageing and reducing in size – but none as fast as Japan’s

How fast is Japan shrinking?

Its population has already been reduced by around a million people in the past five years. In 2006, Japan reached a demographic turning point: deaths outnumbered births for the first time since 1945. Last year, the number of annual births fell to 981,202, while the number of deaths reached 1.3 million – an annual net loss of some 300,000 people, equivalent to a city the size of Newcastle. Japanese statisticians think its population of 126 million will shrink to 105 million by 2050, and to 87 million by 2060. It is already one of the world’s oldest nations, with a median age of 46. By 2040, there will be three senior citizens for every child under 15 – the opposite of the situation in 1975.

Why is it happening?

Excluding Monaco, Japan has the highest life expectancy of any nation – 83.7 – and a very low fertility rate, of 1.45. This situation is in fact not wildly different from that of many developed countries: fertility almost invariably drops as life expectancy grows; Britain’s fertility rate is 1.8 and Italy’s is 1.35. The big difference is that Japan’s immigration rate is ultra-low, and in the postwar period it always has been. In 2015, a mere 1.8% of the Japanese population was foreign – compared with 7% in the US, 8.6% in the UK and 11.1% in Germany.

What will the effects be of the reduction in population?

Population decline and extreme ageing “will profoundly alter” Japan, writes the US demographer Nicholas Eberstadt. Indeed, it already has. Labour shortages hit a 43-year high in 2017, with low-paid sectors such as care work, hospitality, construction and agriculture particularly hard hit. Sales of adult diapers surpassed those of children’s nappies in 2014. Around 400 schools close every year. Unclaimed land and “ghost homes” – akiya – are found all over Japan. A recent report warned that 83,000sq km – an area the size of Austria – could be unoccupied by 2040. Driven by rising welfare spending, Japan’s public debt is more than double its GDP – the largest ratio of any developed nation. And by 2060, about 36% of its population will be 65 or older, requiring vast pension and healthcare spending. “Gradually but relentlessly,” says Eberstadt, “Japan is evolving into a type of society whose contours and workings have only been contemplated in science fiction.”

Why is the fertility rate so low?

Japan’s young people have been blamed for losing all interest in sex and relationships (see box). However, the underlying explanation is probably economic. Japan endured a long economic crisis in the 1990s; since then the economy has grown steadily, if slowly, and unemployment is low. But today, about 40% of the workforce is irregular and precarious, and economic insecurity is a key reason for not having children. Cultural attitudes, meanwhile, remain old-fashioned. Men who don’t have a steady job are not seen as desirable marriage partners. Having children out of wedlock is very rare. And 70% of women who have children stop work; childcare is hard to find and very expensive. In the World Economic Forum’s study of gender parity in the workplace, Japan came 114th out of 144 countries. Similar conditions pertain in other East Asian economies, such as South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, which also have very low birth rates.

Why is there so little immigration?

Geographically remote and culturally homogenous, Japan has long discouraged immigration. Its postwar industrial boom came, almost uniquely, without importing migrant workers on a large scale. Today, policy-makers and most voters think migrants would imperil both Japanese homogeneity and its very low crime rates; they point to Europe’s experience as a cautionary tale. There are 2.3 million long-term migrants in Japan – mostly Chinese, Koreans and Filipinos – and many more on short-term “training” visas, which allow them to work for a limited period of time. The latter group is growing modestly, but the official position of Shinzo Abe’s government is that migration laws will never be loosened.

How does the government intend to tackle the crisis?

The government’s aim is to keep Japan’s population above 100 million: projections are only projections, and if the fertility rate could be raised to close to the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman, the demographic timebomb would be defused. To this end, it has introduced a range of policies, from encouraging shorter hours to taxpayer-funded speed-dating services. PM Abe is committed to “womenomics”: trying to encourage women into the workplace by providing, among other things, longer maternity leave and childcare, so that they are encouraged to have children and to go back to work afterwards; 600,000 new childcare places will have been provided over the five years to 2018. Abe also aims to offset the shrinking labour force by encouraging a “robot revolution”, quadrupling the size of the robotics industry.

Is there an upside to Japan’s predicament?

In Japan people are mostly pessimistic: some analysts even talk of the country’s “extinction”. There could, however, be many advantages to a reduced population – more living space, more arable land per head and a higher quality of life. One think tank envisages the “growth society” evolving into a “mature society”, which enjoys the fruits of growth. But Japan’s predicament isn’t unique; it’s merely leading the way. Most developed countries will follow a similar trajectory. The world population is projected to peak this century and then decline. This will give Japan, with its outstanding hitech sector, a head start in evolving the technologies of the grey future. “Rapid ageing itself is an advantage,” says economist Hiroshi Yoshikawa of the University of Tokyo. “Necessity is the mother of invention!”