What if Kim went to war?

Trump’s White House often talks about its “military options” in confronting North Korea. How might a conflict unfold?

Why is there talk of war?

In the wake of North Korea’s successful test launch in July 2017 of an intercontinental ballistic missile, it was reported that the White House was “very seriously” considering military options against North Korea. Although President Trump is committed to diplomacy for now, and has offered to meet Kim Jong Un (see box), his White House is becoming increasingly hawkish. Last month, Rex Tillerson, a firm proponent of the diplomatic approach to North Korea, was replaced by former CIA director Mike Pompeo, who has warned that Pyongyang is within “a handful of months” of being able to deliver nuclear warheads to the US mainland, and has suggested that the US ought to confront Kim militarily. And Trump’s new national security adviser, John Bolton, recently published an article arguing for a pre-emptive strike against North Korea.

What sort of military options are being considered?

US and South Korean forces have rehearsed plans for a “decapitation strike” on the North Korean leadership in the event of a crisis. Assassinating the hermit kingdom’s paranoid dictator would, though, be extremely difficult. Kim reportedly has 30 residences, each with its own bunker, and takes elaborate precautions to hide his location, moving around only at night. Alternatively, former US officials have briefed that the White House is considering a “bloody nose” attack: a strike to “punch the North Koreans in the nose, get their attention and show that we’re serious”. A broader assault designed to destroy or retard its nuclear programme has also supposedly been mooted.

How would North Korea respond to a limited strike?

It’s hard to say. Experts have long thought that the primary goal of the North Korean regime is to survive, and it knows that it is heavily outgunned by the combined forces of the US and South Korea. So arguably a limited strike, along with a threat that any retaliation would result in the destruction of the regime, might be effective and prevent further escalation. “Will a rational dictator then sort of sit still?” asks Victor Cha, former White House director of Asian affairs. “Possibly. But that’s a big risk to take.” The difficulty is that it would be hard for Kim to judge whether or not the attack was indeed limited. If he feared his survival was at stake, he would hit back hard.

How could Kim counter-attack?

He could devastate Seoul, a city of 25 million people, with his vast arsenal of conventional weapons dug into the mountains just north of the border, a mere 35 miles away. The US Congressional Research Service has estimated that North Korea could hammer South Korea’s capital with 10,000 rounds per minute, and that such a barrage would kill 30,000300,000 people in the opening days of any conflict. The consensus among military planners is that Kim would also try to level the playing field by using his stock of chemical and biological weapons, among the largest in the world. Military historian Reid Kirby concludes that a sustained attack using sarin gas could kill 2.5 million people in Seoul. The Pentagon assumes that its bases in South Korea (it has some 28,500 troops there) would also be among the first targets, as well as those in Japan and the US Pacific territory of Guam.

How would the US react in turn?

As Seoul’s residents raced to the city’s 3,200 bomb shelters, the full might of the Us-south Korean war machine would swing into action. Cruise missiles and jets would be used to hit Kim’s command and control infrastructure, as well as nuclear facilities, military bases, radar systems and artillery. The initial campaign would dwarf the “shock and awe” unleashed on Iraq. The US would at this point almost certainly wish to effect regime change, so a ground war would follow, with 650,000 South Koreans and upwards of 200,000 US servicemen ranged against Kim’s army – which is poorly equipped but 1.2 million strong, including 200,000 special operations troops trained to infiltrate the South via tunnels and mini-submarines. By most estimates, the allies would prevail in a matter of weeks – assuming that neither China nor Russia intervened. But it would be, as James Mattis, the US defence secretary, put it, “the worst kind of fighting in most people’s lifetimes”. Pentagon war games estimate about 20,000 deaths per day in South Korea.

Would Kim use nuclear weapons?

Very likely. In fact, North Korea would probably use nuclear weapons at the beginning of a war – not at the end according to experts, because of the risk of having them knocked out by the enemy. Military strategists call this the “use them or lose them” dilemma. The South Korean port of Busan, which the US would use to ship in its forces, is a likely target. North Korea has some 60 nuclear warheads, enough to kill tens of millions; the US would in theory respond in kind.

How likely is any of this to happen?

Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama all considered preemptive strikes, and rejected them because of the likely consequences. Last year, the US director of national intelligence Dan Coats said that Pyongyang had built up its nuclear weapons “for deterrence, international prestige and coercive diplomacy”, rather than for offensive reasons. And most analysts still think that diplomacy and deterrence are the best policies for the US too. Some US analysts, however – including influential figures in the White House such as Bolton – believe that the risk of allowing North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons capable of targeting American cities is even greater than the risks associated with the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula. And amid the current sabre-rattling, there is a clear risk of one side misreading the other’s belligerent rhetoric, leading to a catastrophic escalation.