Death: a question of numbers
At last, our opinion leaders have begun to quote death rates (per 100,000) as opposed to simple death totals. This is a much-needed improvement – but is it enough? What other factors are likely to affect the number of people dying in a given country, apart from the size of their population? This is a disease that is directly transmitted from human to human; how physically close people live to each other – and how crowded their public transport systems are – must also have an effect on the rate of transmission, and hence on deaths.
Take a basket of seven European countries and the US. In basic “per 100,000” terms, Belgium fares worst (1) and Germany best (8), with the UK firmly holding the centre ground (4). Adjust this ranking for population density and some aspects change dramatically. The US, previously ranked 7, shoots to the naughty step (1); Belgium sinks to a modest 5, and the UK also drops – from 4 to 6. Germany, however, is the best performer on both measures, always at 8.
This adjusted ranking is not “true”. It is not, in itself, of any direct scientific use; but common sense suggests that it may well be closer to an unknowable “truth” than unadjusted figures. There are a host of other factors which undoubtedly have an effect on death rates: age profile, poverty levels, rate of Bame citizens, Vitamin D levels in relation to geographical latitude, obesity – and perhaps a dozen or so more. The full equation would be hugely complex, and vulnerable to wide margins of error.
As a returning GP working on the NHS 111 Covid-19 Clinical Assessment Service, I call on the journalists and others who use such data to challenge our leaders to demonstrate a better understanding of what is going on: there is nothing in such data to justify the question, “Why have we done so badly?” The only useful question that arises from this exercise is perhaps, “Why has Germany [so far] done so well?”
Dr T.G. Maxwell, East Dean, East Sussex challenge to the power of global capital without progressive internationalism. But the current crisis has shown that the idea of the nation and their governments remains powerful among electorates around the world.
Strong progressive nations are the building block for any internationalism that is not the dreaming of a global Left elite. Cliffe writes as though the Left has tried progressive patriotism for the past decade. The Left has largely spurned the idea of the nation, which is why its attempts to engage with public concern on immigration, the EU or the town-city divide have been ineffective. If the Left has no national story, the Right will win again.