The Pentagon papers
Call this thing lessons unlearned
IT’S A big thing during military exercises, or used to be in the Stone Age when we were in uniform. It was called the After-Action Report, and your company, platoon or squad gathered ‘round after a mission and discussed what went right and what went wrong.
Sometimes it was unofficial, with a sergeant standing around in the woods asking questions about what his troopers saw and did. Sometimes it was very much official, with somebody taking notes and recording the discussion.
You’d think that if cadets and corporals could do such, that colonels and generals could, too. But when it comes to the brass, nothing surprises.
The Wall Street Journal reports that the Army pulled in experts (from in and out of the service) to write an “unvarnished history” of the war in Iraq. And, of course, spent a lot of time and money on the project. The U.S. Army doesn’t do much without spending a lot of time and money on it.
The report was to be unclassified. The team on the project spent three years interviewing people. And went through tens of thousands of documents.
The report turned out to be more opus than briefing. The papers said it runs 1,300 pages in two volumes. Surely there are lessons for our service men and women throughout. A general said it contained “by far the best and most comprehensive operational study of the U.S. experience in Iraq between 2003 and 2011.”
And nobody can read it.
The Journal found out that this valuable after-action report, maybe the most valuable to date, is tied up in internal reviews: “Senior brass fretted over the impact the study’s criticisms might have on prominent officers’ reputations and on congressional support for the service.”
We can only imagine what our drill sergeant would say about that. If he knew the Pentagon was holding a non-classified report that may save lives in the next war, he’d turn the clouds over Fort Sill blue with his disapproval.
More than 4,400 Americans died in that war. The general staff owes it to them and their families to discuss publicly what went right and what went wrong, how to improve war-fighting for future soldiers, and have the debate on the record for posterity.
Did war planners think the Iraq War would be over too soon? Remember that Mission Accomplished banner President George W. Bush used in his photo op? Were Americans led to be too optimistic on the timeline?
Did the brass not take the neighborhood seriously enough? Did our generals not plan for interference from Iraq’s neighboring states, which happened almost immediately?
Did we make a mistake by concentrating American forces on large bases in Iraq? President’s Bush’s use of The Surge worked out fine, but should it have been used earlier? Was it a wise decision to start restructuring Army brigades at the start of the war? Could that have waited until we knew what we were in for?
We understand that the U.S. Army, or any branch of the military, is like a large battleship. It doesn’t turn on a dime. But why do these things typically take 5-10 years to finish? Is it because careers may be hurt? Is the Army covering for generals to give them time to retire?
Let’s see the report. Even if it was written by military types, it might make for interesting reading. Maybe life-saving reading.
After-action reviews have never been about assigning blame. But about learning. Surely the generals haven’t forgotten that lesson from their ROTC years.