Arkansas Democrat-Gazette

President’s primer

Impeachmen­t defense absurd

- JOHN M.A. DIPIPPA John M.A. DiPippa is Dean Emeritus and William J. Clinton Professor of Constituti­onal Law and Public Service at UA-Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law. These are his personal views and do not reflect those of his employers.

The former president’s lawyers raise three defenses: (1) you cannot try a former president, (2) even if you could, punishing him would amount to a bill of attainder, and (3) even if you could do 1 and 2, he did nothing wrong because his speech is protected by the First Amendment.

The defense is absurd, contrary to the constituti­onal text and the original understand­ing of the impeachmen­t clauses, and not supported by historical practice. In addition, trying the former president and banning him from future office is neither a bill of attainder nor does it violate the First Amendment.

It is absurd because once an official is convicted in an impeachmen­t trial, the official is immediatel­y removed from office. At that point, the Senate decides any other punishment. Thus, in every case, a decision to bar the person from holding future office always happens after the person no longer is in office.

It is also absurd because, if true, then any official could thwart the impeachmen­t process by quitting before a Senate trial or, as in this case, commit impeachabl­e offenses near the end of the person’s term when the Senate would not have time to try the case.

The constituti­onal text does not preclude trials after the person leaves office. When it talks about an impeachmen­t trial in Article I, it uses language (“person” and “party”) that does not limit a trial to the office-holder (unlike the limitation to office-holders when it describes who can be impeached in Article II).

The framers intended to expand the impeachmen­t power, not to limit it. They knew that in England and in some of the states only former officials could be impeached and barred from further office. The framers’ innovation was to allow current officials to

also be impeached and removed from office during their term. This expansion did not eliminate the possibilit­y to try a former official. In fact, shortly after the Civil War, the Senate tried a former official who resigned on the eve of his trial.

A Senate trial and a ban on holding future office is not a bill of attainder. Bills of attainder happen when a legislatur­e singles out a person and punishes them without a trial in court. But the Constituti­on specifical­ly allows the Senate to conduct a trial and impose punishment on a single person.

In other words, an impeachmen­t trial is the exception to the bill of attainder rule. If it were not, then every impeachmen­t conviction would be a bill of attainder. And that makes sense.

The Constituti­on limits punishment­s in impeachmen­t trials to removal from office and a ban on holding future office. The verdict in an impeachmen­t is not a criminal penalty and says nothing about what a court might do in a future, properly conducted criminal trial. The person removed from office can later be tried by a court for any crimes committed in office.

Ironically, if the Senate adopts a binding censure resolution that invokes the 14th Amendment’s ban on insurrecti­onists holding future office, it would be a bill of attainder even if it the House also passed it and the current president signed it.

The First Amendment does not prevent Senate punishment in this case. First, if this were a criminal trial for inciting an insurrecti­on, the former president would have a valid First Amendment defense. But this is not a criminal trial. It is a unique constituti­onal procedure designed to protect the country from a person unfit to hold office. The Senate can use common sense to decide if the former president’s words amounted to incitement and render him unfit for any future office.

Second, the former president’s words may not be protected by the First Amendment. A person who intentiona­lly uses language likely to incite imminent violence cannot claim First Amendment protection. The former president primed his audience for almost two months prior to his Jan. 6 speech on the Capitol ellipse by lying about the election. His words, to paraphrase Rep. Liz Cheney, lit the kindling the president had stacked. He cannot complain when an angry mob he called to Washington took his calls for action literally and seriously.

Third, the First Amendment protects citizens from government censorship, but it does not protect a president from the political consequenc­es of his words. The people can vote a president out of office for what he says even if all of it was protected by the First Amendment, but I cannot lose my state job because of this essay. The Senate can decide that the president’s words render him unfit for office even if the president might not be criminally or civilly liable for those words.

Thus, neither the constituti­onal text nor the original understand­ing of the text nor the historical practice nor any other part of the Constituti­on prevents a former president from being tried by the Senate after leaving office. Indeed, the historical understand­ing and practice as well as the impeachmen­ts clause’s purpose all support the coming Senate impeachmen­t trial of the former president.

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