Made in Taiwan

He’s done it again . . .

IN 1801, in a letter to the Board of Admiralty, a top leader of the British fleet—Admiral John Jervis, 1st Earl of St. Vincent—made this observation: “I do not say, my lords, that the French will not come. I say only they will not come by sea.”

It turns out he was right. Nowadays, such an assurance would be less than assuring. What with air forces.

The Taiwanese aren’t looking out to sea these days. They are looking overhead. For the ChiComs keep buzzing the free Chinese regularly. Taipei is nervous, and has reason to be.

Not only are jet fighters and bombers being flung across the strait, but insults and warnings as well. Which brings the story back to American leadership.

For some reason, for some unbeknownst and mystifying reason, those responsible for handling the president of the United States can’t seem to get him to understand the meaning of strategic ambiguity and the importance of it when it comes to Taiwan.

Only last year, Joe Biden made the mistake of taking a clear position on Taiwan, and his people had to walk back nearly all of it. This week he repeated the mistake. Not the gaffe. The mistake. On this subject—an important one—he doesn’t appear to be educable.

Since at least 1949, American presidents have been perfectly obscure about what would happen if the Red Chinese on the mainland decided to take Taiwan by force. Questions surrounding the American response to such an invasion have kept Beijing in check—and have kept the peace across the Taiwan Strait for more than one generation.

But this president can’t help himself. He keeps talking. And clarifying. Which seems to be the exact opposite of strategic ambiguity.

In Japan this week, when asked by a pesky reporter, but we repeat ourselves, if the U.S. would defend Taiwan militarily if it’s attacked by mainland forces, President Biden said: “Yes, that’s the commitment we made.”

Oy.

“We agree with the One China policy . . . but the idea that it can be taken by force, just taken by force, is just not appropriate. It would dislocate the entire region and be another action similar to what happened in Ukraine. And so it’s a burden that’s even stronger.”

Of course, immediately after his comments, his press people had to explain and clarify: The president’s comments did not signal a change in policy. Which, of course, they most certainly did, if the president’s words can be taken seriously.

If those running behind the scenes to clarify American policy want to say the president misspoke, or something, that’s one thing. But to say he didn’t say exactly what he just said is to insult the intelligence of the American public. And America’s enemies.

Maybe the best will happen and The Party in Beijing will believe the anonymous clarifiers in the press, and the odd U.S. Cabinet member, who tell the world that Joe Biden didn’t mean what Joe Biden just said. Let’s hope.

Strategic ambiguity has kept the peace in the South China Sea for more than 70 years. And could for another 70 years. For it has a track record of success. If only American presidents can stick to the policy, such that it is. Peace, it’s wonderful.

Any conflict between Red China and the United States would have such devastating effects that nobody even wants to imagine it. Except those who get paid to do so in war games.

There’s nothing wrong with talking up American forces, and giving a tip o’ the hat to the military, and even having live war games with the Taiwanese, just to show some muscle. But for strategic ambiguity to work, the fewer specifics, the better. Let aggressors have to guess. There’s a reason for that old Irish toast, “Confusion to our enemies!”

Such a thing as statesmanlike incoherence does exist. A president named Eisenhower nearly perfected it.

With Joe Biden, we get all the incoherence, but with little statesman. It’s a recipe that could lead to worse things than scrambling behind the scenes at the White House press office.