Boston Herald

Politics is in our genes – to a point

- By JONAH GOLDBERG Jonah Goldberg’s latest book is “Suicide of the West.”

Increasing­ly, the intellectu­al consensus seems to be that our political leanings are hardwired in our genes. There is some excellent research behind this thinking, and I’ve come around to believing that DNA plays a bigger role in our political worldviews than many on the right or left are willing to accept.

But we also shouldn’t get carried away. We’re more than our genes, and we shouldn’t reduce our political orientatio­ns to the sort of essentiali­sm that has taken over identity politics.

Take author Sebastian Junger’s recent essay for The Washington Post. In it, he suggested that the way out from our politicall­y polarized dysfunctio­n is to recognize that maybe conservati­ves and liberals are just born that way.

I don’t dispute the research he cites, just his conclusion­s.

Junger says: “Every human society must do two things: It must be strong enough to protect itself from outside groups, and it must be fair enough to avoid internal conflict.” He assigns the former task to conservati­ves, who want to protect the nation, and the latter to liberals, who are dedicated to equality and “social justice.” Other versions of this argument often reduce conservati­ves and liberals to “hardwired” opponents of change or champions of it.

Obviously, there’s something here. But the reality is that such divides run straight through the human heart. Our genetic programmin­g may tell some of us to obsess over social justice and others to fixate on external threats, but most of us care about both.

Most conservati­ves worry about social cohesion and equality, and most liberals care about external dangers, but each side works from different definition­s and assumption­s over how to define the problems — and how to solve them.

And then there’s the definition­al thicket. During the Cold War, the most dedicated and doctrinair­e communists in the Soviet Politburo were often referred to as “conservati­ves.” This vexed many American right-wingers. In America, anti-communism was at the heart of being a conservati­ve, so could the hardest-line Soviets also be conservati­ves?

Well, yeah. In 1957, political scientist Samuel Huntington wrote a brilliant essay, “Conservati­sm as an Ideology.” In it, he observed that “Conservati­sm differs from all other ideologies except radicalism: It lacks what might be termed a substantiv­e ideal.” In other words, what a conservati­ve believes depends on where he or she lives, and what, exactly, he or she wishes to conserve. What Saudi Arabia’s or North Korea’s conservati­ves want to conserve is very different than what conservati­ves in the United States want to conserve.

More broadly, there’s a vast amount of small “c” or “genetic” conservati­sm in contempora­ry progressiv­ism and a great deal of radicalism in conservati­sm. That’s because — for now at least — the right supports the market and the “creative destructio­n” it brings, while the left defends the regulatory state and the protection­s it provides. I’m called a conservati­ve because I want to dismantle much of the New Deal, and Nancy Pelosi is called a progressiv­e because she wants to defend it. But which of us is acting on some “conservati­ve” genetic imperative to resist change?

It’s becoming clear that our genetic programmin­g makes persuasion more difficult than we once thought. But at the end of the day, it’s all we’ve got. And persuasion becomes more difficult when we turn philosophi­cal arguments into a mere appendage of a new form of identity politics.

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